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Accounts of the shooting differ. Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson testified 
that he first encountered Michael Brown and Dorian Johnson as they walked 
down the middle of Canfield Drive on August 9, 2014.1 Wilson had just finished 
a call for a sick baby at a nearby apartment, during which he heard a call go out 
about a theft in progress at a market on West Florissant Street. Wilson was not dis-
patched to the theft scene, and he had heard only parts of the communication over 
his portable radio, but he reportedly knew that the suspect was wearing a black 
shirt and that a box of cigarillos had been taken. As Johnson, 22, and Brown, 18, 
walked one behind the other near the double yellow line, traffic flow was paused as 
cars took turns going around them. Officer Wilson, a large man at nearly 6’4” and 
210 pounds, stopped as the young men approached his Tahoe, and when Johnson 
passed his side-view mirror, Wilson said, “Why don’t you guys walk on the side-
walk?” Johnson replied, “We are almost to our destination” and continued walk-
ing, and as Brown approached the car’s mirror Wilson said, “Well, what’s wrong 
with the sidewalk?” Brown retorted, “Fuck what you have to say,” attracting extra 
attention from Wilson, who then noticed that Brown carried a box of cigarillos in 
his right hand, and also that he wore a black shirt, matching the description of the 
suspect in the theft at the market.
Wilson notified the dispatcher that he was “on Canfield with two” and asked 
for another car, and then he backed the Tahoe up past Johnson and Brown, an-
gling the car across the middle of the road. He started to open the car door and 
said to Brown, “Hey, come here for a minute,” but Brown, 6’4” and 292 pounds, 
shut the door saying, “What the fuck are you going to do about it.” Wilson tried 
to move Brown back with the door and said, “Get the fuck back,” but Brown 
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pushed back, shutting the door, and struck Wilson in the face with his hand. 
Brown turned to Johnson and handed him the cigarillos, now in Brown’s left 
hand, and said, “Hey, man, hold these,” and Wilson grabbed Brown’s right arm. 
As he later explained to the grand jury, he “felt like a five year old holding on to 
Hulk Hogan” (the professional wrestler). Brown struck Wilson again, and as they 
struggled, Wilson considered his options: his mace, which he could not readily 
reach, and which posed the risk of incapacitating Wilson more than Brown; his 
expandable baton, on which he was partially sitting, making it awkward to draw; 
his flashlight, on the passenger side of the car, which he considered to be of du-
bious effectiveness in close quarters; and his firearm. He drew his gun and told 
Brown, “Get back or I am going to shoot you.” Brown grabbed the gun, pushing it 
into Wilson’s hip, and said, “You are too much of a pussy to shoot me.” As Wilson 
pulled the gun up, with Brown still holding onto it as well, he pulled the trigger; 
after two clicks, the gun discharged on the third pull, the bullet going through 
the door panel, breaking the retracted window and causing glass to fly out. Both 
parties were startled.
Brown stepped back at that point, and according to Wilson, “He looked up 
at me and had the most intense aggressive face. The only way I can describe it, it 
looks like a demon, that’s how angry he looked.” Brown came back toward Wil-
son then, and Wilson tried to fire again, but the gun did not discharge. Wilson 
racked the slide and pulled the trigger again, and the gun fired, the bullet grazing 
Brown’s hand. Brown turned and ran west on Canfield, and Wilson got out, noti-
fying dispatch that shots had been fired. Wilson gave chase until Brown stopped 
and turned toward him, whereupon Wilson told him to get on the ground. When 
Brown started running at Wilson, Wilson started firing. Wilson saw Brown’s body 
jerk and inferred that Brown had been struck at least once, but Brown contin-
ued to approach, and so Wilson started backpedaling and resumed firing. He saw 
Brown flinch but not stop, and “at that point it looked like he was almost bulking 
up to run through the shots, like it was making him mad that I’m shooting at him.” 
When Brown was eight to ten feet away, he leaned forward as if he intended to 
tackle Wilson, and Wilson fired again. Brown went down, face first.
According to Brown’s companion that day, Dorian Johnson, Wilson’s first 
words to him and Brown were “Get the fuck on the sidewalk,” and Johnson in-
sisted that Brown said nothing to Wilson until after Wilson backed his car up to 
intersect them.2 Once Wilson backed up, though, he asked them, “What did you 
say?” Wilson opened his car door and, because they were so close to the car, the 
door hit both Johnson and Brown, and the door “closed back on him [Wilson], like 
real fast.” Wilson then grabbed Brown’s shirt around the neck area. Brown put his 
hands on the car and tried to pull away. Johnson heard Brown and Wilson talk-
ing to one another, “yelling and cussing,” and saw them engaged in a “tug of war.” 
Brown was pulling away as Wilson tried to pull him into the car, Wilson’s left hand 
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on Brown’s right arm. Johnson never saw Brown’s hand touch Wilson’s gun, nor 
did he see Brown at any time form a fist or strike Wilson.
Other witnesses provided testimony to the St. Louis County grand jury, and 
their accounts varied. Some said that Brown was surrendering when Wilson fired 
the fatal shots; others said that Brown was shot in the back. Several witnesses 
saw the conflict between Brown and Wilson, and some said that they saw Brown 
punch Wilson while Brown was partly inside the Tahoe. No camera recording, 
other than that of the theft at the Ferguson Market, was available. But Brown’s 
blood or other DNA was found inside the driver’s door, on the upper left thigh 
of Wilson’s pants, and on Wilson’s shirt and firearm. Reaching its conclusion 
more than three months after the shooting, the grand jury declined to indict 
Wilson. Announcing the grand jury decision, the St. Louis County prosecutor 
Robert McClulloch explained that physical evidence and the most credible wit-
ness testimony indicated that as Brown charged at Wilson, the officer fired five 
shots, and then fired another five shots as Brown made a “full charge” at Wilson 
(Eckholm 2014). A federal investigation into Wilson’s actions concluded that his 
use of deadly force was not a violation of Brown’s civil rights.
Ferguson, Missouri, is a small city of 21,000, two-thirds of whom are black. 
As in many American cities, Ferguson’s police, with only four blacks on a force 
of fifty-three, have historically had a tense relationship with its black community. 
Michael Brown was black; Wilson is white. The deadly shooting sparked protests 
in Ferguson the next day, which became violent. Brown’s death galvanized the 
Black Lives Matter movement, which organized a freedom ride to Ferguson (Day 
2015; also see Luibrand 2015). Demonstrations continued episodically for weeks 
and months thereafter in Ferguson and elsewhere, reinforced by a series of inci-
dents in which unarmed black men—and one youth—died at the hands of police, 
including Tamir Rice, 12, who was shot and killed by Cleveland police as he drew 
a toy gun from his waistband, in November 2014; Walter Scott, who was shot 
and killed by police in North Charleston, SC, in April 2015; Freddie Gray, who 
died as a result of injuries to his spinal cord sustained while being transported by 
Baltimore police, also in April 2015; and Samuel DuBose, who was shot and killed 
by police during a traffic stop in Cincinnati in July 2015. Parts of these and other 
incidents involving deadly force were captured in digital video, either by police 
cameras or citizens’ smart phones.
In late 2014, a presidential task force was charged with formulating recommenda-
tions for (re)building public trust in policing, and the short ninety-day turnaround 
reflected the urgency of its work (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
2015). As we write in the fall of 2016, police reform remains a salient issue. The 
President’s Task Force issued its report and recommendations, and it also produced 
a guide to implementation for police agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
is committed to devising a system for collecting data on police use of deadly force, 
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which until now has been reported only as justifiable homicides on a voluntary (and 
hence unsystematic) basis by police agencies.
But police conduct, and especially police use of force, has been a recurring issue 
in the United States and other Western countries. It arises with some frequency at 
the local level and at times on a national scale. Twenty-three years before Michael 
Brown was killed, the beating of Rodney King by police in Los Angeles attracted 
national attention. King was a black man who, at the conclusion of a vehicle pur-
suit, was tased, struck by batons, and kicked by four LAPD officers, while nineteen 
other officers watched. Much of the incident was captured on video by a citizen and 
later viewed by people across the United States. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley 
formed an independent commission to investigate the use of excessive force by 
Los Angeles police, and the commission’s report summarized a broadly conceived 
inquiry into organizational dynamics that underlay police use of force. Commonly 
known as the Christopher Commission, after its chairman, Warren Christopher, 
the report noted that “police violence is not a local problem” (Independent Com-
mission on the Los Angeles Police Department 1991, i), and the reception of the 
report reflected the national character of the issue. For its part, Congress mandated 
that the Justice Department collect national data on the use of force by police.
Twenty-three years before the King beating, another commission issued a re-
port. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also known as the 
Kerner Commission, was appointed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 to in-
quire into the whys and wherefores of riots that rocked American cities. The pur-
view of the Kerner Commission included but was by no means limited to police 
practices. And it found that: “Disorder did not erupt as a result of a single “trig-
gering” or “precipitating” incident. Instead, it was generated out of an increasingly 
disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically a series of tension-heightening in-
cidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the minds of many in 
the Negro community with a reservoir of underlying grievances. At some point in 
the mounting tension, a further incident—in itself often routine or trivial—became 
the breaking point and the tension spilled over into violence.”
Police actions comprised the “prior incidents” in almost half of the cases, and 
the “final” incidents in twelve of twenty-four cases. The Commission’s recommen-
dations for the police were:
• Review police operations in the ghetto to ensure proper conduct by police of-
ficers, and eliminate abrasive practices;
• Provide more adequate police protection to ghetto residents to eliminate their 
high sense of insecurity, and the belief of many Negro citizens in the existence 
of a dual standard of law enforcement;
• Establish fair and effective mechanisms for the redress of grievances against 
the police, and other municipal employees;
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• Develop and adopt policy guidelines to assist officers in making critical deci-
sions in areas where police conduct can create tension;
• Develop and use innovative programs to ensure widespread community sup-
port for law enforcement;
• Recruit more Negroes into the regular police force, and review promotion 
policies to ensure fair promotion for Negro officers;
• Establish a “Community Service Officer” program to attract ghetto youths 
between the ages of 17 and 21 to police work. These junior officers would per-
form duties in ghetto neighborhoods, but would not have full police authority. 
(U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968)
Contemporary prescriptions for reform bear a fairly strong resemblance to those 
of nearly fifty years ago. One new development in the reform agenda, however, is 
an emphasis on procedural justice and police legitimacy. Building trust and le-
gitimacy was the first of the six “pillars” identified by the President’s Task Force, 
around which its analysis and recommendations were organized. Its report stresses 
that “[b]uilding trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides of the police-citizen 
divide is not only the first pillar of this task force’s report but also the foundational 
principle underlying this inquiry into the nature of relations between law enforce-
ment and the communities they serve.” Its first recommendation was that “[l]aw 
enforcement culture should embrace a guardian mindset to build public trust and 
legitimacy. Toward that end, police and sheriffs’ departments should adopt proce-
dural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and prac-
tices to guide their interactions with the citizens they serve” (11).
Even before the events that propelled police shootings into national headlines, 
however, steps had been taken by the Department of Justice to launch the National 
Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, which enlisted six pilot sites, 
in each of which three interventions are being implemented. One of the interven-
tions is procedurally just policing. Making procedural justice a central plank in the 
reform agenda rests on a substantial volume of research into citizens’ perceptions 
of and attitudes toward the police.
Can and will reform predicated on procedural justice as the main determinant 
of public trust succeed? As well grounded in logic and empirical evidence as it 
appears to be, we are doubtful. We believe that a procedural justice model of polic-
ing, which we describe below, is likely to be weakly implemented in police orga-
nizations, despite the best of executive intentions, and also that improvements in 
the procedural justice with which police act in their interactions with citizens are 
unlikely to yield corresponding improvements in citizens’ subjective experiences 
with police. Moreover, we believe that the prescription for a procedural justice 
model rests on a misdiagnosis of the fundamental issues.
Some explanation is in order.
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POLICE LEGITIMACY AND PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE
When people have contacts with the police, the fairness with which police are 
perceived to act affects citizens’ trust and confidence in the police and their sense 
that the police deserve to be obeyed—that is, the procedural justice that citizens 
subjectively experience affects the “legitimacy” of the police. A large body of social 
psychological research demonstrates the strength and consistency of these em-
pirical relationships. Procedural justice, this research tells us, is a matter of treat-
ing people with dignity and respect, giving them an opportunity to explain their 
situations and listening to what they have to say, and explaining what police have 
done and/or will do, so that it is clear that officers are taking account of people’s 
needs and concerns and basing police decisions on facts. This research further 
tells us that legitimacy is important, not only for its own sake but because it has 
consequences. People who believe that police are legitimate are more likely to ac-
cept police decisions and comply with police requests and directives, more likely 
to cooperate with the police, and more likely even to abide by the law.
Legitimacy is, in the context of this social psychological research, an abstract 
outlook, with both cognitive and affective elements. It is subjective in nature, but 
as we discuss below, it is affected by citizens’ experiences. As the National Research 
Council’s Committee to Review Research has observed: “Legitimacy is the proper-
ty that a rule or an authority has when others feel obligated to voluntarily defer to 
that rule or authority. In other words, a legitimate authority is one that is regarded 
by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by oth-
ers” (National Research Council 2004, 297).
The legitimacy of the police is thought to be important for several reasons. 
First, research suggests that citizens who see the police as legitimate are, in their 
interactions with the police, more likely to comply with police commands, di-
rections, and requests. In the micro-context of police-citizen encounters, citizens’ 
compliance makes the performance of police tasks easier (Mastrofski, Snipes, and 
Supina 1996; McCluskey 2003; McCluskey, Mastrofski, and Parks 1999), and can 
be expected to result in less use of force by police and fewer injuries to both police 
and citizens. Second, citizens who see the police as legitimate might be expected 
to more readily cooperate with police and other legal actors, for example, in re-
porting crime, and perhaps in providing information (Hart and Rennison 2003). 
Third, citizens who regard legal authorities as legitimate may be less likely to break 
the law. Research on this question is hardly conclusive, but findings suggest that 
offenders may be less prone to recidivate when their treatment by the legal system 
conforms to principles of procedural justice (Paternoster et al. 1997; also see Tyler 
1990; Tyler and Huo 2002).
Legitimacy and other attitudes toward the police, extant research suggests, 
comprise a stock that police can either build or deplete through their perfor-
mance, though it is also clear that the public’s attitudes toward the police are to a 
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significant extent shaped by forces beyond the control of police.3 Several elements 
of procedural justice shape citizens’ subjective experience:
• People are more satisfied when they have an opportunity to “tell their side of 
the story”—to explain their situation or behavior to authorities.
• People are more satisfied when they believe that authorities’ decisions are 
based on facts.
• People are more satisfied when they feel that they have been treated with dig-
nity and respect.
• People are more satisfied when they trust authorities’ motives, which is more 
likely when authorities explain their actions in terms that demonstrate that 
they have taken account of citizens’ concerns and needs.4
Thus the research suggests that, in the words of the Committee to Review 
Research, legitimacy is “created” in individual encounters, and is also created in 
a more general form by the aggregated actions of police: “When a police officer 
responds to a call or stops someone on the street, what happens affects general 
feelings that people have regarding the extent to which authorities are legitimate 
and entitled to be obeyed” (National Research Council, 2004, 298). The effects 
of each contact on the attitude of the citizen participant are quite modest. The 
effects may be somewhat greater when we take account of both direct and in-
direct experiences, as the effects of vicarious experience ripple through circles 
of relatives, friends, and neighbors (Miller et al. 2003; Rosenbaum et al. 2005). 
The effects may be greater still as they accumulate across many contacts: in a 
single year, even in a fairly small city, police handle tens of thousands of calls for 
service, make thousands of arrests, issue thousands of traffic and other tickets, 
and have innumerable other contacts with the public. It may be possible to es-
tablish a reputation for treating people properly by earning it, through behavior 
that accords with principles of procedural justice. Given the asymmetrical ef-
fects of positive and negative experiences, which we discuss in a later chapter, 
it is easier to establish a reputation for treating people improperly by treating 
them unjustly, thereby eroding the stock of legitimacy. But the evidence base on 
which these expectations rest does not withstand close scrutiny, as we explain 
in later chapters.
A PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE MODEL OF POLICING
Translating this body of research into police practice is not straightforward, 
however. With the voluminous research on procedural justice and legitimacy 
as a point of departure, Stephen Schulhofer et al. (2011) describe a procedural 
justice model of policing (also see Tyler 2004; Meares 2009). They make the 
important point that outcomes—say, whether or not the citizen is ticketed, 
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searched, or even arrested—are not determinative of citizens’ subjective ex-
perience; people can be satisfied with their encounter with police even when 
the outcomes are unfavorable for them, so long as they believe that they were 
treated justly. The implication is, as they emphasize, that police need not choose 
between “toughness” and “fairness.” Police can be both “tough” and fair when 
they take enforcement action with cognizance of procedural justice: “Instead of 
seeking to instill fear or project power, officers would aim to treat citizens cour-
teously, briefly explain the reason for a stop, and, absent exigent circumstances, 
give the citizen an opportunity to explain himself before significant decisions 
are made” (Schulhofer et al. 2011, 352). Thus the procedural justice model does 
not prescribe nonenforcement. It is about how, not whether, police authority is 
exercised. The procedural justice model is long on the forms that procedurally 
just policing takes at the street level, and its rationale, but rather short on the 
managerial measures that police departments should take in order to implement 
the model. One such measure is to establish procedures for procedurally just 
policing. Schulhofer et al. suggest that
In connection with street stops, operational guidelines within each department 
could formalize appropriate steps, such as the need for courteous treatment, the 
obligation to give the citizen a reason for the stop, and a chance to explain the 
circumstances.  .  .  .  . Such steps could be made a routine part of every officer’s 
behavior on the beat. . . . officers could easily carry and give to those they stop a 
card containing a short statement of the rules that govern police stops. The card 
would enumerate the rights that must be respected (including the right to have 
the reasons for the stop explained and the right to tell their side of the story before 
decisions are made) and the procedures for complaining about unfair treatment. 
(Schulhofer et al. 2011, 354)
We might suppose further that police departments that adopted such a model 
would establish and enforce expectations that their officers exercise their authori-
ty with procedural justice. Their chief executives would make procedural justice an 
explicit priority, and their expectations would be embodied in departmental poli-
cies and procedures. They would train their officers in proper police-citizen inter-
action (see, e.g., Schuck and Rosenbaum 2011; Skogan, Van Craen, and Hennessy 
2014). They would monitor the available indicators of police performance, such 
as complaints and use of force, and recognizing the limits of these indicators, 
they would make supervisors responsible for spot-checking the quality of police-
citizen encounters. They might even develop more systematic measures of such 
performance, conducting periodic surveys of citizens with whom their officers 
have had contact. And they would treat officers with the same procedural justice 
that they demand of officers in their encounters with citizens, thereby nurturing 
officers’ trust in the organization and their sense of obligation to obey its rules.
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Procedural Justice and Management Accountability
In most if not all large police departments, the organizational infrastructure is not 
conducive to the procedural justice model. Even in an era that stresses manage-
rial accountability, the procedural justice with which officers act is typically not 
measured in police agencies, nor is it an outcome for which police managers are 
held accountable.
The New York City Police Department’s “Compstat” management accountabil-
ity mechanism has been widely emulated. One of its primary virtues, we believe, 
is its potential to fix police attention not only on the means—arrests, tickets, and 
so forth—but on the ends of policing: crime reduction, disorder control, the en-
hancement of quality of life, and community satisfaction. Accountability mecha-
nisms should stress outcomes, and not simple counts of outputs. If unit command-
ers are to be held accountable for outcomes, and for mounting good-faith efforts to 
affect those outcomes in desirable ways, then outputs are important mainly as the 
manifestations or by-products of effective tactics.
A drawback of Compstat is that the measurement of outcomes is normally con-
fined to crime, and it thus omits important outcomes that ought to be the objects 
of police attention. Mark Moore describes a range of outcomes, or performance 
dimensions, that reflect the value of policing, including:
• Reduce criminal victimization;
• Call offenders to account;
• Reduce fear and enhance personal security;
• Guarantee safety in public spaces;
• Use financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively;
• Use force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively;
• Satisfy customer demands and achieve legitimacy with those policed. (Moore 
2002, 131–33)
With reference to case studies of six police departments that were, in the 1990s, 
implementing community policing, Moore found that only one department ac-
corded high overall importance to performance measurement. More to the ob-
ject of our concern here, Moore found that three of the six agencies used citizen 
complaints as a measure of performance with respect to the use of authority, and 
two used repeated citizen surveys to measure citizen satisfaction. The agencies 
that tapped these sources of information for performance measures were among 
the agencies originally selected for study because they “were judged to be making 
unusually rapid progress toward community policing” (Moore 2002, 159), so they 
are hardly representative.
We should add that the general community surveys that are administered 
on an annual or biannual basis by some departments are of limited utility for 
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management accountability. Measures of performance that are derived no more 
often than once every year (or two) are unlikely to either guide police manag-
ers or form the basis for holding them individually accountable (Behn 2008). 
And general, communitywide perceptions of police performance—for example, 
whether police are in general polite or fair—may not reflect officers’ actual per-
formance in police-citizen encounters. We should also add that the procedur-
al propriety of police actions is not measured validly with citizen complaints, 
which are rarely filed even when citizens are dissatisfied with police service, and 
which are not infrequently based on misunderstandings of police procedure or 
on (intentional or unintentional) misrepresentations of police action.
For the purposes of the research summarized here, we therefore undertook 
to measure citizens’ subjective experience, and especially their perceptions of 
procedural justice, through surveys of people who had recently interacted with 
police. In each of the two study departments, in Schenectady and Syracuse, New 
York, semi-monthly samples were drawn from police records from mid-July 2011 
through mid-January 2013. Respondents were interviewed by phone within one 
to five weeks of their contact with police. Following the accumulation of survey 
data to form a baseline, survey results on citizens’ satisfaction and judgments 
about procedural justice in the contact were summarized and reported to com-
mand staffs on a monthly basis through the departments’ respective Compstat 
meetings. Across the eighteen months of surveying, we completed 3,603 inter-
views, or approximately 100 per month in each city. In this way the project pro-
vided for measures of police performance with respect to procedural justice with 
sufficient periodicity that the information was potentially useful in managing 
performance. We also interviewed “key informants” in each city, that is, com-
munity leaders attentive to police services and knowledgeable about community 
attitudes, as a potentially larger and more representative slice of public opinion 
about the police.
Theories of organization form two divergent sets of expectations for how police 
managers would use the new measures of performance. The management guru 
Peter Drucker is reputed to have said that “what gets measured gets managed.” 
Thus we might suppose that with monthly feedback about officers’ performance 
in procedural justice terms, managers would pay more attention to how, and not 
merely whether, their subordinates used their authority and interacted with citi-
zens. As managers—platoon commanders—pay more attention to these dimen-
sions of police work, we might suppose that field supervisors would likewise pay 
more attention to it. They might remind patrol officers at roll calls about the vir-
tues of procedural justice: its effects on citizen compliance with police, citizen co-
operation with law enforcement, compliance with the law, and the public image of 
the department—its stock of legitimacy. The department might mount in-service 
training on the rationale for procedural justice and the actions that comprise it. 
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It was not our place as researchers to tell managers how to manage; as we told 
them at the outset, we were there to learn from them.
The second set of expectations for how police managers would manage proce-
dural justice is derived from an institutional perspective on organizations, which 
we describe in greater depth in chapter 2. From this perspective, we might expect 
to see the management of what is measured only in a market-driven organization 
whose productive operations apply a well-known technology with well-established 
connections to productive output, and we would instead expect to see little such 
effective management in an institutionalized organization, whose technical “core” 
is only loosely coupled with many organizational structures. In many respects, as 
we will explain, police departments resemble institutionalized organizations.
We met with the command staffs of the departments each month to report on 
survey results, and those meetings also afforded us an opportunity to hear from 
police managers about their efforts to manage performance. In addition, we inter-
viewed patrol officers and field supervisors at two points in time, about halfway 
through the eighteen-month survey of citizens, and after the conclusion of survey-
ing, in order to learn more about what, from their perspective, the department 
was doing to manage this dimension of their performance, and also to learn their 
reactions to this emphasis on the quality of police-citizen interactions.
Finally, because the Schenectady Police Department had for a number of years 
provided for audio and video recordings of its officers’ activities, we drew a sample 
of encounters about which citizens had been surveyed and conducted structured 
observation to independently code features of those police-citizen interactions. 
For this purpose we formulated an observation protocol that built on the platform 
of more than forty years of systematic social observation of police in the field. Be-
cause we were able to link survey data on citizens’ subjective experience to trained 
observers’ independent coding of the behavior of officers and citizens toward one 
another, encounter by encounter, we can for the first time analyze citizens’ subjec-
tive experience in terms of independent measures of police behavior. With the 
observational data we formed a measure of officers’ procedural justice and a sepa-
rate measure of officers’ procedural injustice. Thus we can better assess the value 
of citizen surveys for measuring (and managing) the overt procedural justice with 
which officers treat citizens.
C OMING AT TR ACTIONS
Readers need not wait to learn what we found in this research, inasmuch as we 
briefly summarize it here. We found that what gets measured does not always get 
successfully managed. With the introduction of monthly measures of the quality 
of citizens’ subjective experience in their contacts with police reported through 
Compstat meetings, we detected no substantively significant changes overall in 
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either city. Police performance in these terms was fairly high at the outset in both 
cities, leaving only a little room for improvement. We nevertheless found that ef-
forts to manage the measured outcomes took various forms in each police depart-
ment, which we arrayed on a management continuum. Among patrol officers and 
field supervisors, we found a mixed reception to the administrative push for better 
“customer service”: some officers were quite receptive; some exhibited a tempered 
receptivity; others were quite skeptical.
We can make sense of these findings about management and performance by 
applying an institutional perspective. Management accountability is only “loosely 
coupled” to management and to street-level practices. The officers in whose be-
havior implementation of the procedural justice model rests are not all equally 
receptive to making customer service a priority, and the implementation of any 
administrative mandate is mediated by officers’ interpretations of its meaning. 
Officers must make sense of administrative demands, and they vary in the sense 
that they make of it.
But the story does not end there. In our analysis of police-citizen encounters for 
which observations were conducted, we found that citizens’ subjective experience 
is very weakly related to officers’ procedural justice and only moderately related 
to officers’ procedural injustice. Whether officers used their authority—by using 
physical force or conducting searches—proved to be much more important than 
how officers used their authority—their procedural (in)justice—in shaping citizens’ 
assessments of procedural justice. To a significant extent, it appears that the weak 
relationship stems from citizens’ overestimation of police procedural justice: citi-
zen ratings of procedural justice were fairly high even when observed procedural 
justice was fairly low. These findings challenge the supposition that legitimacy is 
“created” through police-citizen interactions, and also call into question the extent 
to which survey data on citizens’ perceptions reflect officers’ performance. Nor did 
we find change overall in observed procedural justice by officers in Schenectady, 
which was moderately high in the first place, and no change in procedural injustice, 
which was uniformly low. However, in one platoon, whose commander and first-
line supervisors were among the more supportive of a customer-service orienta-
tion, we detected a modest increase in officers’ procedural justice.
These findings raise doubts about the efficacy of the procedural justice model 
as an approach to police reform. Although it is based on voluminous research con-
cerning public perceptions of police, it is based on assumptions about the strength 
of the connections: between those perceptions and police actions in police-citizen 
contacts, and between the adoption of a process-based model of policing and of-
ficers’ practices on the street.
With that as an overview, we proceed to detail our empirical study. In chapter 
3 we summarize what we know about public trust and confidence in police and 
the forces that influence trust, and present survey-based measures of public trust 
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in the two cities. Chapter 4 presents a detailed quantitative analysis of citizens’ 
subjective experiences, while chapter 5 summarizes the sources of citizen dissatis-
faction in survey respondents’ own words. Chapter 6 presents the findings about 
officers’ behaviors, and especially those that comprise procedural justice, as well as 
procedural injustice. In chapter 7 readers will find an analysis of citizens’ subjec-
tive experience in terms of officers’ behavior. Chapter 8 summarizes the measure-
ment of procedural justice performance and its incorporation into Compstat, the 
forms that the management of customer service took, evidence on the effects of 
management. Chapter 9 describes the varied interpretations of “customer service” 
that officers applied, and how they made sense of the administrative emphasis on 
the quality of their treatment of citizens. Chapter 10 summarizes what we found, 
overall, and discusses the implications of our findings for understanding police 
legitimacy and procedural justice, for police departments’ efforts to build legiti-
macy, and for future research. We believe that our findings about management, 
management accountability, and procedural justice can be understood by consid-
ering them from an institutional perspective, to which we turn next in chapter 2.
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Police departments can be described from many perspectives, but one useful per-
spective is an institutional one. Institutional theory has been widely used in the 
study of private- and public-sector organizations generally, and it has been applied 
previously to police departments. We sketch that perspective here. We did not set 
out to test propositions drawn from institutional theory, nor do we purport to of-
fer tests of that theory in the chapters that follow. But we believe that institutional 
theory can in large measure account for our findings, and we adopted this per-
spective because we think that it is very useful in understanding the dynamics of 
police administration in general and the management of procedural justice in par-
ticular.1 Thus we explain what it means for an organization to be institutionalized, 
and we describe at some length relevant parts of the institutional environment of 
police departments in the United States. Then we turn to the study departments, 
and describe them in terms of their institutional environments.
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICE ORGANIZ ATIONS
The technology of policing—that is, how the work gets done—is an intensive one, 
with choices about how to proceed made in any one case as events unfold. Polic-
ing thus requires the exercise of discretion, and that discretion is exercised in its 
most palpable forms on the street and by the lowest-ranking members of police 
organizations. The task environment of policing is heterogeneous, ambiguous, and 
turbulent, with countless contingencies that bear on officers’ choices, factors to be 
weighed even though their meaning and implications are not clear, and subject to 
a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the consequences of alternative courses 
2
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of police action (Thompson 1967). What police officers should do in most of the 
situations that they handle on a day-to-day basis cannot be specified in policy and 
procedure manuals. “You can’t go by the book,” as police are wont to say.
The task environment and the technology of police work have far-reaching 
implications for how police work can be managed. Police departments are what 
James Q. Wilson (1989) describes as “coping organizations”—those organizations 
whose managers cannot easily observe their subordinates’ operations or assess the 
value of those operations for achieving desired social outcomes. The managers of 
such organizations are not powerless, but they are sharply constrained in their ca-
pacity to direct what the organization does and how it is done. Police officers work 
for the most part outside of direct supervision, they perform work that is rife with 
situational contingencies, and information about what they do and the circum-
stances under which they do it is normally recorded by the officers themselves. 
The consequences or effects of what police do are subject to a host of influences 
other than police action, so managers cannot infer from observed or documented 
consequences what officers actually did; even scientifically structured evaluations 
of police intervention cannot provide definitive evidence about the effectiveness of 
what police do, and scientific evaluations are seldom performed.
Police departments are also what Michael Lipsky (1980) calls “street-level 
bureaucracies,” whose front-line workers exercise wide discretion in their interac-
tions with the agency’s clients. Street-level bureaucracies are “people-processing” 
organizations (Prottas 1978). Teachers, social workers, police officers, and others 
are all street-level bureaucrats, and they must cope with some common conditions 
of work: chronically inadequate resources, including time and information; vague, 
ambiguous, and sometimes conflicting organizational goals; and an inability to 
control the pace or outcomes of their work. Consequently, according to Lipsky, 
street-level bureaucrats develop patterns of practice that are in some respects dys-
functional for the organization’s clients but enable the workers to cope: they hus-
band resources; they routinize their processing of cases; they reconceptualize their 
jobs in order to reduce the discrepancy between the ideal and the achievable; and 
they reconceptualize their clientele. These systemic forces have impacts that are 
largely beyond the capacity of managers to control.
Michael Brown (1981) argues that the police bureaucracy exerts control over 
only the more mundane aspects of police work, such as the timeliness and neat-
ness of officers’ reports, and that the substantive exercise of police discretion is 
controlled—insofar as it is controlled at all—by the peer group, or the police cul-
ture. We often think of the police culture as a set of outlooks that are widely shared 
among police officers: strong loyalty to co-workers, an “us vs. them” mentality; 
suspiciousness and cynicism; an occupational focus on crime control and law en-
forcement, and a correspondingly derisive regard for order maintenance and ser-
vice functions; and a willingness to bend or break rules governing the use of force 
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or search and seizure. Moreover, the police culture has long been recognized as an 
impediment to bureaucratic control, and the paramount value of loyalty manifests 
itself in a norm of mutual cover-ups of bureaucratic (and legal) transgressions. 
Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni (1983) describes street cop culture and its codes, including 
“don’t give up another cop,” as antithetical to management cop culture.
If this was ever an accurate characterization of an entire occupational group, it is 
no longer (Herbert 1998; Paoline 2004; Paoline, Myers, and Worden 2000; Paoline 
and Terrill 2014), but police culture remains an important consideration. Brown’s 
portrayal of police culture is simpler and it may be timeless. He asserts that the 
police culture is comprised of two core values: loyalty and individualism. As other 
accounts of police culture hold, loyalty to co-workers—backing them up in the face 
of the threats to their safety, and honoring their accomplishments in the context of 
a police bureaucracy that is “punishment-centered”—is an occupationally univer-
sal value, owing mainly to the danger in the occupational environment. Individu-
alism allows officers to practice their own styles and apply their own priorities, and 
to do so without second-guessing. Individualism allows for heterogeneity among 
officers in their conceptions of the police role, in their degree of cynicism, in their 
respect for restrictions on their authority, and in their “operational styles” (Brown 
1981). Research has repeatedly found such heterogeneity, rather than a monolithic 
police culture. So it is that Brown’s description of police culture can be reconciled 
with the research that has found not a single occupational culture but rather mul-
tiple subcultures. This more delimited and accurate rendition of police culture has 
important implications for how tenuously bureaucratic controls are connected to 
the discretionary choices that together comprise the delivery of police services. 
The culture legitimizes street-level individuality in doing police work, and the na-
ture of the work makes it very difficult to apply bureaucratic controls.
Front-line supervisors can affect some types of officers’ behavior, but not all 
supervisors are created equal, and the impact of supervision on behavior will be 
attenuated or amplified by individual supervisors’ own orientations and styles 
(Engel 2001, 2002). William Ker Muir Jr. (1977) explains how supervisors can be 
instrumental in their subordinates’ professional growth and moral renewal if they 
are actively engaged in developing their subordinates’ skills and judgment. But 
such forms of supervision have not been normal in law enforcement (Brown 1981; 
Engel 2001, 2002; Van Maanen 1983); the potential impact of supervision prob-
ably remains unfulfilled in many cases. Immediate supervisors are caught in the 
middle, between management and the street, and, as Brown observed, “the pres-
sures for loyalty and solidarity are refracted throughout the police bureaucracy” 
(1981, 90), with norms that prohibit second-guessing and micro-management. 
Many supervisors keep their priorities limited and expectations low (Van Maanen 
1983), and they may not even be comprehended by their subordinates (Engel and 
Worden 2003).
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Furthermore, many efforts to change the way that street-level policing is per-
formed are subject to a process of interpretation by the officers whose behavior is 
the target of the change, a process known in the study of organizations as “sen-
semaking.” Officers’ interpretations will not always conform with those of police 
executives. Some police subcultures will be receptive to a reform proposed by 
management, such as community policing, and others will tend to resist, based 
on the compatibility of the reform (as officers make sense of it) with officers’ own 
occupational values and attitudes.
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Every organization is subject to the environments in which it operates, includ-
ing a technical environment and an institutional environment. Technical environ-
ments are those in which the goods or services produced by an organization are 
exchanged, as in private markets, and that reward the effective and efficient pro-
duction of those goods or services. Institutional environments, by contrast, con-
tain requirements or expectations for the structure of an organization and reward 
the adoption of required or favored structures, not effective or efficient production 
as such.
Some types of organizations, such as manufacturing firms, operate in a well-
developed technical environment, where production processes are well understood 
and a market establishes the value of the products, and a weak institutional envi-
ronment. Other types of organizations operate in a weakly developed technical 
environment and a strong institutional environment. For these organizations, the 
technical environment provides a limited understanding of cause-and-effect rela-
tionships in the production technology, such that it may be hard to assess the tech-
nical performance of an organization or even to say what effective and efficient 
production is. But the institutional environment contains well-developed expecta-
tions or requirements for how the organization should be structured. These ex-
pectations are institutional “myths,” or “idealized cultural accounts” of how an or-
ganization should operate (Hallett 2010). Structures are adopted and maintained, 
not because they have a well-established and well-understood utility in effective 
and efficient production, but rather because they are expected or demanded by 
external stakeholders, or “sovereigns,” as markers of proper and/or professional 
operations. Thus, even if they do not serve to make the organization more effective 
or otherwise perform better, the structures serve to confer legitimacy: “a general-
ized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574).
Institutional pressures take several forms, and they may tend to yield a high 
degree of structural homogeneity among the organizations in an organizational 
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“field” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Some such pressures are “coercive,” such as 
statutory, regulatory, or judicial requirements or mandates, or widely shared cul-
tural expectations. Other pressures arise from the structures and practices of other 
organizations in the same field that are perceived to be successful; the presumed 
virtues of those structures or practices make them appear worthy of emulating. Still 
other pressures stem from professional or occupational norms or standards. These 
various forces in an organizational field tend to produce institutional “isomor-
phism” of corresponding kinds—coercive, mimetic, and normative, respectively—
such that organizations in a field tend to be structurally similar to one another. 
Conformity to these various demands and expectations is the price of legitimacy 
for organizations whose institutional environments are strong. Legitimation is 
achieved by an organization not through its technical performance but by meet-
ing these environmental demands, that is, adopting structures and practices that 
institutional myths prescribe.
Police departments are particularly susceptible to forces in their institutional 
environments. By virtue of the nature of the work that they perform, police de-
partments have:
• vague, ambiguous, conflicting goals;
• uncertain technologies for turning raw materials—people and their problems—
into valued outputs;
• great difficulty in monitoring the work of turning raw materials into outputs; 
and
• great difficulty in evaluating the effects of the work that is done.
As many have observed, technical performance by police organizations encompass-
es many dimensions. Moore (2002) identifies several dimensions of performance as 
part of the mission of police, including reducing crime and criminal victimization; 
holding offenders to account; reducing fear and enhancing a sense of security; regu-
lating public spaces and traffic safety; and providing emergency medical and social 
services. In addition, the economy with which police operate, in terms of the ex-
penditure of money and/or authority, is a basis for assessing police performance, so 
the efficient use of public resources and the fair and judicious use of police authority 
may be considered. Not all of these facets of the police mission are compatible with 
one another, as improving performance in one area (e.g., respecting civil liberties) 
may come at the expense of performance in another (e.g., crime control), and peo-
ple inside and outside of the organization may not agree on the relative importance 
of those areas. Little information is available about the technical performance of the 
police, and to a large degree judgments about technical performance require infer-
ences about causal relationships among police inputs, outputs, and outcomes that 
are embedded in larger systems of social and economic forces; even when police 
strategies or programs are subjected to scientific evaluations, inferences about the 
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impacts of police interventions are subject to some doubt. These challenges weaken 
the technical environment of policing.
The institutional environment of policing is fairly well developed, however. 
Among the structures that police might adopt in order to conform to broad cul-
tural expectations are “appropriate titles, uniforms, badges, and insignia indicating 
rank, department and assignment” (Crank and Langworthy 1992, 342–43). Indeed, 
even the Weberian bureaucracy in U.S. policing, dating from the Progressive era, 
is an organizational form that was adopted and maintained because it is expected 
by external stakeholders, as well as by many inside of policing, despite its question-
able compatibility with the technical demands of police work (Brown 1981); the 
task environment and technology of policing is more compatible with a much less 
bureaucratic form of organization. But institutional forces compel police organiza-
tions to maintain a bureaucratic form—some would say a “presentational strategy” 
or façade (Manning 1977)—that includes thick books of policies and procedures 
and a quasi-military chain-of-command, which (at least partially) satisfies the 
public expectation of control over the exercise of police authority. The appropri-
ateness of a bureaucratic form for police departments is largely taken for granted. 
In a police department that is institutionalized, then, structural features—the di-
vision of labor, the allocation of resources, and recruitment, selection, training, 
supervision and management practices—may be continued or changed based, 
not on their demonstrable technical utility, but rather on widespread suppositions 
about their value.
The range of actors whom we would consider sovereigns in police departments’ 
institutional environment encompasses what Moore describes as the “authorizing 
environment,” including “all those political actors or agents who have the formal 
power to review police department operations, or the informal power to influence 
those who do” (2002, 84). They include elected and appointed officials—mayors 
and city councilors, city managers, comptrollers, civil service commissions—as 
well as the representatives of interest groups and “watchdog” organizations (e.g., 
the American Civil Liberties Union), police unions, and the media. They also in-
clude other law enforcement organizations at higher levels of government, profes-
sional organizations (e.g., the International Association of Chiefs of Police) and 
accrediting bodies (such as the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforce-
ment Agencies), as well as actors with regulatory authority, e.g., the courts, and the 
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. In the United States, most but 
not all of these sovereigns are local. These external stakeholders, whose support is 
required for the organization’s survival and prosperity, are as hard-pressed as any-
one is to ascertain what the organization does and the contribution that it makes 
to social outcomes. They tend to fall back on suppositions about how an organiza-
tion should be structured, even if the structural prescriptions have not been tested 
and validated. The suppositions represent “ordinary knowledge” (Lindblom and 
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Cohen 1979). To the degree that external stakeholders rely on such suppositions, 
the organization’s legitimacy is determined, not by how well the work is actually 
performed, but by how closely the organization conforms to the expectations of its 
institutional environment.
The expectations of these various sovereigns need not and often do not agree 
with one another, and any one sovereign’s expectations need not be internally con-
sistent, making the institutional environment complex. Demands for community 
policing, for example, are not entirely compatible with demands for public ac-
countability: pushing discretion down as much as possible to field supervisors and 
beat officers, and thereby unleashing the creativity of officers in addressing the 
many and varied problems that communities confront, is a prominent feature of 
community policing, but expanding officers’ discretion is not entirely compatible 
with demands for public accountability and administrative rule-making, which 
tend to emphasize constraints on police discretion. An institutional environment 
of such complexity and, potentially, contradiction, has implications that we con-
sider below.
We would add that to recognize the strength of the institutional environment 
of policing is not to hold that the technical environment is irrelevant or that police 
executives deliberately adopt structures merely for symbolic purposes. The adop-
tion of structures that serve institutional purposes may also serve more conven-
tional technical-rational purposes in an organization, and even if the structures 
serve only more symbolic purposes, for reasons that we discuss below, it does not 
follow that their adoption was an act of administrative duplicity.
Institutional myths may be incompatible with the requirements of the orga-
nization’s tasks (as they are perceived by operators such as teachers or police of-
ficers), or with one another, creating the potential for structural conflict. One way 
that such conflict can be averted is through the “loose coupling” of structures with 
technical activities, which allows the continued performance of technical tasks 
without hindrance by structures that satisfy sovereigns’ expectations but are not 
compatible with the work. Such buffering need not be by executive design. When 
the structures that police departments adopt are incompatible with one another, 
with previously existing structures that remain in use, or with the technical de-
mands of the work itself, something has to give. Often, the “technical core”—in 
policing, that would be the street-level work of patrol officers or detectives—is, 
in effect, buffered from the structures with which the work is not compatible. We 
do not doubt that when police executives adopt new structures such as commu-
nity policing or Compstat, they do so in good faith and for the intended instru-
mental benefits that they promise in accomplishing the work of the organization. 
Structural forces are more powerful than the wills and good intentions of police 
executives, however, and as the complexity of the organization’s structure mirrors 
that of the institutional environment, with features that are incompatible with one 
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another and with the technical core, loose coupling (or decoupling) can result. 
Technical performance that is loosely coupled (or decoupled) from structural re-
forms may not be readily detected, for the same conditions that make it difficult 
for sovereigns to judge technical performance make it difficult for managers to 
detect such loose coupling. Thus institutionalization stems from the nature of the 
work, not from managerial ineptitude or resistance (though some managers are 
inept and others have their own agendas).
In an organization whose goals are vague and ambiguous, whose operators 
work largely independently, and whose technical activities bear an uncertain re-
lationship to organizational outcomes, structures are subject to interpretation—a 
process of “sensemaking” (Weick 1995; also see Bechky 2011; Hallett and Ventr-
esca 2006; Sharma and Good 2013). Schools fit this description, as do police de-
partments. Efforts to change such organizations require winning the “hearts and 
minds” of operators. The adoption of structures that are incompatible with work 
requirements may breed cynicism toward managers who are seen to engage in 
political posturing.
We pause here to note that legitimacy in the context of institutional theory cer-
tainly bears a resemblance to the constellation of outlooks that social psychologists 
have labeled legitimacy, but there are important differences. Institutional theory 
treats legitimacy as a property of organizations. Organizations can establish and 
maintain their legitimacy. Organizational legitimacy can be challenged or threat-
ened. And organizations can lose legitimacy. An organization’s legitimacy turns 
on perceptions and judgments by actors—sovereigns—in its environment, but its 
relationship to public attitudes is less proximate. We will return to these connec-
tions in the next chapter.
Research on policing provides a number of illustrations of institutionalization 
in addition to those mentioned above, and we briefly describe a few of these here, 
reserving more extended descriptions of others for discussion in conjunction with 
the institutional environment of U.S. policing a bit later. Consider, for one ex-
ample, the Junction City Police Department (a pseudonym). When the depart-
ment adopted a specialized gang unit, it was not because the department’s chief 
perceived street gangs as a threat to the safety of Junction City (Katz 2001). It was a 
consequence of external pressure brought by segments of the community that saw 
gangs as a community problem warranting the formation of a specialized unit, and 
in spite of the chief ’s conviction that gangs were not a problem. The newly created 
gang unit, comprised of a sergeant and four investigators, represented a feature of 
the department’s structure whose existence was owed not to the technical require-
ments of policing, but rather to the demands of powerful external constituencies 
for an organizational response of the expected form. The operation of the unit, in 
the absence of a serious gang problem toward which to direct their efforts, con-
sisted first of public presentations and subsequently of forming partnerships with 
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other, well-established units—such as homicide— thus gaining unit legitimacy 
through its association with reputable partners.
Another example involves training in drunk-driving enforcement (Mastrofski 
and Ritti 1996). Among six police agencies—two each of city police departments, 
township police departments, and state police troops—three exhibited a strong 
connection between training in enforcement against driving under the influence 
(DUI) and officers’ actual enforcement practices, while three others did not. In 
the former, DUI enforcement activity was actively encouraged and rewarded; the 
training was tightly coupled to practice. In the latter, however, police management 
was not supportive of DUI enforcement; in two of those agencies, managers per-
ceived that high levels of DUI enforcement conflicted with other organizational 
goals. DUI training served a purpose, but it was an institutional one, uncoupled 
from the work of enforcement. Consider one agency:
Township 2 has a well-developed institutional presentation of DUI enforcement, in 
which training is an important element. The local MADD chapter provided some 
incentive for addressing the DUI issue.  .  .  . None of these, however—banquets, 
awards, donations of breath-testing equipment, and public education campaigns—
were tied to the actual work of making DUI arrests. DUI training was also part of 
the highly developed professional reputation cultivated by the leaders, based (for 
example) on being well-equipped, well-dressed, and client-oriented. (Mastrofski 
and Ritti 1996, 316)
Specialized training, which certainly can serve instrumental purposes when the 
subject of the training is reinforced by other organizational practices, can instead 
serve institutional purposes. The same might be said, more speculatively in the 
absence of empirical research, about other police training curricula. Stephen Mas-
trofski and R. Richard Ritti allow as how “a police brutality scandal . . . generates 
pressures for reform, which leads to an extensive training program on race rela-
tions, less-than-lethal methods, and ‘verbal judo’ ” (1996, 292).
One final example, for now, is a pro-arrest policy for spouse assault. In the 
1980s and 1990s, many police agencies adopted policies that mandate or encour-
age arrests for some types of domestic violence. Many factors contributed to the 
adoption of such policies: a grass-roots battered women’s movement pressed for 
legislative changes that would facilitate or compel law enforcement to invoke the 
law against offenders (Ferraro 1989); the threat of litigation against police depart-
ments; recommendations by the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Vio-
lence; and the findings of the Minneapolis domestic violence experiment, which 
concluded that repeat violence was less likely when police made arrests (Sherman 
and Cohn 1989). Pro-arrest policies have increased the incidence of arrests in cases 
of spousal assault, though compliance by officers is only partial (Cross and New-
bold 2010; Eitle 2005; Ferraro 1989; Hirschel et al. 2007; Jones and Belknap 1999). 
Evidence from replications of the Minneapolis experiment have cast doubts on the 
Police Departments as Institutionalized Organizations    23
conclusions that were drawn from that study, but it is doubtful that many depart-
ments have abandoned pro-arrest policies, which are still expected by sovereigns.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF POLICING
Police departments across the United States have been subject to a number of en-
vironmental forces for change in the past twenty to thirty years, but as Mastrofski 
and James Willis (2010, 57) observe, “the core police patrol technology has re-
mained essentially unchanged for decades.” Notwithstanding the panoply of ac-
coutrements that adorn an officer’s belt and, increasingly, his/her patrol car, police 
work is now and has always been a human service occupation that is performed 
through direct interaction with people, and that relies mainly on verbal commu-
nication. Coercive authority is the occupational prerogative that makes a police 
force a unique domestic organization, but most of the functions that police per-
form, most of the time, turn on how they talk with and to people. These basic 
features of police work have not changed with the introduction of the radio, the 
vehicle, computers, or cell phones.
The stability of the basics of police work stands in contrast with changes in the 
institutional environment. Local officials and other constituencies, state officials, 
and federal officials have all exerted pressures on police departments. Some of the 
pressures conflict with one another. These environmental forces have led police 
officials to adopt structural forms that are widely considered desirable, even in the 
absence of clear connections to valued outputs or outcomes, but that may be and 
often are only loosely coupled with street-level practice. We would direct atten-
tion to three such forms that the institutional environment of U.S. policing has, 
in general, promoted: community policing; mechanisms of public accountability; 
and mechanisms of management accountability.
Community Policing
With roots in team policing and foot patrol, community policing had by the 1980s 
emerged as a new strategy of policing. It includes establishing a new kind of re-
lationship between police and communities and new practices in addressing the 
public’s safety concerns. Police form partnerships with neighborhood groups and 
community agencies, seek and accept community input and influence on police 
priorities so that police address the concerns of the community, and foster more 
cooperative relationships between officers and community members. Officers 
make the acquaintance of community members and learn about neighborhood 
norms and concerns, and police address community problems through the prac-
tice of problem-oriented policing. Thus community policing calls for far-reaching 
structural and operational changes in police departments (Sparrow et al. 1990): 
establishing structures that facilitate community input and influence; forming 
24    Police Departments as Institutionalized Organizations
partnerships with community agencies (e.g., sanitation, public works) through 
which community problems can be addressed; flattening the police hierarchy and 
decentralizing authority; providing for stable beat assignments for officers in or-
der to inculcate attachments to and knowledge of communities; training officers 
in new practices; supervising and evaluating officers in new ways. Community 
policing is no programmatic “add-on” to existing organizational structures.
Community policing has enormous appeal to local constituencies, invoking 
images of “the friendly night watchman” who walks a beat and of a “‘community’ 
in the sense of groups of like-minded individuals, living in urban areas, who share 
a common heritage, have similar values and norms, and share a common percep-
tion of social order” (Crank, 1994: 335–336). The adoption and implementation of 
community policing was given a major federal boost in 1994 with the enactment of 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Title I of which provided for 
grants to state and local police agencies that subsidized the hiring of new officers, 
so long as the grantee agencies adopted some version of community policing. So 
it was that multiple forces in the environment of police agencies led (or pushed) 
them in the direction of this strategic innovation.
Research on the implementation of community policing, however, has gener-
ally found organizational innovations of a more limited, programmatic nature. 
A national survey conducted by the Police Foundation in 1993 found that only 
one-third of the respondents agreed that structural change was necessary for com-
munity policing, and almost 40 percent did not agree that “community policing 
requires major changes of organizational policies, goals, or mission statements” 
(Wycoff 1994, 32). Jeffrey A. Roth et al. (2004) report on a succession of agency 
surveys, in 1995, 1998, and 2000, in which they asked agencies about each of ten 
organizational practices that are associated with the implementation of commu-
nity policing, such as establishing neighborhood patrol boundaries, alternative re-
sponse methods to free up time for proactive work, and revising employee evalu-
ations. In 2000, their survey showed that the percentages of even large agencies 
that indicated that they had adopted these practices ranged from about 40 to 80. 
A previous survey and site visits led them to observe that “funding conditioned 
expressly on community policing implementation, coupled with substantial peer 
pressure to embrace this model of policing, has also led a substantial number of 
law enforcement agencies to stretch the definition of community policing—to in-
clude under its umbrella traditional quick-fix enforcement actions, draconian zero 
tolerance policies, long established crime prevention programs, and citizen advi-
sory councils that are clearly only advisory” (Roth 2000, 237).
Other research has recounted resistance to community policing among rank-
and-file police, whose hearts and minds have been difficult to win over to a new def-
inition of the police role, new ways to relate to the community, and new practices. 
Some officers who are more service-minded, and who may have been practicing a 
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community-oriented style on their own, are quite receptive to the implementation 
of community policing. Eugene A. Paoline III (2004) describes “peacekeepers,” for 
example, as having (relatively) positive attitudes toward the community and a role 
orientation that emphasizes order maintenance. But Paoline also finds a group he 
labels “traditionalists,” whose outlooks resemble those of the conventionally de-
scribed police culture: they prize crime-fighting and denigrate order maintenance, 
they endorse aggressive policing tactics and resent legal restrictions, and they are 
skeptical about citizen cooperation. More generally, we can surmise that officers 
are likely to embrace the practice of community policing to the degree to which it 
is consistent with their occupational outlooks, and consequently the implementa-
tion of community policing will face resistance in many though not all quarters 
(see Skogan 2008; Wood et al. 2004).
Problem-oriented policing (POP) is a key element of community policing, 
which focuses attention on constellations of related incidents—“problems”—and 
the conditions that contribute to them, on the plausible assumption that if one or 
more of the conditions can be changed, the problem may be ameliorated or even 
solved entirely. POP is contrasted with incident-driven policing, which provides 
only for handling incidents one by one, as police typically do when they respond to 
911 and other calls for service. POP requires not only a recognition that incidents 
are related to one another, but also analysis of conditions that contribute to the 
problem and that are within the power of police (and/or their partners) to alter. 
Moreover, POP is thought to be most effective when the search for responses that 
might alter the identified conditions is not limited to the enforcement of the penal 
law. Whether the scope of the targeted problem is wide or narrow, POP calls for 
a reorientation from incidents or cases—an orientation to which police become 
accustomed by their experience—to problems, and also from provable, concrete 
facts and evidence to more abstract patterns based on data that are not always ac-
curate or complete.
Experience with POP teaches us that its practice is not easily achieved (see 
Capowich et al. 1994; Cordner and Biebel 2005; Police Executive Research Forum 
2000; Sampson and Scott 2000). The popular SARA model of the POP process—
Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment—makes analysis central to the 
practice of POP (Eck and Spelman 1987; see also Tilley 2003); analysis, as the SARA 
model highlights, is the bridge from problem identification to the formulation of 
possible solutions. The problem-analysis triangle is a tool in whose use many of-
ficers have been trained, and it highlights the role of analysis in problem-solving. 
The problem-analysis triangle encourages those doing problem analysis to consid-
er three components that all problems have in common: an offender, a victim, and 
a location. Each of these may afford some leverage on the problem, though police 
attention has traditionally focused on the offender. Situational crime prevention, 
by contrast, focuses on features of the location, changes in which may reduce the 
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opportunities for offending. Similarly, changes in the behavior of would-be victims 
may reduce the opportunities for offending. Studies of POP have found that police 
officers tend to focus on narrowly defined problems; skip over or give short shrift 
to the analysis that supports problem-solving; and rely on conventional, enforce-
ment-based responses. Instead of POP, then, research has found more narrowly 
conceived “problem-solving” (Clarke 1998).
Even when community policing is implemented as a strategic reform, as it was 
in Chicago as much as (and probably more than) it was in any other city, it is 
fragile. There, after a decade of community policing and in the wake of a media-
generated “crime scare” that coincided with the selection of a new superintendent 
of police, the new administration prioritized tough enforcement.
The new chief . . . reorganized and refocused the department on guns, gangs, and ho-
micides. Soon commitment to the department’s community policing program with-
ered. Most districts lost their community-policing managers, lieutenants who were 
instead put in charge of flying squads. All of the department’s slack resources were 
rounded up to staff them. Police hoping to get ahead organizationally gravitated to-
ward crackdown units, for they are the focus of the top brass. Headquarters account-
ability reviews, which used to include community-policing activities and goals, were 
scaled back dramatically to make time for discussion of homicide patterns. Activi-
ties that better fit a recentralized management structure driven by recorded crime 
have become what matters. The only thing that protects the shell of the program that 
remains is that it was politically infeasible to shut it down, so deeply are the beat-
oriented parts of community policing woven into the political and organizational 
life of the city’s neighborhoods. There it lurks, waiting perhaps to be resurrected 
when a crisis of legitimacy again haunts the police, and they have to rediscover com-
munity policing in order to rebuild again their credibility with the community. 
(Skogan 2008, 33)
There is much to commend community policing as a police strategy, but the adop-
tion and implementation of community policing has confronted the challenge of 
coupling its organizational structures to street-level practice.
Public Accountability
Police brutality and other forms of police misconduct have been recurring issues 
at both the local and national levels for decades, and over the past forty years the 
country has seen the proliferation of one presumptive remedy: citizen oversight. 
This typically takes the form of what are widely known as civilian review boards, 
which are authorized to oversee the processing of citizens’ allegations of police 
misconduct. Citizen oversight might provide for the involvement of civilians, 
rather than sworn officers, in the receipt of complaints, in monitoring or assessing 
police investigations of alleged misconduct, or even in conducting their own “ex-
ternal” investigations pursuant to citizen complaints. The establishment of citizen 
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oversight in the 1980s and 1990s has been characterized as a “national movement” 
(Walker 2001). City after city adopted some version of citizen oversight, usually 
in the aftermath of a widely publicized incident of what was perceived as police 
brutality, and in response to local demands. The popularity of citizen oversight 
appears to rest on a deep-seated distrust of the willingness of the police to police 
themselves, that is, to conduct thorough investigations of complaints against fel-
low officers, or even to faithfully accept complaints when citizens seek to file them. 
Police departments did not, in general, welcome the establishment of citizen over-
sight. The push for citizen oversight is a force in the institutional environment to 
which departments have had to adapt.
However, there is no evidence that citizen oversight alters patterns of police 
behavior or performance. Indeed, there is no evidence that citizen oversight has 
impacts even on more proximate outcomes: the rate at which the allegations in 
citizen complaints are substantiated or “sustained” by investigation; or complain-
ants’ satisfaction with the complaint review process (DeAngelis 2009; Perez 1994; 
Sviridoff and McElroy 1989; Walker 2001; also see Livingston 2004; National 
Research Council 2004). There is, however, good reason to believe (and some evi-
dence) that, at the margin, citizen oversight elevates the confidence of the public 
(if not of individual complainants) in the integrity of the complaint review process 
(Kerstetter and Rasinski 1994; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; Worden and Becker 2015). 
Citizen oversight thus serves the purpose of promoting police legitimacy, but it 
appears to be decoupled from the technical core of policing.
Citizen oversight of police is not the only structural demand in the institu-
tional environment that relates to public accountability. In the past twenty years, 
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) has used authority 
with which it was endowed by the 1994 Crime Act to investigate allegations of a 
“pattern or practice” of civil rights violations by local police departments. DOJ 
can pursue (or threaten) litigation, one frequent outcome of which has been a 
settlement in the form of either a consent decree or a memorandum of agreement 
that stipulates the adoption of a series of organizational reforms (Harmon 2009; 
Walker 2003). Beginning with the Pittsburgh police in 1997, DOJ has investigated 
and reached agreements with numerous agencies, including the Cincinnati Police 
Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the New Jersey State Police. 
Court-appointed monitors oversee the implementation of the reforms, and the 
decree is lifted only when the agreed-upon reforms are implemented to the court’s 
satisfaction. Even when the investigation does not lead to an agreement, DOJ may 
issue a “technical assistance letter” that includes a series of recommendations for 
organizational change. The reforms that DOJ mandates through consent decrees 
(or recommends in letters) tend to emphasize the establishment or strengthening 
of citizen oversight, the implementation of early intervention systems, and policy 
development. These mandates purportedly are based on “best practices,” but in 
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fact they are based on the kinds of suppositions that we described above, lack-
ing empirical validation of their effectiveness. We have already considered citizen 
oversight.
Early intervention (EI) systems (also known as early warning systems) synthe-
size and use management information about police outputs that are “risk-related” 
(Bobb and staff 2009) to identify “problem officers,” whose performance displays 
symptoms of misconduct, and to intervene as early in the emerging pattern as pos-
sible with training or counseling, thereby preventing further misconduct. Given 
the well-documented concentration of citizen complaints and use-of-force inci-
dents among a small fraction of a police force, EI systems rest on a compelling 
logic. Several studies of EI systems have produced results that suggest that they 
reduce the incidence of complaints and the use of force, but the designs of these 
studies were weak, with either no control group or a nonequivalent control group; 
one recent study, with a much stronger design, found that one agency’s EI system 
was ineffective in reducing complaints, the use of force, or secondary arrests, but 
had the unintended consequence of inhibiting officers’ initiative (Worden et al. 
2013; also see Lersch et al. 2006). An assessment of Pittsburgh’s EI system, imple-
mented as part of the consent decree there, found that even officers who had not 
been subject to EI system intervention reported feeling such inhibitions, and su-
pervisors complained about the demands for paperwork that left them with less 
time to supervise officers directly, in the field (Davis et al. 2005). Thus, as promis-
ing as the concept may be, the jury is still out on the utility of EI systems as they 
are currently designed and operated. Furthermore, EI systems are not infrequently 
only loosely coupled with practice, as some recent investigative journalism has 
found (Kelly 2016).
DOJ lawyers have also required or recommended the formulation or further 
development of policy and procedure, especially concerning the use of force by 
police. Such administrative rule-making can be effective under some circumstanc-
es in regulating police behavior (Prottas 1978; Walker 1993; Worden 1995). James 
Fyfe (1979) demonstrated, for example, that the administrative rules established 
by the New York City Police Department to govern the use of deadly force were 
effective in reducing police-involved shootings; Fyfe’s research (1979, 1988) also 
makes it clear, however, that the effectiveness of the rules turned on their enforce-
ment, which was effected by a firearms-discharge review process, and which was 
feasible because, for the most part, the use of deadly force by police is difficult to 
conceal. For another example, as noted above, policies mandating or encouraging 
officers to make arrests when they have probable cause in cases of spousal assault 
have increased the incidence of such arrests. The documentation that comes with 
officers’ compliance with these rules facilitates their enforcement by supervisors, 
but even so, given officers’ near monopoly on information about cases in which 
arrests are not made, compliance is only partial at best, (Cross and Newbold 2010; 
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Ferraro 1989). Generally, we might hypothesize that the lower the visibility of the 
discretionary action that is the subject of administrative rules, the less able the 
department is to enforce the rule and the lower the rate of officers’ compliance will 
be. Little of the discretionary behavior in which officers engage is readily visible to 
supervisors and managers (Goldstein 1960), and Michael Brown (1981) concluded 
that bureaucratic controls did not by and large extend to the substantive exercise 
of police discretion.
A national survey of law enforcement agencies revealed a dizzying array of per-
mutations with respect to the placement of particular forms of force relative to 
others on a use-of-force continuum, and no one policy emerged as “best” in an 
intensive examination of the use of force in eight police departments, with neither 
bivariate nor multivariate analysis detecting “consistent policy effects” (Terrill, 
Paoline, and Ingram 2012, 198–99). However, in an analysis of three of the eight 
departments, whose policies varied in their restrictiveness, Terrill and Paoline 
(2016) find that officers in the department (Charlotte-Mecklenburg) with the most 
restrictive policy used less force than those in the departments (Albuquerque and 
Colorado Springs) with less restrictive policies. We think it quite likely that the 
impact of use-of-force policies will be contingent on the will of administrators 
and supervisors to enforce the policies. Terrill and Paoline note that “perhaps 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg supervisors were more active with respect to emphasizing 
use of force policy, thereby giving policy on paper more ‘substance’ so to speak. 
Alternatively, perhaps Colorado Springs and Albuquerque supervisors were more 
lax in terms of policy guidance (e.g. ‘rubber stamping’ force reports)” (2016: 19). In 
other words, policies designed to guide and constrain officers’ discretion in the use 
of less-lethal force can be coupled with practice, so long as police managers and 
supervisors enforce their department’s policy; lax supervision and management 
concerning the use of force is liable to leave policy loosely coupled with officers’ 
practices. One success story of change in this regard appears to be Cincinnati, 
whose officers’ rates of using force declined following reforms to which the police 
department agreed in a settlement with DOJ in 2002 (Schatmeier 2013; Chanin 
2015); we consider the experience of Cincinnati further in chapter 10.
Demands for public accountability in the institutional environment of polic-
ing have promoted the adoption of particular organizational structures—citizen 
oversight, early intervention systems, and administrative rules governing the use 
of force—that have little or no demonstrated efficacy in regulating officers’ behav-
ior, and are in many or most instances only loosely coupled to street-level perfor-
mance. But their adoption by police departments is taken as a signal of good prac-
tice, and the Department of Justice has been one external stakeholder demanding 
the adoption of these structures, with the threat of litigation. Use-of-force policies 
may hold more promise, with tighter coupling possible so long as managers and 
supervisors implement the policies.
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Management Accountability
Compstat is an administrative innovation introduced as part of the “reengineer-
ing” of the New York City Police Department wrought by Commissioner William 
Bratton in the mid-1990s (Bratton 1998, esp. chap. 14). Seeking to make the com-
manders of NYPD’s seventy-five precincts the engines of crime-reduction initia-
tives, Commissioner Bratton gave precinct commanders more authority to develop 
operational plans and to allocate their resources accordingly, holding them ac-
countable through Compstat for using their authority to achieve crime-reduction 
results. Compstat originated in meetings with borough and precinct command-
ers at which their performance could be assessed, justified, and critiqued, with 
information on that performance available to all present; the information about 
crime, initially available in a book of weekly crime totals, became increasingly 
detailed and rich, so that what started as “crime meetings” evolved into “computer-
statistics” meetings.
NYPD’s Compstat was—correctly or not—credited with the dramatic decline 
in New York City’s crime rate through the latter half of the 1990s, and consequent-
ly it has been widely emulated by police agencies across the United States and 
the world. In 1996, Compstat was recognized with an “Innovations in American 
Government” award by the Ford Foundation and Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government. By 2000, one third of the 515 American police agencies with 100 or 
more sworn personnel had adopted a Compstat-like program, and an additional 
one quarter were planning such a program (Weisburd et al. 2003). Compstat has 
also been adopted by other types of public agencies, and by city mayors and even 
state governors. Compstat can be an organizational mechanism that serves, first, 
to direct attention to important police outcomes—crime, disorder, fear of crime, 
quality of life, citizen satisfaction—and, second, to stimulate the formulation and 
implementation of tactical and strategic operations directed toward those out-
comes (Moore 2002). Like POP, Compstat is data-driven and outcome-oriented. 
Using timely, accurate data is one of its principles, and the selection of effective 
tactics on the basis of those data is another. “Relentless follow-up and assessment” 
is also based on data about police action and outcomes. Compstat requires the 
development of an analytic capacity, and when it operates properly, it also serves 
to exploit the potential of crime and intelligence analysis more completely, for it 
is a mechanism that can stimulate the translation of analytic products into crime-
reduction operations.
But the replication of NYPD’s Compstat in other agencies has not always ad-
hered to the same principles, and it has not proved to be effective in prompting 
precinct commanders or their subordinates to engage in innovative problem-solving; 
it has not proved effective even in holding commanders accountable for outcomes 
(Behn 2008; Silverman 2006; Weisburd et al. 2003; Willis et al. 2003, 2007). Comp-
stat in NYPD would not have been so effective as an accountability tool were it 
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not for the larger reengineering of the department, including “structural, opera-
tional, and strategic reconfigurations” (Silverman 2006, 273). One of the keys was 
the recognition that precinct commanders could be held accountable for reduc-
ing crime only if they were granted greater latitude to formulate crime-reduction 
initiatives and to allocate resources accordingly. Grafting Compstat onto a police 
department’s preexisting organizational arrangements is unlikely to produce simi-
larly salutary effects; Compstat would then be liable to be no more than loosely 
coupled with either management or tactical operations. The adoption and contin-
ued operation of Compstat could serve the organization’s interests, enhancing its 
legitimacy, but without stimulating the kinds of operations that have been credited 
with New York’s crime decline.
That is exactly what was found in a study of three police departments in which 
the adoption of Compstat amounted to “mimetic isomorphism,” which is to say 
that they simply copied “other organizations that have received recognition and 
support for appearing effective” (Willis et al. 2007, 152). Compstat was loosely 
coupled to operations: in none of the departments did accountability extend down 
past the precinct or district commanders, with no “efforts to get the rank-and-file 
to respond to the direction of middle managers,” and consequently Compstat “did 
not strengthen control over lower-ranking officers who continued to exercise the 
same high level of discretion long recognized as a characteristic of police work” 
(165–66). Commanders succeeded in the context of the Compstat meetings by be-
ing prepared with facts and figures to respond to the chief ’s questions, and not by 
devising and implementing effective crime-reduction strategies. More generally, it 
appears that Compstat reforms tended to strengthen the existing top-down chain 
of command, rather than stimulating innovative problem-solving—“changing ev-
erything so that everything can remain the same” (Weisburd et al. 2006).
Complexity and Conflict
The institutional environment is complex, and its demands on police departments 
are not all mutually compatible. Pushing discretion down as much as possible to 
precinct commanders or, even further, to field supervisors and beat officers, and 
thereby unleashing the creativity of officers in addressing the many and varied 
problems that communities confront, is a prominent feature of community polic-
ing. But expanding officers’ discretion is not entirely compatible with demands 
for public accountability and administrative rule-making, which tend to empha-
size constraints on police discretion. And as Wesley Skogan’s (2008) observations 
about numbers-driven policing in Chicago illustrate, community policing and 
management accountability can be difficult to reconcile, especially since so much 
of what community policing involves and seeks to accomplish is not readily subject 
to quantitative measurement. This kind of complexity in the institutional environ-
ment of policing helps to explain how it is that day-to-day police work might be 
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decoupled from or loosely coupled with the structures that agencies adopt: when 
the structures that police departments adopt conflict with one another or with 
the nature of the work, something has to give. When something gives, however, 
it need not give way entirely: we need not and should not suppose that technical-
rational considerations are absent or that organizational structures—even those 
adopted to satisfy demands of the institutional environment—have no impact on 
technical performance. But insofar as street-level practices are loosely coupled to 
organizational structures, the impacts of the structures on practices are attenuated.
Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy
As police executives have acknowledged the significance of legitimacy, and the 
role of procedural justice in improving legitimacy, they have responded to an 
emerging force in their institutional environment. Summarizing research on 
policing, the National Research Council drew attention to these issues in its 
volume titled Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing (2004), an entire chapter of 
which was devoted to police legitimacy. DOJ has supported the development 
of training in procedural justice through the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS), and it has supported research on procedural jus-
tice and legitimacy (including the inquiry on which we report here) through 
the National Institute of Justice. The International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) has held sessions on procedural justice and legitimacy at its 
annual conference. The Police Executive Research Forum, a well-known not-
for-profit membership organization of police officials, recently published two 
reports on legitimacy and procedural justice (Fischer 2014a, 2014b). As we not-
ed in chapter 1, the DOJ-funded National Initiative for Building Community 
Trust and Justice is designed to serve as a demonstration project, piloting in 
six police departments structures that promise to enhance public trust in lo-
cal police. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted 
measures to enhance procedural justice, and, with it, police legitimacy, in its 
recommendations and implementation guide.
Legitimacy and procedural justice have not supplanted the other forces in the 
institutional environment, however, and the procedural justice model is not en-
tirely compatible with them. The procedural justice model will not be compat-
ible with Compstat-like mechanisms unless procedural justice can be regularly 
quantified as a performance measure with sufficient validity and reliability for it 
to be incorporated into a management-accountability system. Procedural justice 
may be celebrated, in ceremonial fashion, as an important consideration in the 
practice of policing, but it is liable to assume the position of an only symbolic 
feature of police administration and not a set of principles that are infused into 
the technical core of police departments and manifested in officers’ day-to-day 
interactions with citizens. The implementation of the procedural justice model 
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may also confront some of the same obstacles that so challenged the implementa-
tion of community policing: winning the hearts and minds of officers and field 
supervisors. It is subject to the same process of street-level interpretation, or 
sensemaking, as community policing, and it is likely to be accepted by some 
officers and resisted by others. Street-level procedural justice probably cannot 
be achieved through the formulation and promulgation of administrative rules, 
since the procedural justice that officers demonstrate in their behavior is of de-
cidedly low visibility, and rules governing procedurally just action would be dif-
ficult to enforce. Procedural justice is arguably more a matter of “workmanship” 
than “legality” (Bittner 1983), and putting standards of workmanship into place 
confronts legal, bureaucratic, union, and other practical issues.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT S OF POLICING 
IN SCHENECTADY AND SYR ACUSE
We have sketched the institutional perspective on organizations, and selected 
features of the institutional environment of U.S. policing, in order to better un-
derstand the findings of our research on Schenectady and Syracuse, whose police 
departments accommodated survey-based measures of procedural justice into 
their management-accountability systems. We turn now to a description of these 
departments as settings for this research, attending particularly to the rationale 
for conducting the research in these two departments, and to the elements of their 
institutional environments that are important for understanding the contexts in 
which research results were generated.
The Schenectady and Syracuse Police Departments are mid-sized agencies, and 
in this respect they resemble many other departments; among the respondents to 
the 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) 
survey, one can find nearly 500 agencies with 100 to 500 sworn, full-time employ-
ees, but only 89 agencies with more than 500 sworn personnel, about half of which 
have more than 1,000 sworn. No sample of two agencies could possibly be repre-
sentative of American municipal police departments, but insofar as the external 
validity of empirical findings about the dynamics of organization and manage-
ment is circumscribed by the size of the studied departments, Schenectady and 
Syracuse are propitious sites for research. Moreover, an examination of two de-
partments rather than one allows us to ascertain the extent to which the findings 
are idiosyncratic to a single department.
The two cities are similar in a number of respects. They are both rustbelt cities 
that are coping with demographic and economic shifts that have strained govern-
mental capacities with greater demands for services and an eroding tax base. The 
populations are comparable in their racial and ethnic composition. Both cities 
have fairly high rates of violent crime, especially for cities of their size.
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The two departments also share a number of similarities. Their sworn ranks are 
disproportionately white, relative to the cities’ populations, with limited represen-
tation of women. However, both departments had, at the beginning and through 
most of the project, a black chief executive; Syracuse had a female deputy chief. 
These facts may have a bearing on perceptions of the departments’ legitimacy.
We had a relationship with each department before we approached either chief 
about his department’s participation in the project. In Syracuse, we had worked 
since late 2004 as the research partner to a criminal justice task force that included 
the police department. We had worked as a research partner to the Schenectady 
Police Department since 2004. Both departments afforded the proximity that was 
required for ongoing data collection and appearance at Compstat meetings. Both 
chiefs were, as we anticipated, receptive to the project, based on their avowed 
interest in ensuring high-quality police service to the citizenry. Finally, the two 
departments had contrasting public images. Schenectady’s had a poor image ac-
quired through years of extraordinary turmoil and scandal. Syracuse’s had what 
we take to be a fairly typical image, free of the taint of extraordinary mishaps. 
Accordingly, we presumed that there would be a degree of contrast with respect to 
levels of respect and trust among those they serve.
Schenectady
According to 2010 Census figures, the city of Schenectady has 66,135 residents 
and is comprised of ten distinct neighborhoods across its ten square miles. 
Nearly one-quarter (24.4 percent) of the population was under the age of 18; 
61 percent of it was white, 20 percent, African American, 10.5 percent, Hispanic 
or Latino, and 3.6 percent, Asian. The proportion of Schenectady’s population 
living in poverty (22.5 percent) was half again that of the nation (15 percent). 
The city’s violent crime rate exceeds the average of the largest U.S. cities: in 2010, 
Schenectady’s violent crime rate of 1117.7 per 100,000 population was 183 percent 
higher than that of cities of comparable size (394.6) and 57 percent higher than 
that of the largest U.S. cities. The rates are as striking with respect to homicide. 
In 2010, the homicide rate in Schenectady was 13.2, which was more than three 
times greater than in cities of comparable size (3.9), and 47 percent higher than 
that of the largest cities.
The Schenectady Police Department had a sworn strength of 160 and an actual 
strength of 158 in 2007, 114 of whom were uniformed and regularly assigned to 
patrol duties.2 Most (94.3 percent) of the sworn personnel were white, 3.8 percent 
were black, and 1.9 percent were Hispanic; 5.1 percent were female. Schenectady’s 
chief of police is appointed by the mayor but enjoys civil service status and pro-
tection. The chief who in 2010 agreed to participate in this project was first ap-
pointed in 2008 and retired at the beginning of 2013. The assistant chief of the 
Field Services Bureau oversees uniformed patrol, which is organized into three 
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platoons, each commanded by a lieutenant, with officers deployed across eight 
patrol zones.
Like many U.S. police departments, Schenectady had established a commu-
nity policing unit, to which 24 of its 158 officers were assigned, though it had no 
formal, written community-policing plan. The unit was part of the Field Services 
Bureau. Training in community policing was provided to all officers through ei-
ther recruit or in-service training. The department encourages officers to conduct 
SARA-guided problem-solving projects, but it does not include officers’ work on 
those projects in personnel evaluations.
Citizen oversight exists in Schenectady, though it is not prominent. In 2002, 
after two years of deliberations, the Civilian Police Review Board (CPRB) replaced 
the Police Objective Review Commission. Modeled on the citizen-oversight 
mechanism in neighboring Albany, the CPRB is comprised of eleven members 
appointed by the mayor to serve two-year terms. The CPRB reviews the investi-
gations of citizen complaints by police internal affairs investigators, and in cases 
involving allegations of excessive force or (other) civil rights violations, the board 
may hire an independent investigator to review the police investigation. The board 
may return a complaint to internal affairs for further investigation or reevaluation, 
and when it is satisfied with the investigation, it renders findings of approved, dis-
approved, or unable to be determined.
The department initiated Compstat in late 2010, following nearly a year of de-
liberation about its design and preparation. Thus Compstat had been operational 
for just a year at the outset of this project. Schenectady’s Compstat provides for 
monthly meetings, at each of which units of both the Field Services Bureau (patrol 
and traffic) and the Investigative Services Bureau (detectives) are subject to review. 
The three platoon commanders report individually on platoon performance, so 
each platoon is examined separately. Statistics on crime and enforcement, city-
wide and at the platoon level, are displayed as appropriate. We further describe 
Schenectady’s Compstat in chapter 8, but suffice it to say here that although it un-
mistakably makes each platoon commander individually responsible for his or her 
platoon’s performance, it is not—and was not intended to be—punitive. Whereas 
management accountability requires the application of formal or informal sanc-
tions when performance falls short of expectations, Schenectady’s Compstat does 
not provide for it. More generally, the operation of Compstat in Schenectady bears 
a strong resemblance to that of Compstat in the three departments described by 
Willis et al. 2007.
The Schenectady Police Department has a long and troubled history of un-
favorable portrayal in the media and scandals involving the misbehavior of its 
members. In 2001, after years of complaints by citizens about the use of excessive 
force and mounting pressure by civil rights activists to address the problem, the 
department became the subject of a probe by the DOJ Civil Rights Division. The 
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New York Times recounted some of the incidents that were symptomatic of the 
problem, one of which was this:
Suspecting that David Sampson was up to no good but having no proof, the two white 
police officers chose instead to take him for a ride that summer’s evening in 1999. A 
long, long ride. They drove in silence, ignoring the young black man’s questions as 
their patrol car crossed the city limits and continued 11 miles deep into the country-
side’s enveloping dusk. “I kept asking them ‘Where am I going?’ over and over, 15, 
16 times,” Mr. Sampson, 29, said recently. “I was really scared.” They came to a stop on 
a gravel road. While his partner stayed behind the wheel, Officer Richard Barnett later 
recalled, he removed their passenger’s boots, tossed them into the surrounding trees 
and told Mr. Sampson “to get out and have a nice walk back to Schenectady.” Then 
the car, emblazoned with the name of the Schenectady Police Department, sped into 
the darkness, its back seat emptied. This is Schenectady, where the police do things 
differently. Officer Barnett later said under oath that it was “common practice for a lot 
of midnight shifts taking intoxicated people out of the city.” It was called “relocation,” 
he said, and had been the source of great amusement among officers. (Barry 2001)
“Relocation” was later characterized as an official unwritten policy to DOJ investiga-
tors. The officers involved in the Sampson incident became the subjects of an FBI 
investigation, but not because of their practice of relocation; one of them admitted in 
a plea agreement that “he and his partner once paid an informer with crack that they 
had just extorted from a drug dealer” (Barry 2001). Other officers were also prosecuted 
on similar allegations; one of them had tipped off an informer to police surveillance.
In March 2003, DOJ issued a “technical assistance” letter (Cutlar 2003). Based 
on its review of the department’s written policies and procedures, interviews with 
officers at various levels of the department’s hierarchy, and ride-alongs with of-
ficers, DOJ identified a number of deficiencies and made a number of recom-
mendations. Those recommendations for the most part followed the template 
described above: further development of policies governing the use of force; 
strengthening the procedures for complaint intake and investigation (since Sche-
nectady already had a citizen oversight body); and establishing an early warn-
ing system, including the information infrastructure that such a system requires 
(including use-of-force reporting). More specifically, and for example, DOJ rec-
ommended that “the SPD adopt a progression of force model that describes the 
available force options on a continuum  .  .  . that relates the appropriate officer 
response to the specific actions of a suspect.” For another example, DOJ recom-
mended that “every officer in the department be required to accept a written 
complaint presented by a citizen,” and that written policy should specify the types 
of complaints that can be investigated by the subject officer’s unit and those that 
are investigated by internal affairs. DOJ also recommended the formulation of a 
“comprehensive risk management plan,” including specific supervisory responsi-
bilities, in addition to an early warning system.
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The turnaround was slow, and the local media continued to report with some 
regularity on officers’ driving while intoxicated, engaging in domestic assaults, 
“cooping” (sleeping on duty), and worse. A veteran detective of the department 
pled guilty to possessing drugs and tampering with evidence from the vice squad 
locker, and as part of a plea agreement, he was sentenced to four years in state 
prison and one year of probation. Following an investigation of the vice squad, a 
number of vice detectives were reassigned or retired and the assistant chief over 
the unit was ultimately reassigned. “For the Schenectady Police Department, a 
department with a well-documented history of controversy and scandal, this latest 
news seemed to most of us almost unfathomable,” the mayor told a press con-
ference (Schenectady 2007). In a later article articulating allegations of an officer 
collecting overtime pay while inside an apartment complex instead of on patrol, 
Schenectady City Councilman Gary McCarthy said: “It’s human nature to make 
mistakes, but this just seems so institutionalized” (Nelson 2009). In 2009, a former 
Schenectady chief and his wife were arrested and pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and their role in a drug ring. It was found that the ex-chief, 
his wife, and his stepson were part of a group of “some two dozen people who fun-
neled large quantities of cocaine and heroin from Long Island and Manhattan onto 
the streets of Schenectady” (Nelson 2010).
Due to the widespread disrepute of the department and its members, the mayor 
of Schenectady is reported to have considered in 2009 multiple options for the fu-
ture of City’s policing; these options included, but were not limited to, martial law, 
disbanding the police department, contracting out to the New York State Police or 
county sheriff ’s, or using the National Guard. The mayor did not in fact take any of 
the aforementioned routes; instead he was able to start removing problem officers 
and enacted a zero-tolerance policy for the officers. A retired superintendent of 
the New York State Police was appointed commissioner in 2007, with greater au-
thority than the chief had to fix discipline. By August of 2010 the City had removed 
eight officers from its force that year.
If residents of Schenectady still hear of their city’s police officers being appre-
hended or investigated for driving while intoxicated, assault, or domestic issues, 
they also hear of them having to face consequences and being held accountable for 
their actions. In late 2012, DOJ ended its investigation, declaring that the depart-
ment was not in violation of federal law, and citing its adoption of some of DOJ’s 
2003 recommendations (Nelson 2013). We may reasonably consider that chapter 
of the department’s history to be closed, but memories of it may linger, potentially 
tarnishing the image of the department as a whole among the city’s residents and 
throughout the entire region.
It might not be an exaggeration to say that in 2009, the Schenectady Police De-
partment suffered a crisis of legitimacy, with the city’s mayor publicly contemplat-
ing dismantling it. Even allowing for the possibility that the mayor’s public posture 
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was struck as a move calculated to gain some leverage in collective bargaining 
negotiations, it is probably a measure of how far the department’s stock with its 
sovereigns had fallen that the mayor would openly speculate, for public consump-
tion, about the wisdom of abolishing the police department.
Syracuse
The city of Syracuse covers 25 square miles and had a population of approximately 
145,170 in 2010. According to the Census, nearly one-quarter (23.3 percent) of the 
population was under the age of 18; 56 percent of it was white, 29.5 percent, African 
American, 8.3 percent Hispanic or Latino, and 5.5 percent, Asian. The proportion 
of the city’s population living in poverty (33.6 percent) was more than double that 
of the nation (15 percent).
Syracuse is not a big city, but it has big-city violence. Despite some decreases 
in the past several years, violent crime in Syracuse remains well above not only 
the average for cities its size (100,000 to 249,999) but even above the average for 
the largest U.S. cities. In 2011, the violent crime rate (per 100,000 population) in 
Syracuse was 892.9, 79 percent higher than the rate for cities of comparable size 
(498.5), and 27 percent higher than that of the largest U.S. cities. The rate of aggra-
vated assaults that same year (576 per 100,000) was 94 percent higher than the rate 
in similarly sized cities, and 54 percent higher than that of the largest U.S. cities.
In 2007, the Syracuse Police Department had a sworn strength of 498 and an 
actual strength of 485, of whom 203 were uniformed and regularly assigned duties 
that included responsibility for responding to calls, with 16 assigned to community 
policing. Most (91.8 percent) of the sworn personnel were white, 7 percent were 
black, and 1 percent were Hispanic; 11.8 percent were female. The chief of police is 
appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the mayor. The chief who agreed to par-
ticipate in this project was first appointed by a newly elected mayor in late 2009, 
and continues to serve at the time of this writing. The deputy chief of the Uniform 
Bureau oversees patrol, which is organized into three platoons, each commanded 
by a captain.
The community policing unit was part of the Community Services Bureau, 
which was commanded by a deputy chief. The department had a formal, written 
community-policing plan, though it did not encourage officers to conduct SARA-
guided problem-solving projects. Training in community policing was provided to 
all new officers through recruit training.
Syracuse has a Citizen Review Board, which was originally established in 1993, 
and which is authorized to “hear, investigate and review” complaints of police 
misconduct.3 The CRB has a full-time, paid administrator. The Internal Affairs 
(IA) Division of the police department conducts “initial investigations” (Cintron 
2003, 21), which are forwarded to the CRB for review. However, if the complain-
ant so requests, the CRB is authorized to hold a full fact-finding hearing, which 
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is conducted by a CRB panel of three members. The CRB was the subject of some 
controversy during the project, which we discuss below.
The department initiated Compstat (but spelled “Comstat”) in 1999.4 Compstat 
had reportedly evolved over time, but had always been convened on a regular, 
biweekly basis. Compstat provides for presentations by platoon commanders and 
other unit commanders, as well as by a representative from the crime analysis 
unit. We further describe Syracuse’s Compstat in chapter 8, but suffice to say here 
that, like Schenectady’s, its operation resembles that of the departments studied by 
Willis et al. (2007).
By way of contrast with Schenectady’s recent history at the outset of this proj-
ect, the Syracuse Police Department appears to be fairly typical, insofar as the 
department received a share of bad press locally but nothing extraordinary. For 
example, in 2005 the then-chief resigned following his arrest for driving while 
intoxicated; the print media followed the troubles of one Syracuse officer who was 
involved in (and arrested for) giving cigarettes, marijuana, and alcohol to minors, 
drug trafficking out of his home, and sexually abusing two young boys. More com-
monly, the coverage of the Syracuse police focused on use of force that was alleged 
to be excessive.
During the project and while the police services survey was in progress, the 
Syracuse police were subject to further negative print media attention. One high-
visibility source of bad press was a dispute between the department and the On-
ondaga County district attorney. A sexual abuse case against a well-known Syra-
cuse University basketball coach received local and national media attention, and 
a conflict between the district attorney’s office and the police department played 
out in the media, with the district attorney issuing a subpoena requiring the police 
to turn over the records of their investigation. The district attorney continued to 
publicly air his disagreements with the leadership of the department in what one 
local media outlet described as an “extraordinary public war of words with . . . [the 
chief] for more than a year” (O’Brien and O’Hara 2013).
Tensions between the mayor’s office and the department arose when the mayor 
refused to sign a commendation for an officer in 2010 because he was previously 
found to have used excessive force against a suspect in a drug and assault case. The 
mayor said that she has been working to clean out a minority of police officers 
whose behavior had been inappropriate: “[W]e are actively changing the culture 
and the behavior,” she said (O’Brien 2010b). As a response, the police union and 
its members boycotted the city’s annual awards ceremony in June and held their 
own in August.
The Citizen Review Board (CRB) was disbanded by the mayor and recreated. 
In February 2011, the mayor fired the CRB administrator because she “failed to do 
her job” (Knauss 2012). The CRB is an eleven-member panel, eight members of 
which are appointed by the Common Council and three by the mayor. The mayor 
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appointed her three new members in January 2012 and the new administrator was 
announced in April that year. Although the chief of police supports the CRB, the 
police union sees it as “unnecessary” (Reiner 2012). The union particularly object-
ed to the CRB’s subpoena power, which requires a police officer to appear in front 
of the board’s panel, but does not force the officer to speak. The union president 
said that the CRB did not have the proper training to investigate a police officer; 
the officers had twenty weeks’ worth of training, he observed, and they (the CRB 
members) would not do twenty hours’ worth (Reiner, 2012).
In addition to citizens’ complaints about unfair treatment that filter into the 
media, officers’ complaints about unfair treatment have also received coverage. 
In March 2010, a female officer was awarded $400,000 in a sexual discrimination 
suit. She was reportedly the third officer in a ten-month period to receive a large 
award for sexual discrimination (O’Brien 2010a). Then, in February 2012, three 
black officers sued the department for racial discrimination, stating that they had 
been passed over for promotions and discriminated against by the police force and 
their own union because of their race (Eisenstadt 2012).
Contrasts
Some negative media attention is inevitable for a city police department, and we 
know of no well-established metric of bad press. Both of the study departments 
received some unfavorable attention in local media. But Schenectady’s police had 
been the subject of extraordinary attention, not only in the form of uncompli-
mentary media coverage, but also in the form of a DOJ civil rights investigation, 
and even public speculation by the city’s mayor about the wisdom of disband-
ing the department. Whether the unfavorable distinction that Schenectady police 
earned translated into a lower level of public trust is intuitively likely, though it is 
an empirical question. We supposed that if one of the two departments stood to 
enhance its legitimacy more through improvements in the procedural justice of 
police-citizen encounters, it was Schenectady’s. But the two agencies were similar 
in many respects, and as the project began in 2011, the worst of Schenectady’s 
scandals were behind it. We would do well to bear Schenectady’s recent history in 
mind, but we can nevertheless think of the study of either department as a replica-
tion of the study of the other.
SUMMARY
When police departments are viewed as institutionalized organizations, we can 
better understand how it is that reforms, such as community policing or the pro-
cedural justice model, tend to come undone. Vats of ink have been spilt on the dif-
ficulties in organizational change, and police departments are no exceptions to the 
rule that organizations tend to resist change. Change in the form of the procedural 
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justice model can be done in all executive sincerity and with the best of intentions 
through, say, pronouncements about the importance of legitimacy and how police 
treat citizens, changing procedures,5 or even rolling out a training curriculum, 
but we should be skeptical that these reforms will produce systematic changes in 
the department’s technical core, in police-citizen interactions at the street level. 
Structures that are designed to be tightly coupled with day-to-day practice may, 
upon inspection, be no more than loosely coupled (or decoupled) from practice. 
To administrative exhortation we may anticipate rank-and-file resistance, the likes 
of which we will describe in more detail in chapter 9. If there are domains of police 
work that are susceptible to control through administrative rule-making, proce-
dural justice is probably not one of them. Police departments cannot mandate 
procedurally just treatment, and even if they tried to do so, the mandate would 
be virtually unenforceable. Departments can prohibit some forms of procedural 
injustice, such as discourtesy, as many already do, though these prohibitions are 
(or have been) difficult to enforce. And in any event, police managers will need to 
make judgments about the extent to which they want to and should micro-manage 
their subordinates’ behavior. Training can be (and in some instances, has been) 
delivered, but the lessons of training must be reconcilable with the (interpreted) 
requirements of the streets, and reinforced by supervisors, or its effects are likely 
to decay; that is, then, training must be tightly coupled with the day-to-day reality 
of officers’ experience, and if it is not, it will prove ineffective.
With this institutional perspective as background, we proceed now to the find-
ings of our empirical research in and with these departments. In chapter 3 we ex-
amine public trust and confidence in the police and police legitimacy, and then in 
chapters 4 and 5, citizens’ subjective experience with police, and especially citizens’ 
judgments about procedural justice.
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Police legitimacy—that is, public trust in and a felt obligation to obey the 
police—forms the fulcrum of the procedural justice model of policing. Such 
outlooks are intrinsically important, of course, and they are important also be-
cause research suggests that they lead to other valued outcomes: compliance 
with the law, providing information to police, working with them on commu-
nity problems, and accepting police directions and decisions in police-citizen 
encounters. Tom Tyler’s model of process-based regulation (Tyler 1988, 1990, 
2003, 2004; Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun, 2015) holds that trust is influenced by the 
procedural justice with which authorities are perceived to wield their powers, 
and so it would appear to be susceptible to enhancement through improvements 
in the procedural justice with which police act.
In this chapter, we explain our use of terms and concepts, lest we confuse the 
meaning of legitimacy as a construct of institutional theory with that of the con-
structs in social psychological theory. We first consider trust and obligation in the 
context of public attitudes toward the police more generally, including their histor-
ical trends and the forces that influence those attitudes. Public attitudes toward the 
police are subject to some broad social factors that have shaped attitudes toward 
government and other social institutions, as well as factors more peculiar to polic-
ing. We discuss those here so that we can better understand the role that citizens’ 
own experiences with the police play in contributing to (or detracting from) their 
trust and confidence in police. Citizens’ direct contacts with the police are not the 
only influence on trust; moreover, citizens’ interpretations of their contacts with 
the police are themselves subject to the influence of prior attitudes and contex-
tual factors. We also assess citizens’ satisfaction with the police as a special case 
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of “customer” satisfaction. We consider the respects in which citizens resemble 
customers, and those in which the analogy to customers breaks down, and briefly 
discuss selected findings from research on customer satisfaction that may serve to 
place citizens’ satisfaction with the police in perspective. Then we consider how 
levels of public trust may be related to the legitimacy of police departments, as an 
organizational property, and discuss challenges to police legitimacy in the form of 
diminished trust and also, more overtly, protests and riots.
We then present survey results that bear on public trust and obligation in Sche-
nectady and Syracuse, which serves two purposes. First, an analysis of the levels 
of public trust of the study departments enables us to consider them in the larger 
context of their public images. Second, by establishing the measurement proper-
ties of the trust and obligation constructs that can be derived from the survey 
data, we will be better able in the next chapter to determine the extent to which 
the subjective experiences of people in Schenectady and Syracuse exhibit the same 
kinds of associations with trust and obligation as those commonly reported in 
previous research.
PUBLIC TRUST AND OBLIGATION
From the perspective of social psychology, at least two strands of legitimacy have 
been identified; we will call them trust and obligation. With respect to the police 
in particular, the Committee to Review Research of the National Research Council 
(2004, 291) explained that by “legitimacy we mean the judgments that ordinary 
citizens make about the rightfulness of police conduct and the organizations that 
employ and supervise them.” However, Tyler has emphasized the obligation to 
obey an authority as a hallmark of its legitimacy. For his seminal study of Chicago, 
Tyler conceived legitimacy as not only “support for legal authorities” but also a 
“perceived obligation to obey,” and the latter aspect—obligation—is prominently 
featured: “When people feel that an authority is legitimate, they authorize that 
authority to determine what their behavior will be within a given set of situations” 
(Tyler 2004, 87).
However, empirical research that has examined the dimensionality of these le-
gitimacy constructs has shown that indicators of trust in or support for police are 
manifestations of a latent construct that is distinct from that of obligation. In an 
analysis of the construct validity of process-based measures, Reisig, Bratton, and 
Gertz 2007 concluded that trust and obligation are distinct constructs only moder-
ately related to one another. Similarly, Jacinta Gau (2011) found a two-dimensional 
structure underlying these indicators. Moreover, Reisig et al. (2007, 1022–23) found 
that trust affected both cooperation and compliance, while obligation affected 
neither cooperation nor compliance. Hence, we treat trust and obligation as two 
distinct social psychological dimensions.
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Tyler’s model of process-based regulation is the predominant social psycholog-
ical theory of legitimacy. In this model, procedural justice is the central antecedent 
of legitimacy: “legitimacy develops from and is maintained by the fair exercise of 
authority on the part of the police when they deal with the public—that is, through 
the provision of procedural justice” (Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun 2015; also see Tyler 
1988, 1990, 2003, 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo 2002). Procedural 
justice is not about whether but rather how authority is exercised. As Schulhofer, 
Tyler, and Huq 2011 indicates, police need not choose between being tough and 
being fair; they can be both tough and fair.
Although Tyler’s model has been the conceptual touchstone for social psy-
chological research on police legitimacy, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
a consensus has emerged on the definition of legitimacy. Justice Tankebe (2013; 
2014) insists that legitimacy should not be conflated with either trust or obligation; 
police legitimacy, he argues, has four dimensions: lawfulness; procedural fairness; 
distributive fairness; and effectiveness. James Hawdon (2008) maintains that legit-
imacy is different from trust. And Ben Bradford and Jonathan Jackson (2009) note 
that though there may be important differences among trust, confidence, support, 
satisfaction, and legitimacy, much of the research on public attitudes toward the 
police is predicated on an assumption that people tend to subscribe to a single 
outlook about the police that shapes their judgments about various aspects of the 
police. We acknowledge these cautions without accepting their implications. In 
view of these competing views of legitimacy, and the potential for confusing it 
with organizational legitimacy, we focus as appropriate on trust and obligation.
Public Trust of Police in Context
Our understanding of trust and confidence in the police is enriched by placing it in 
the larger context of facts about public attitudes. First, the public’s trust in “govern-
ment,” which has been tracked for many years in the American National Election 
Studies (ANES), declined from 76 percent in 1964 to 25 percent in 1980, and since 
then has exceeded 50 percent only once, in 2002.1 The ANES trust in government 
index, which combines responses to four survey items that all concern the federal 
government, fell from its peak of 61 in 1966 to 27 in 1980, and through 2008 never 
again reached 50, fluctuating mainly in the 20s and 30s.2 This decline in trust in the 
government to some extent paralleled a broader decline in trust and confidence in 
social institutions, such as the press, medicine, and education (Smith 2008).
Second, in general, the public now has more confidence in state and local gov-
ernments (Gerstenson and Plane 2007; Orren 1997), and more confidence in some 
institutions than it has in others. In June 2014, 53 percent of the respondents to a 
Gallup poll had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police, which was 
a level of confidence lower than that of only the military and small business. Other 
institutions did not stack up so well in the public’s eyes. Only 34 percent expressed 
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a comparable level of confidence in medicine, 26 percent in public schools, 23 per-
cent in the criminal justice system, and less than 10 percent in Congress. Between 
1993 and 2014, confidence in the police fluctuated between 52 and 64 percent. Over 
the same time period, confidence in the public schools dropped from 39 percent to 
32, while confidence in the Supreme Court dropped from 44 percent to 34 (with an 
intervening rise to 50 percent between 1997 and 2002). Confidence in the criminal 
justice system improved over that same span, from 17 percent in 1993 to 23, peak-
ing at 34 percent in 2004, but it was uniformly lower than that in the police.3
Even in the immediate aftermath of the series of deadly force incidents in 
2014–15, a Gallup poll in June 2015 found that 52 percent of Americans had a “great 
deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police (Jones 2015), and though that 
figure was the lowest since 1993, the police still enjoyed more of the public’s trust 
and confidence than all but two of the social institutions about which Gallup in-
quires. Public ratings of the honesty and ethics of police likewise dropped in 2014, 
but by the end of 2015 they had rebounded (Saad 2015). We have previously seen 
such dips in confidence following high-profile incidents, with rebounds thereafter 
(Weitzer 2002).
Analyses of the decline in trust in government have identified several sources. 
Gary Orren (1997) notes the backdrop of “traditional skepticism” of governmen-
tal power among Americans, and the long-term trend in the United States and 
elsewhere in the first world toward “post-material values” that foster “authority-
challenging attitudes,” such as self-expression and self-realization. Shorter-term 
changes in trust stem from: assessments of government performance against pub-
lic expectations; disagreement with the direction of government policy; negative 
assessments of the honesty and integrity of public officials; and denunciations of 
government by public officials and the media. Trust and confidence in police has 
not declined so much as that in government generally, but it has not improved as 
much as police performance and fairness has arguably improved, which Lawrence 
W. Sherman (2002) attributes to broad cultural shifts in public expectations. We 
might suppose that trust and confidence in the police would turn especially on 
the perceived integrity of the police, and not very much on (actual) performance, 
since the public’s perceptions of and concern about crime are not closely linked to 
actual crime levels.
Much of the research on the public’s attitudes toward the police has addressed, 
not trust or confidence as such, but rather “satisfaction” with police. The refer-
ent in survey items varies—for example, it might be either police services in your 
neighborhood or the police department in your city—but the satisfaction about 
which respondents are queried is in many instances not specific to a particular, 
concrete experience with the police but rather more global and abstract. Even 
people who have not had (ever or recently) contact with the police typically have 
an opinion about the police. We suspect that citizens’ global satisfaction with their 
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local police is strongly associated with their trust and confidence in their local 
police, and if that is so, we can learn something about trust from previous research 
on satisfaction with the police.
The racial disparity in Americans’ attitudes toward the police has been as du-
rable as it is remarkable. Blacks have less favorable attitudes than whites do, and 
Hispanics’ attitudes also tend to be less positive than those of whites. This gap is 
nearly uniform in its direction, if not its magnitude, across time and space in the 
United States (for a rare exception to the more general rule, see Frank et al. 1996). 
Much of the research on attitudes toward the police has dwelled at least to some 
degree on the origins, meaning, and implications of this disparity.
It appears that attitudes toward the police are shaped to some degree by the 
severity or perceived severity of social and physical disorders in urban neighbor-
hoods, for which (we might infer) the public holds the police responsible (Reisig 
and Parks 2000; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Thus attitudes are more positive 
where (and by those whom) such incivilities—for example, vandalism, noise, 
open-air drug markets, abandoned cars—are perceived to be less serious prob-
lems. Variation in these quality-of-life conditions may account for at least some of 
the racial disparity in attitudes toward the police.
Attitudes toward the police also correlate with citizens’ subjective experiences 
with the police in individual contacts, both voluntary contacts—when citizens 
report crimes or request assistance—and involuntary contacts—when they are 
stopped by the police. The correlation reflects reciprocal causal effects: satisfac-
tion with the individual contact affects more global satisfaction with the police, 
but more global attitudes toward the police also shape the perceived quality of 
police performance in individual police-citizen encounters (Brandl et al. 1994; 
Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Tyler 1987, 1990). Most of the research that reports on 
this correlation is cross-sectional, and so it is unable to tease the reciprocal effects 
apart; multiwave panel surveys are necessary, providing for interviewing the same 
respondents at two (or more) points in time. Global satisfaction—satisfaction with 
the police overall—is measured at both times, and in a second survey wave, sub-
jective experience is assessed retrospectively, such that the effects of prior (first-
wave, or T1) attitudes on subjective experience can be estimated, and the effects 
of subjective experience on later (second-wave, or T2) attitudes can be separately 
estimated, controlling for the effects of T1 attitudes on T2 attitudes. See figure 1.
Such panel studies find that a substantial fraction of the association between 
the perceived quality of citizens’ experiences with the police and their more gener-
al attitudes toward the police reflect the effect of the latter on the former: citizens’ 
subjective experiences are shaped by their prior attitudes much more than their 
experiences shape their subsequent attitudes. Global attitudes tend to be stable, 
and any one contact has a limited effect on citizens’ broader views of police. But 
global attitudes have strong effects on citizens’ interpretations of their experiences.
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The effects of global attitudes on subjective experience may be greater for 
blacks than for whites. Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (2005) surveyed samples of 
blacks and whites about their beliefs about the fairness of the justice system, and 
also elicited respondents’ judgments about the propriety of police enforcement ac-
tions in each of two scenarios in which the race of the citizen was experimentally 
manipulated. They found considerable support for their “perceived discrimination 
hypothesis”:
Given the history of racial bias in the system, African Americans should be more 
vigilant to signs of discrimination in encounters between police and black civilians. 
Brutality and profiling are so familiar to many African Americans that they consti-
tute chronically accessible “scripts” that are frequently primed and likely to guide 
interpretations of ambiguous events.  .  .  . Thus, blacks as a group are likely to view 
confrontations between police and black civilians as yet another instance of police 
discrimination. (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005, 767)
The effects of global attitudes on citizens’ interpretations of the scenarios were 
greater among blacks than among whites.
One recent study (Braga et al. 2014), which also employed experimentally ma-
nipulated scenarios, further suggests that citizens’ assessments of police conduct 
are affected by broader matters of context, such as the climate of police-commu-
nity relations: whether “the police department had been cited for its strong com-
munity policing work, had received extensive negative media coverage for poor 
community relations and civil rights violations.”
Moreover, the effects of subjective experiences on more global attitudes toward 
the police are asymmetrical: unfavorable experiences have a more detrimental ef-
fect on attitudes toward the police than favorable experiences have a beneficial 
effect. Skogan (2006) goes so far as to assert that police are in a no-win situa-
tion, finding that positive experiences do not move the attitudinal needle, whereas 
Figure 1. Panel Survey Logic.
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negative experiences detract from global satisfaction. He locates this asymmetry 
in a broader set of findings in psychological research that reveals
a strong “negativity bias” that shapes the interpretation that people give to their day-
to-day experiences. . . . The lessons of bad things are learned more quickly, and for-
gotten more slowly, than the lessons of positive experiences. When people are faced 
with a mix of positive and negative experiences, the negative ones predominate in 
shaping both attitudes and behavior. They pay more careful attention to negative 
experiences, and think about them and recall them later in more elaborate and fine-
grained fashion. (Skogan 2006, 106)
These relationships may also help to account for the disparities in the attitudes of 
whites and blacks.
Skogan’s findings about the effects of subjectively positive experiences with the 
police are as dispiriting as they are consistent with the psychological research to 
which he alludes, though one need not conclude that positive experience has no 
effect on more global attitudes toward the police in order to see merit in the prop-
osition about negativity bias. The panel studies cited above found that positive 
experience has a beneficial effect of modest magnitude and negative experience 
has a detrimental effect of greater magnitude. These results have been consistent, 
though they do not demonstrate that the estimated effects of subjective experience 
are rooted in the overt actions of police.
However, all of these findings are difficult to reconcile with the fairly high lev-
els of satisfaction with and trust in the police. Given the asymmetrical effects of 
experience, and given that about one-fifth of the American adult population has a 
contact each year with the police (mostly through traffic stops), we might deduce 
that satisfaction and trust would spiral down over time with the predominantly 
negative effects of experience. Yet that is not what we have seen over time. Clearly, 
other forces are at work in shaping attitudes toward the police, forces of a longitu-
dinal nature that previous research has missed. Perhaps the effects of experience 
decay over time.
Research on the etiology of attitudes toward the police is thin. We can safely 
assume that the typical adult is not a blank slate on which direct experiences with 
legal actors leave their mark, but to say that prior attitudes influence an individual’s 
judgments about direct experiences is to beg the question: whence do prior at-
titudes come? We would do well to consider the “primacy principle” of political 
socialization (Searing et al. 1976), comprised of three assumptions: that political 
orientations are learned in childhood; that childhood learning shapes later modi-
fications of political attitudes; and that the scale of any such modifications tends to 
be small. Insofar as the police are one of the most visible manifestations of govern-
ment, we should take seriously the idea that attitudes toward the police are shaped 
in important ways through childhood socialization.4 Parents and other adult 
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guardians would presumably play a large role in childhood legal socialization, as 
they do in political socialization more generally (see, e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1968, 
1975; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). Parents can overtly influence their chil-
dren’s outlooks through direct communication that establishes and reinforces ways 
of interpreting and understanding the world, and they can unobtrusively model 
beliefs and attitudes for their children. But studies of the influence of parents in 
legal socialization are few in number, and those that exist appeared only recently.
Amie Schuck (2013) found that youths in 5th or 6th grade (i.e., aged 11 or 12) 
hold positive attitudes toward the police, though even at this early age, the at-
titudes of African American youths are less positive than those of white or Latino 
youths. Further, she found that youths’ attitudes tend to become more negative 
from age 12 until the age of 17, and that the downward trend holds regardless of 
adolescents’ race, sex, or socioeconomic status; as Schuck observes, “this pattern 
strongly resembles the archetype theorized for adolescents’ perceptions of figures 
of authority, including parents and teachers, as well as, the pattern described by 
Fagan and Tyler . . . for adolescents’ perceptions of legitimacy of the law and legal 
authorities” (2013, 597). Jeffrey Fagan and Tom Tyler argue that “there is a de-
velopmental process of legal socialization, and that this process unfolds during 
childhood and adolescence as part of a vector of developmental capital that pro-
motes compliance with the law and cooperation with legal actors.” Summarizing 
early studies of childhood legal socialization, they observe that “early orientations 
toward law and government were found to be affective in nature, and character-
ized by idealized and overly benevolent views about authority. These early views 
shaped the later views of adolescents, views that were both more cognitive and 
less idealized in form. In other words, each stage of the socialization process influ-
enced later, more complex, views” (Fagan and Tyler 2005, 218).
The findings of two recent studies testify to the influence of parents on their 
children’s outlooks. Analyzing the attitudes of nearly 1,000 adjudicated delin-
quents aged 14 to 17, for each of whom “collateral” interviews were also conducted 
with a parent, and controlling for a wide range of potentially confounding influ-
ences, Wolfe, McLean, and Pratt 2016 found that “parental attitudes regarding the 
legitimacy of legal authorities influence those same attitudes in their children.” 
Analyzing the attitudes of 315 first-time juvenile offenders aged 13 to 17 and their 
mothers or female guardians, Cavanagh and Cauffman 2015 similarly found that 
the mothers’ attitudes toward the justice system influenced their sons’. That both 
studies detected such effects in samples of youth restricted to adjudicated delin-
quents, all of whom had passed the point at which Schuck found youths’ attitudes 
becoming more negative, suggests that their estimates of parental effects are prob-
ably quite conservative.
In a third study, a survey of 9th grade students in schools in Queensland, Aus-
tralia, in which respondents completed items about their attitudes toward the 
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police and one on their parents’ attitudes toward the police, Elise Sargeant and 
Christine Bond found that even controlling for police-initiated contacts, prior de-
linquency, and peer delinquency, perceived parental attitudes are associated with 
youths’ attitudes. (Sargeant and Bond 2015). They point out that “theory suggests 
that attitudes attributed to others may be more important than actual attitudes,” 
and conclude (albeit speculatively) that “if young people learn attitudes to police 
from their parents, it may be that negative attitudes to police can then lead to nega-
tive police contacts.”
Parental influence on their children’s attitudes toward the police may be exerted 
through other mechanisms of childhood and adolescent socialization. Research 
has shown that parents’ monitoring and discipline shapes their children’s level 
of self-control (e.g., Hay, 1981; Pratt, Turner, and Piquero, 2004). Self-control, in 
turn, is associated with justice system attitudes (Reisig, Wolfe, and Holtfreter 2011; 
Nivette, Eisner, Malti, and Ribeaud 2014). Thus parenting has both direct and in-
direct effects on youth attitudes toward the police.5
Most research on the attitudes of juveniles has not controlled for the socializing 
influences of parents, however, and so it risks overestimating the effects of con-
tacts with the police. Piquero et al. 2005 analyzed youthful offenders’ trajectories 
of legitimacy and legal cynicism over an eighteen-month period. The trajectories 
proved to be largely stable, but they exhibited different levels, and from associa-
tions between the levels of these attitudes and subjects’ baseline assessments of the 
procedural justice of police and courts, Alex Piquero and his colleagues inferred 
that “situational experiences with criminal justice personnel influence more gen-
eral attitudes about the law and legal system” (296). But they also acknowledge that 
the stability in the differences “suggests that inter-individual differences among 
study participants in their cynicism about the legal system likely were established 
before their first assessment in this study, perhaps as young as fifteen years of age” 
(287), and the same could be said about their judgments about legitimacy. Megan 
Augustyn (2015) examined the same sample over a longer time period, finding a 
decline in offenders’ procedural justice judgments, much as Amie Schuck (2013) 
did, and also that later judgments were influenced by prior judgments. She also 
found that, curiously, arrests improved offenders’ perceptions of procedural justice, 
and that the positive effect of an arrest increased as offenders aged. In contrast, 
Amy Nivette et al. (2014) found that, among a general sample of youth, police con-
tacts increased legal cynicism, controlling for prior cynicism (which accounted for 
half of the explained variance). They further found that self-reported delinquency 
in the preceding year was a strong predictor of legal cynicism, which they took to 
suggest that negative (or cynical) attitudes may serve a neutralization function, 
justifying juveniles’ own delinquency. They opine that “following a negative police 
contact, we venture that cynicism operates as a cognitive distortion that denies the 
shameful aspects of sanctioning and instead places blame on the law itself ” (287).
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Furthermore, much of the research on juveniles’ attitudes, like that on adults’ 
attitudes, is cross-sectional, and so the effects of prior attitudes cannot be esti-
mated or controlled. Fagan and Tyler (2005), for example, estimated the effects 
of procedural justice—the quality of interactions with police, school disciplinary 
personnel, and private security—on legitimacy, legal cynicism, and moral disen-
gagement among 215 youths aged 10–16, who were interviewed once each. They 
controlled for a number of personality and contextual factors, but they could not 
control for prior attitudes. They must therefore assume that procedural justice 
affects—but is not affected by—legitimacy, and thus they almost certainly overesti-
mate the effect of procedural justice. Other cross-sectional research, however, has 
found that the effects of youths’ experience are mediated by community ties and 
delinquent subcultures (Brick et al. 2009; Leiber et al. 1998)
The lessons that we take from the research on youths’ attitudes toward the 
police are that trust in the police and other legal institutions, like political at-
titudes more generally, are to a large degree formed early in life, and while they 
are not immutable, early attitudes influence later attitude formation. They shape 
the experiences to which adolescents and young adults are exposed, and they 
form the lens through which those experiences are interpreted. Adult attitudes 
toward the police are not simple functions of the treatment that they receive 
from the police.
We would also note that much of the previous research on procedural justice 
and legitimacy concerns abstract characterizations of the procedural justice with 
which police perform and not judgments about how police acted in specific police-
citizen encounters. This research has consistently found that people who believe 
that police act in procedurally just ways tend also to trust the police, and vice versa. 
That these more abstract judgments about the procedural justice of policing are 
related to equally abstract outlooks about trust and confidence in police does not 
necessarily tell us much about how police actually perform, but they do tell us 
about how people think about the police.
“Customer Satisfaction” in Policing
Police administrators sometimes invoke a customer analogy in order to promote a 
more service-oriented mentality and style of policing. Thinking of the people with 
whom police interact as customers would presumably lead to a heightened atten-
tiveness to what it is that citizens want from the police and greater appreciation of 
the importance of interpersonal relations. A more customer-friendly approach by 
police would entail the very actions that comprise procedural justice: asking for 
and listening to citizens’ accounts of the situations in which police and citizens 
meet one another; courteous treatment; explaining what police are doing and on 
what basis. Research suggests that these features of the process are important to 
the people who interact with police. The customer analogy has limits, however, 
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and ambiguities in the boundaries of the analogy allow or invite differing inter-
pretations by officers.
A true customer, in a private market transaction, is someone who chooses to 
seek out a product or service, finds a provider for that product or service and 
ascertains the price, and enters into a transaction that involves the exchange of 
the agreed price for the product or service. The exchange is voluntary on the part 
of both parties, and the price that the customer is willing to pay for the product 
or service reflects the minimum value that she attaches to the product or service. 
Her satisfaction with the product or service will turn on a later judgment about 
the extent to which it met her expectations of it, relative to the price that she paid 
for it. Chances are that the benefit of the product or service will be limited to 
her alone (or her household) and not extend to others who are not party to the 
transaction.
A citizen who calls police to report a stolen bicycle or a loud party, say, re-
sembles such a customer in some respects. He seeks a service—official recognition 
and recording of a crime of which he is the victim, or third-party intervention to 
resolve a situation that he defines as a disturbance. His contact with the police is 
at his initiative and is largely voluntary; he could instead choose to forego any as-
sistance in recovering the bicycle or making an insurance claim, or to tolerate the 
disturbance that the party represents to him until it ends without intervention.
This transaction, however, is nonvoluntary insofar as the citizen has no options 
in a police market; in most instances, he must contact his municipal or town police 
force if he is to receive police service from any agency. Furthermore, he does not 
pay a discrete price for the service on the occasion on which it is provided; the 
community has paid for the service, and so beyond any taxes that he might pay 
(which he is compelled to pay whether he uses the service or not), the service is 
free to him.
Indeed, any individual member of the community is a customer who pays for 
the presence and availability of police even if she never requests assistance from 
the police with respect to a particular situation. These are collective and not indi-
vidual services; whatever benefits flow from the police services for which she pays 
in this way are also enjoyed by other members of the community at the same time, 
and not limited to her or her household. In addition, the payment for these ser-
vices is nonvoluntary in a different sense: taxes paid to finance police operations 
are coerced payments.
Mark Moore (2002) points out that police availability to answer emergency 
calls might come at the expense of quality service to individuals; the time that an 
officer devotes to high-quality service to one complainant can compromise her 
capacity to respond promptly to a more urgent situation. More generally, police 
cannot give “customers” what they want when it exceeds the resource capacity or 
legal authority of the police to do so.
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Of course, the police also interact with citizens whose contacts with police 
are not voluntary; suspected offenders have “obligation encounters” with police 
(Moore 2002). In what sense is a service delivered to people who are taken into 
police custody for booking, drivers to whom traffic citations are issued, or pedes-
trians who are stopped on suspicion for questioning? To what kind or level of ser-
vice are they entitled, given that they may have crossed a legal and/or moral line? 
At a minimum they are entitled to a level of service mandated by the Constitution: 
their rights—to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable in-
trusions, to be subject to no more than the amount of force necessary to overcome 
any resistance that they may offer, and against self-incrimination—set a floor on 
the level of service to be delivered. We might expect a still higher level of service 
than that, in the form of respectful treatment, because not only of its intrinsic 
value but also of its hypothesized instrumental value in achieving compliance, and 
minimizing injuries (to citizens and officers). But the term “customer” is surely 
stretched in application to these recipients of police service; “client” might be more 
appropriate.
Like the recipients of many human services, many of the people who interact 
with police, including even some of those who request police assistance, do not 
know or recognize what they need and should want. Some of them are incapable 
of making informed judgments because they are impaired by mental disability 
or intoxication. Even if they suffer from neither mental illness nor mind-altering 
substances, they may be ill-equipped to make assessments of the quality of the 
service options, though that is true of many consumer choices. The single mother 
of a rebellious teenager who, at her wits end, calls the police may not know what 
the police should or can do for her. If we suppose that the customer is always right, 
then, we will be misled by the customer service analogy.
Thus the customer service analogy breaks down in several respects: the re-
cipients of police services—let us call them, generally, clients—are not voluntary 
in the sense of having a meaningful range of choice in service providers; some 
encounters are distinctly involuntary; some clients may be incapable of making 
informed judgments; and clients may lack essential information in assessing the 
quality of the services they receive. We might add that, unlike private-sector firms, 
police do not welcome repeat customers; however, police would welcome public 
“loyalty” insofar as that means public support and cooperation.
Research on customer satisfaction reinforces these observations and offers 
some additional perspective on citizen satisfaction with police. First, customers 
tend to be more satisfied with “products” than they are with services (Fornell et al. 
1996). Services are “co-produced” by both the provider and the recipient, allowing 
the provider less control over the process, and services rely more on the human 
resources of the provider organization, such that they are less susceptible to stan-
dardization (Anderson, Fornell, and Rust 1997; Johnson and Fornell 1991; Nilsson 
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et al. 2001). Services are more intangible than products, making it “difficult for 
customers to understand service quality” (Nilsson et al., 2001, 12). This is all surely 
equally true for police organizations.
Second, employee management has a direct effect on business results (Nilsson 
et al. 2001)—organizational effectiveness, the use of resources, profits, and revenue 
growth—as well as indirect effects, through organizational orientations to both 
customers and processes. Furthermore, customer loyalty to a service provider 
tends to be earned through high-quality performance, while customer loyalty to a 
product tends to be “bought” through product discounting, which is not generally 
feasible with service provision (Edvardsson et al. 2000). These patterns may not 
hold equally well in public agencies.
Third, customers’ expectations of a product or service shape their evaluations 
of it (Anderson and Fornell 2000; Fornell et al. 1996; Szymanski and Hernard 
2001) when they compare their experience with what they expected. Customers 
have weak or no expectations of a new product with which customers have no ex-
perience, meaning that product performance drives satisfaction, but “as customer 
experience with the product grows and past performance information becomes 
available, more product-specific expectations develop” (Johnson and Fornell 1991, 
275). Hardly anyone has an interaction with the police—even their first personal 
contact—without having formed expectations—positive or negative—about the 
police through the socialization process.
Fourth, and relatedly, customers’ opportunity for choice can be expected to in-
fluence customer satisfaction, since customers who are dissatisfied with one firm’s 
product will turn to those of other firms: “in a competitive environment, people 
generally do not continue to purchase products toward which they are ambivalent 
or hold negative evaluations” (Johnson and Fornell 1991, 278). As noted above, 
clients’ range of choice in receiving police services is very restricted.
Some police officers have misgivings about—or reject—a customer-service ori-
entation in policing, reasoning that the people with whom they interact in their 
day-to-day work are not customers as such. They might well sense the limits of the 
customer analogy.
PUBLIC TRUST AND ORGANIZ ATIONAL LEGITIMACY
The social psychological dimension of trust (but not obligation) bears a fairly 
strong resemblance to the legitimacy construct that appears in institutional theory. 
Even so, the two theories diverge somewhat in their conceptions of legitimacy. 
For social psychological theory, legitimacy—trust—is a property of individuals 
and it is continuous or at least ordinal: differences in degree matter, both for the 
level of support that the organization enjoys and for the likelihood of individual 
compliance with the police and the law. For institutional theory, legitimacy is by 
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and large a dichotomous or perhaps trichotomous variable: organizations that 
are legitimate survive, those that lose legitimacy cease to exist, and organizations 
whose legitimacy is challenged or threatened can be expected to take steps to re-
gain legitimacy.
Two very important differences between institutional theory and social psy-
chological theory lie in who makes these judgments, or perhaps more accurately, 
whose judgments matter for the organization, and the basis on which those judg-
ments rest. In social psychological theory, the relevant judgments are those of 
“ordinary citizens,” who evaluate the fairness with which policing is performed. 
In institutional theory, the pertinent judgments are made by sovereigns such as 
legislators, professional bodies, and courts—that is, audiences with some stand-
ing to make or influence authoritative decisions that have clear implications for 
the organization. But institutional theory holds that these judgments are based 
not on technical performance, which is difficult for any audience to judge, but 
on the police department’s conformity to expectations for structural forms. So-
cial psychological theory attributes far greater significance to judgments about 
the routine exercise of police authority, that is, the technical performance of the 
organization.
Notwithstanding the trichotomous character of legitimacy in institutional the-
ory, finer differences of degree can be discerned. First, one strategy for maintain-
ing legitimacy is to “stockpile” goodwill (Suchman 1995), so it would seem that an 
organization can accumulate more or less legitimacy. Second, legitimacy can be 
challenged by less powerful constituencies, and so, as W. Richard Scott observes, 
“ ‘legitimate’ structures may, at the same time, be contested structures” (2014, 73), 
arguably resting on a lesser foundation of trust.
For all but social survey purposes, citizens’ trust in police is not aggregated by 
computing means or percentages; it is filtered through the judgments of sover-
eigns. So an agency might thrive despite suffering the distrust of a significant mi-
nority of its population. In the absence of polling, it is difficult to say what level of 
trust an agency enjoys. Citizens’ trust, in this political context, is a weighted mean 
(perhaps a weighted mode)—weighted by political standing and other resources, 
and not to achieve sample representativeness of the population. Even so, notwith-
standing such political weighting, public trust can drop to a level that stimulates 
a crisis of legitimacy for an agency. John Crank and Robert Langworthy (1992) 
write about what happens then: a ceremonial replacement of the chief and perhaps 
some other symbolic, structural reforms (reforms, we would add, that are likely to 
be only loosely if at all coupled to street policing). The Baltimore Police Depart-
ment in the wake of the Freddie Gray incident may be a case in point, since its 
commissioner was fired amid violent protests that erupted following Gray’s death. 
The crisis was averted and legitimacy restored, at least at a level that suffices. In 
the twenty-first century, there are other options for restoring legitimacy: accepting 
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mandated reforms in a consent decree, or asking the COPS Office to undertake the 
collaborative reform initiative in your department.
Agencies whose legitimacy is not threatened may be able to build up levels of 
trust beyond that necessary for survival; stockpiling good will is a legitimation 
strategy (Suchman 1995). A symbolic display may be a way to gain some addi-
tional trust, even when an agency has enough to get by without it. So while orga-
nizational legitimacy is dichotomous or trichotomous, aggregate public trust is 
continuous, and public trust can sink to levels at which organizational legitimacy 
may be threatened.
Challenges to Legitimacy
Challenges to a police department’s legitimacy can surely be mounted most ef-
fectively by its sovereigns—say, the city’s mayor, the courts, or DOJ litigators—
but they can also be initiated by a mobilized public. The protests surrounding 
shootings by police and other deaths while in police custody in 2014 and 2015 il-
lustrate such threats to police legitimacy, and so does the civil unrest and rioting 
in the 1960s. Protests over police use of deadly force, or other police practices, 
can be characterized as a challenge or threat to an agency’s legitimacy in that 
they are claims that the department’s operations are not “proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
tions” (Suchman 1995, 574). Certainly large-scale demonstrations, and those that 
are repeated over days or weeks, attract attention to a set of grievances and mo-
bilize support for addressing those grievances. While they may not jeopardize 
the survival of a police organization, they may be able to generate pressure that is 
sufficient to prompt organizational change, at least change of a symbolic nature. 
But in order to do so, the support of sovereigns for change must at some point 
be enlisted.
It would be easy—but mistaken—to see the riots that rocked Ferguson, Mis-
souri, Baltimore, and other cities in 2014–15 as reflections of the depth of distrust 
of police, just as it would have been a mistake to interpret the 1967 riots in Detroit, 
Newark, and elsewhere as a products only of grievances against the police. The 
Kerner Commission surmised that the riots of 1967 were rooted in a number of 
intersecting conditions:
• Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and 
housing, which have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great numbers of 
Negroes from the benefits of economic progress;
• Black in-migration and white exodus, which have produced the massive and 
growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a 
growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs;
• The black ghettos, where segregation and poverty converge on the young to 
destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug addiction, dependency 
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on welfare, and bitterness and resentment against society in general and white 
society in particular are the result.
Police practices were among the grievances held at the highest level of intensity, 
along with unemployment and inadequate housing, but inadequate education, 
poor recreational opportunities, and others were enumerated by the commis-
sion. Commentary on the 2014 rioting in Ferguson offered similar diagnoses 
(Sneed 2014).
Academic research on race riots has confirmed that the conditions that under-
lie such violent protest extend well beyond police practices, even as policing may 
contribute to those conditions, and an incident involving the police may be the 
final (if not the only) precipitating event. Empirical support has been found for 
the role of social marginality or disadvantage in racial violence, and also for the 
impact of “closed and unresponsive political systems” that provide no channels 
through which grievances can be addressed (Lieske 1978, 1329). Other research has 
pointed toward “hypersegregation of Blacks in urban settings” that breaks down, 
with increasing interracial contact and competition (Olzak et al. 1996).
Insofar as police practices comprise a patch in a much larger quilt of social, 
economic, and political conditions that give rise to racial unrest, reforming police 
practices is by itself no solution. Confronted by a galaxy of problems that are in 
many ways intractable, local and even state and national sovereigns might be ex-
pected to direct attention to police reform as a feasible response. Those reforms 
need not, however, be compatible with the technical demands of police work or 
with other existing organizational structures.
TRUST AND OBLIGATION IN SCHENECTADY AND 
SYR ACUSE
Previous research has identified several categories of outlooks that may relate 
to the social psychological construct of legitimacy, and which may be strongly 
intercorrelated: trust; confidence; and identification. In addition, these attitudes 
are thought to be strongly associated with citizens’ support for police, belief in 
empowering police, and citizens’ sense of obligation to obey. Both the police 
services survey and the key informant survey included items on trust, identi-
fication, and empowerment, and the police services survey also included items 
on obligation. We summarize our analyses of these survey responses here, and 
we also construct indices of trust and obligation based on the police services 
survey data for analysis in a later chapter.6 We reserve an examination of survey 
results over time until chapter 8. First, however, we describe the police services 
and key informant surveys; some readers may wish to skip over this treatment 
of research methods and go directly to the findings in the section on trust and 
confidence.
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Survey Methodologies
The Police Services Survey
The police services survey was designed primarily to capture citizens’ subjec-
tive experience with police, that is, the quality of police service from citizens’ 
perspectives, but it also extended to citizens’ more general judgments about and 
attitudes toward the police. We sampled police records of various kinds to rep-
resent, as much as possible, the entire population of police contacts with citi-
zens. Thus the design provided for sampling records of calls for service, stops, 
and arrests. After a pilot test of the survey in July 2011, we commenced it on 
August 1, beginning with samples of incidents that occurred in the latter half of 
July (July 16–31). We continued to draw new samples semi-monthly over thirty-
six waves of surveying, or eighteen months. We treated the first 7–10 waves as 
a baseline, and thereupon began providing monthly summaries of the previ-
ous month’s performance to each department’s command staff in the context 
of the department’s Compstat meeting. The survey also served as an outcome 
measure, of course, as one month’s performance measures were the previous 
month’s outcomes.
Three Types of Contacts. Half or more police-citizen contacts in cities arise from 
calls for service (Parks et al. 1999; also see Eith and Durose 2011). They are in im-
portant respects voluntary contacts, initiated by citizens, who request some form 
of assistance.7 The nature of the problems or issues about which citizens seek as-
sistance is quite heterogeneous, however, and the assistance that citizens request 
takes many different forms; sometimes citizens want or demand services that po-
lice cannot provide. But citizens who dial 911 or other police numbers bear as close 
a resemblance to “customers” as any with whom police deal.
Traffic stops, and other field stops, have been and continue to be the subject 
of much controversy. Police claim that high levels of such police proactivity have 
crime-control benefits, and research tends to bear those claims out (Boydstun 1975; 
Sampson and Cohen 1988; Whitaker et al. 1985; Wilson and Boland 1978; also see 
Cohen and Ludwig 2003; McGarrell et al. 2001; Sherman and Rogan 1995; Rosen-
feld et al. 2014). But critics point to frequent violations of constitutional limits on 
police authority, and racially disparate impacts, as reasons to more closely regu-
late police-initiated contacts. Stops are also a heterogeneous category of events, 
including routine stops of traffic law violators, pretext stops of traffic law viola-
tors motivated by crime-control objectives, and investigatory stops of pedestri-
ans, which are often based only on reasonable suspicion. Stops are not, of course, 
sought by citizens, and they are thus thought to raise more doubts among citizens 
about the propriety of police intervention (Reiss 1971).
Both calls for service and stops are defined by how they begin. Either type of 
contact may end in a variety of ways. Calls for service can prompt a wide range 
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of police responses, at the discretion of officers, varying simultaneously along 
dimensions of control and support. The dispositions may or may not accord with 
citizen preferences, and they may or may not resolve the situations satisfactorily. 
Citizens may or may not consider the outcomes favorable. Stops also can involve 
any of a variety of police actions and eventuate in any of a variety of dispositions, 
though arguably a narrower range of dispositions than calls for service. Traffic law 
violators may be lectured, admonished, and/or ticketed. Motorists’ vehicles may 
be searched, with or without the consent of the motorist. Warrant checks may 
be conducted. Questions may be asked, citizens frisked. Most stops that do not 
culminate in a ticket will end with the citizen being released in the field. Some, 
however, will be arrested and taken into custody.
Arrests might stem from either calls for service or stops. They are a type of 
contact defined by how the contact ends rather than how it begins. The outcome 
for the citizen is unambiguously unfavorable, and unfavorable to a degree that far 
exceeds that of a ticket; the citizen is often booked and at least briefly incarcerated, 
and may be held pending arraignment. The arrest could be based on another citi-
zen’s complaint, on an officer’s own observations, or both. Many arrests, as Egon 
Bittner (1974) surmised, are made in order merely to handle the situation, and 
not primarily because the law has been violated. Arrestees are people who, for 
whatever reason, did not benefit from the tendency of the police to underenforce 
the law (Wilson 1968), which is often a discretionary choice. Previous research, 
with very few exceptions, has not examined the judgments of arrestees about their 
treatment by police.
The sample of contacts in each site represented all of these contacts, but we 
oversampled those in which procedural justice is presumptively more challenging: 
stops and arrests. In this way we were more likely to achieve subsamples of a size 
that would support separate analysis. Results were weighted as necessary in order 
to represent the entire population of contacts (i.e., calls were weighted more heav-
ily for such analysis).
Survey Content. We formed a survey instrument based on previously fielded 
surveys, such that all of the items had been pretested, in effect, and many of 
the items have a lineage that includes many surveys over decades. Some items, 
for example, were drawn from the surveys that Wesley Skogan administered 
in Chicago in the 1990s, and they had also been used in surveys by the Police 
Foundation in the 1980s. Many other items, tapping elements of procedural jus-
tice or legitimacy, were drawn from survey research conducted by Tom Tyler 
and others. Still other items were drawn from the Police-Public Contact Sur-
vey (PPCS), developed and administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 
the 1990s. Respondents were informed that their names had been drawn from 
police records, and that we were interested in their contact with the police on a 
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specified date, but were not told that we had information on the nature of that 
contact. Like the PPCS, our survey instrument allowed respondents to tell us 
how their encounter with police began, with a series of questions tailored to the 
nature of the contact: a motor vehicle stop; a pedestrian stop; a call to report a 
crime; a call for some other kind of assistance; or being contacted by police in 
some other way (e.g., when someone else calls police). The instrument also al-
lowed respondents to self-report arrests.8 Most of the interview concerned the 
sampled contact, but prior to that series of questions, respondents were asked 
a set of items about the legitimacy of their city’s police more generally. Some 
items were unique to particular types of contacts, for example, only those who 
had called for assistance or to report a crime were asked whether the police had 
solved the citizen’s problem, and queries about experiences with searches were 
posed only to those who were stopped by police. Demographic information was 
also collected.
Samples. Our design provided for sampling contacts from police records of calls 
for service, stops, and arrests in each department, and conducting interviews 
by phone with the citizens named in those records. Samples were drawn semi-
monthly from records of contacts that occurred between July 15, 2011, and January 
15, 2013. Calls for service records were extracted from each department’s comput-
er-aided dispatch (CAD) system. Arrest records were extracted from each depart-
ment’s record management system, and included custodial arrests as well as cases 
in which suspected offenders were either issued appearance tickets or released on 
their own recognizance. Records of stops differed across the departments: Syra-
cuse has for many years provided for a citizen contact form on which officers 
record all stops that do not result in arrest; these records include stops in which a 
traffic ticket is issued. Schenectady, however, does not have a comparable record 
of stops, but rather separate records of traffic tickets and “field interview cards.” 
Field interview cards may be completed pursuant to any contact with a citizen, 
whether it is police-initiated or not, but most field interview cards are based on 
police-initiated contacts. In Schenectady we sampled only field interview cards, 
since sampling traffic tickets was not at that time feasible. Thus the samples of 
stops in the two cities are different, in that routine traffic stops are included only 
in Syracuse.
In general, the interviewed sample resembles the eligible population in each 
site fairly closely (details are provided in the methodological appendix). Since the 
samples are stratified, with different probabilities of sample selection across the 
different subpopulations, and since the response rates varied across subpopula-
tions, we weight the cases for most analyses of the survey data in order to represent 
the entire contact population in each site. We apply weights that reproduce the 
original population proportion that each subpopulation represents, though these 
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weights are very nearly the same as those that are based only on the probabilities 
of sample selection (with correlations over 0.90).
Key Informant Survey
We administered a three-wave key informant panel survey with two objectives: 
to provide a description of the legitimacy that community members attribute to 
the study police departments, and then to compare responses over time to as-
sess whether departments’ efforts to cultivate improved police-citizen relations by 
actively assessing satisfaction had an impact on the public’s views about police le-
gitimacy. While the police services survey included items about police legitimacy, 
it was limited to people who had contact with the police, and the key informant 
survey complements the police services survey by providing information on the 
perspectives of the community more generally.
In general, key informants are persons whose organizational roles imply they 
have special knowledge about the population being studied. For our purposes, we 
operationalized key informants as current leaders of a neighborhood association 
in Schenectady or Syracuse. To identify neighborhood associations and their re-
spective leaders in each city, we relied on contact lists provided to us by represen-
tatives of the police departments. Both police departments maintain up-to-date 
lists of associations and contact information for leaders, which include, in many 
cases, email addresses.
In Wave 1, surveys were distributed to key informants by a private e-mail web-
link and paper copies were mailed, with a prepaid postage return envelope, to 
respondents for whom we had no e-mail address. We asked respondents in Wave 
1 for whom we had no e-mail address to provide us with one for follow-up survey-
ing; all respondents complied. Therefore, in subsequent waves we relied exclu-
sively on the e-mailed weblink.
Nine in ten of Syracuse informants had lived in the city for six or more years 
(75 percent for eleven or more), and the majority (83.4 percent) had lived in their 
current neighborhood for six years or more. All Syracuse respondents reported they 
had been active members of their neighborhood association for more than one year, 
with the greatest proportion (45 percent) reporting three to five years of active in-
volvement, and one-third reporting involvement for six or more years. The majority 
(68.2 percent) reported holding a leadership position for three years or more.
Consistent with Syracuse, nine in ten Schenectady informants (92.8 percent) 
reported that they had lived in the City for six years or more, and the majority 
(85.7 percent) had lived in their current neighborhood for six or more years. All 
Schenectady respondents reported being active in their neighborhood association 
for more than a year with the majority (64.2) reporting six or more years of active 
membership, with the greatest proportion (57.1 percent) reporting eleven or more 
years of active membership.
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Trust and Confidence
Legitimate authorities can be trusted to do the right thing, and to make proper 
decisions. The surveys provide for several measures of trust and confidence in the 
form of statements with which survey respondents could agree or disagree:
• I have confidence that the S___ PD can do its job well.
• I trust the leaders of the SPD to make decisions that are good for everyone in 
the city.
• The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my 
neighborhood.
• There are many things about the SPD and its policies that need to be 
changed.
In general, two-thirds to three-quarters of the people with whom police had con-
tact during the eighteen months of the survey expressed trust and confidence 
in the police, though the proportions were somewhat higher in Syracuse—
particularly the proportions expressing strongly favorable views. By comparison, 
the proportions of key informants expressing trust in the police were somewhat 
higher in Syracuse and lower in Schenectady, but the samples are small and not 
too much should be made of the differences across the surveys. But among both 
sets of respondents, the Syracuse police appear to enjoy a more favorable public 
image, which is consistent with the recent histories of the departments and hence 
consistent with our expectations. The exception to the generality about trust lies 
in citizens’ assessments of the need for change: 62 to 69 percent of the police ser-
vices survey respondents in both sites said that there were “many things” about 
the police department and its policies that needed to be changed, with still higher 
proportions among key informants.
Identification
People identify with and feel connected to authorities that they consider legiti-
mate, and from their association with legitimate authorities people derive a mea-
sure of status (see Tyler and Fagan 2008). Identification is measured through state-
ments with which respondents could agree or disagree:
• I am proud of the work of the S_____ police.
• You can usually understand why the police who work in my neighborhood are 
acting as they are in a particular situation.
• If you talked to most of the police officers who work in my neighborhood, 
you would find that they have similar views to my own on many issues (police 
services survey only).
• Most of the police officers who work in my neighborhood have similar views 
to my own on many issues (key informant survey only).
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With responses that were largely congruent with those on the trust items, 62 to 75 
percent of the people with whom police had contact identified at least somewhat 
with the police, with similar to somewhat larger proportions among key infor-
mants.
Empowerment
People are willing to grant a lot of latitude to authorities they consider legitimate, 
thereby empowering the authority (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). We measure em-
powerment with these survey items:
• The police should have the right to stop and question people on the street.
• There need to be clear limits on what the police are allowed to do in fighting 
crime (police services survey only).
• The police should have the power to do whatever they think is needed to fight 
crime (police services survey only).
• Leaders of the SPD believe that police should work with citizens to try to solve 
problems (key informant survey only).
People appear to be somewhat conflicted, as more than 80 percent espouse the 
need for clear limits on crime-fighting by police, while more than half say that 
police should have wide latitude in fighting crime.
Key informants were also asked for their views on a few other items:
• The SPD take a tough stance on improper police behavior.
• The SPD has effective procedures for preventing improper police behavior.
• Leaders of the SPD believe that the police should be accountable to the com-
munities they serve.
• The SPD considers community satisfaction an organizational priority.
Responses to these statements also reflected perceptions that were predominantly 
favorable to the police, expressing faith in the orientation of the police and police 
leadership toward the community, and in its commitment to police rectitude. Half 
to two-thirds of key informants agreed with these statements. But insofar as the 
responses differ across the cities, the differences on these items are in favor of 
Schenectady police.
Obligation
Obligation is the belief that an authority should be obeyed; the greater the legiti-
macy, the greater the obligation to obey. Police services survey respondents were 
asked to agree or disagree with these statements:
• Communities work best when people follow the directives of the police.
• There are times when it is okay to ignore what the police tell you to do.
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• You should do what the police tell you to do even when you don’t like the way 
they treat you.
• You should accept the decisions made by police even if you think they are 
wrong.
Generally, three-quarters or more of the people who had a police contact believed 
that people should obey police commands. About two-thirds believed that such 
obedience was called for even when police do not treat them properly. Nearly half 
believe that people should obey police even when they think that police are wrong. 
Patterns of responses were very similar across the two sites.
Attitudinal Dimensions
As we discussed earlier in this chapter, previous social psychological research on 
legitimacy exhibits no clear consensus on the measurement of legitimacy or its 
presumed component dimensions, but it appears prudent for both theoretical and 
empirical reasons to treat obligation as a distinct construct, separate from trust 
and confidence in police. In their analysis of the construct validity of process-
based measures, Michael Reisig et al. (2007) concluded that trust and obligation 
are distinct constructs only moderately related to one another, and Jacinta Gau’s 
(2011) findings led to the same conclusion.
Our analysis of the fourteen items posed on the police services survey and 
summarized above suggests that the trust and identification items reflect a single 
attitudinal dimension, which we will simply call trust. (In this respect our findings 
are consistent with those of Tyler and Fagan 2008.) Factor analyses of the fourteen 
items and of subsets thereof repeatedly yield a factor on which the seven trust and 
identification items load strongly, and the average inter-item correlation among 
these seven items is 0.51.9 The obligation items also formed a distinct dimension, 
as in previous research. The empowerment items, however, loaded on a separate 
factor, and these items do not comprise a reliable scale, with an average inter-item 
correlation of only 0.25. Thus we formed two indices, one of trust and the other 
of obligation.
The trust index is a simple additive scale based on the seven trust and identifica-
tion items, each of which was centered at zero (don’t know responses and refusals) 
and provided two values above and below zero for strong and moderate (dis)agree-
ment, respectively (and reverse coded as necessary). This additive index is virtually 
identical statistically to the factor scale that is formed by weighting the items in 
proportion with the factor coefficients. The trust index ranges potentially from -14 
to 14, with an alpha of 0.88. The distribution of cases across categories of trust for 
each site is shown in Figure 2, along with the means for each subpopulation.
If we translate the trust index into a 4-point scale resembling those formed in 
previous research (with high distrust assigned a 1 and high trust assigned a 4), the 
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levels of legitimacy reported by Tyler (2005) and Tyler et al. (2010). Inflated (by 
25 percent) to render the index comparable to five-point scales formed in previous 
research, the means of 3.5 and 3.8 are similar to the levels of legitimacy reported by 
Tyler and Fagan (2008), Murphy and Cherney (2012), and Murphy et al. (2008).
The obligation index is also an additive scale, based on three (of the four) obli-
gation items, each of which was centered at zero (and reverse coded as needed).10 
The obligation index ranges from - 6 to 6, with an alpha of 0.64. The distribution 
for each site, and the mean for each subpopulation, is shown in figure 3. Overall, 
the means are 1.77 and 1.67 for Schenectady and Syracuse, respectively. The obliga-
tion index scores are not different across the sites, on average.
The disparity in the public images of the departments, which we described 
in chapter 2, is not clearly detectable in the distributions and central tenden-
cies of the trust index in the two sites. The mean scores are different—higher 
in Syracuse than in Schenectady—and the difference is statistically significant. 
Three-quarters of the Syracuse respondents, compared with about two-thirds 
of the Schenectady respondents, have index scores in the higher ranges of val-
ues. But the difference is not wide, especially in view of the circumstances that 
detracted from the legitimacy of the Schenectady police. Two-thirds of the peo-
ple who had contact with the Schenectady police expressed, on balance, trust 
rather than distrust. Two-thirds or more of the key informants in Schenectady 
likewise expressed trust in the department and its leaders.
The expected difference in trust levels across the two cities is further contra-
dicted by a comparison of trust levels in individual contact populations, which 
are not all of the same magnitude or even direction: among people who called for 
service, trust is higher in Syracuse, but among people who were arrested, trust is 
lower in Syracuse. The sample of people who were stopped in Syracuse exhibit 
higher levels of trust, but the two samples are not directly comparable, since the 
stops in Schenectady do not represent as well as those in Syracuse the people sub-
ject to routine traffic stops.
Thus we do not see in these data on public trust and confidence a clear indi-
cation of the crisis of legitimacy that Schenectady police suffered. Sovereigns in 
Schenectady could plainly see in the misadventures of individual officers symp-
toms of mismanagement, which (we infer) led them to challenge the department’s 
legitimacy. The judgments of the broader public, however, were seemingly less 
affected by the unflattering reports of officers’ misconduct. Compared with the 
judgments of those who encountered the Syracuse police, the legitimacy of which 
was not at issue, the judgments of those who encountered the Schenectady police 
were only slightly less positive. We lack data on public trust and confidence over 
time, and so we cannot establish that public attitudes were stable. But these find-
ings are consistent with the proposition that a police department’s legitimacy turns 
























68    Police Legitimacy
courts, and other parties—such as the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice—to make or influence authoritative decisions about the organization.
SUMMARY
We briefly reviewed extant research on police legitimacy and, more generally, citi-
zens’ attitudes toward the police. Previous research findings testify to the myriad 
influences on citizens’ outlooks, which are subject to long-term forces (e.g., post-
material values) and to factors that are more narrowly circumscribed temporally 
and spatially, such as the perceived level of social and physical disorder in one’s 
neighborhood and the reputation of the local police (for good or ill), but among 
which the performance of the police in police-citizen encounters is but one. Citi-
zens’ attitudes are rather tenuously connected to their direct, personal experiences 
with the police.
Using survey items identical to those used in previous survey research, we find 
in Schenectady and Syracuse patterns of trust and obligation that resemble those 
reported in previous research. First, citizens overall reported fairly high levels of 
trust and confidence in their police departments, with two-thirds to three-quarters 
in agreement with statements that police can be trusted to make good decisions, 
that they have confidence in the police, and that they are proud of their police. 
Second, seven survey items were strongly intercorrelated and form a scale of trust 
and confidence that is reliable. As in previous research, obligation forms a distinct 
construct, and while it is related to trust, the obligation items appear to tap a sepa-
rate attitudinal dimension. Finally, the two sources of data on citizens’ perceptions 
were only weakly consistent with our initial supposition that Syracuse police en-
joyed greater public trust and confidence at the project’s outset, and the differences 
were not nearly so stark as might have been expected, given Schenectady’s crisis of 
legitimacy in the decade preceding our surveying. Public trust, it appears, was less 
susceptible to the reported misdeeds of Schenectady police than were the judg-
ments of sovereigns, suggesting that organizational legitimacy turns more on the 
latter than the former.
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One premise of this research was that the quality of service that citizens receive 
in their encounters with the police is a dimension of police performance to which 
police managers should pay attention. We undertook to measure this dimension 
of performance by asking citizens who had contact with the police about their ex-
perience, and to make the results regularly available to managers in Schenectady 
and Syracuse. In this chapter, we describe those measures and the subjective ex-
perience that they documented in police-citizen encounters. In addition to sum-
marizing the contours of citizens’ subjective experience in each of the cities in 
terms of citizen satisfaction and the discrete components of procedural justice, we 
also form a composite measure of procedural justice on which further analysis will 
focus in a later chapter.
Citizens’ subjective experiences with the police have been conceptualized and 
measured in previous research in two principal ways. One approach has been con-
cerned with citizens’ satisfaction with their contact, which has been operational-
ized in terms of satisfaction with “the police” (Brandl et al. 1994), with “how the 
police responded” (Skogan 2005), with “the officer’s overall performance” (Wells 
2007), with the citizen’s treatment by police (Reisig and Parks 2000), and with how 
the situation was handled by police (Reisig and Parks 2000).
The second approach has dwelled on procedural justice. Procedural justice has 
to do with how authority is exercised and how people experience it. It is not unique 
to law enforcement and police-citizen encounters; many people use the same cri-
teria in judging the character of their interactions with authorities of many kinds, 
such as the interactions that people have with their supervisors at work. These 
criteria include:
4
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• Voice: people want and are more satisfied when they are given an opportunity to 
tell their side of a story, explain their situation, and communicate their views.
• Quality of interpersonal treatment: people want to be treated with dignity and 
respect.
• Trustworthy motives: people are more satisfied when they believe that authori-
ties care about their well-being and are considering their needs and concerns, 
and they draw inferences about that when authorities explain their decisions 
and justify and account for their actions.
• Neutrality: people believe that decisions are made fairly when they see evi-
dence of evenhandedness and the consideration of objective facts.
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; indeed, insofar as subjective ex-
perience has been treated as an object of explanation, it has been mainly through 
an examination of the extent to which satisfaction with the contact is shaped by 
the elements of procedural justice (Skogan 2005; Wells 2007). Most of this research 
has been cross-sectional, and so it has seldom accounted for the effects of citizens’ 
prior attitudes toward the police on their subjective experiences. As we pointed out 
in chapter 3, when the effects of prior attitudes have been analyzed in panel sur-
veys, we have found that subjective experience is strongly influenced by those prior 
attitudes. Citizens who have favorable attitudes toward the police are, ceteris pari-
bus, more satisfied with their subsequent interactions with the police, and citizens 
whose attitudes toward the police are unfavorable tend to be less satisfied. This 
could be a function of selective perception, as citizens tend to interpret what police 
do in terms of what citizens expect (Brandl et al. 1994). It could be a function of 
how citizens with different attitudes behave in their contacts with police and how 
police respond to that behavior (Tyler and Fagan 2008). Both of these dynamics 
could operate at the same time. Finally, we note that none of the previous research 
has empirically estimated the extent to which citizens’ perceptions are shaped by 
what police actually do as opposed to other factors that police do not control, in-
cluding the attitudes and expectations that citizens bring to the encounter.
In this chapter we examine citizens’ subjective experiences with the Schenect-
ady and Syracuse police: citizens’ satisfaction with how police treated them and 
how police handled their problem; citizens’ judgments about the procedural jus-
tice of the police in their contact, and citizens’ judgments about the outcomes of 
their contacts. We also formulate and test a preliminary model of citizens’ subjec-
tive experience.
SATISFACTION
Citizens’ satisfaction is in some respects a bottom line, in police as in other organiza-
tions. Private sector businesses are concerned with customer satisfaction, which has 
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implications for customer loyalty and long-term profitability. Public sector organi-
zations do not compete in markets, and they are sometimes accused of becoming 
complacent as a consequence, but “reinvented” agencies have exhibited a concern 
with customer service that rivals that of private firms. Police organizations have 
direct contact not only with “customers,” that is, people who request services and 
to whom they are delivered, but also involuntary “clients” to whom police authority 
is applied. The experiences of the latter are nevertheless important, in respects that 
parallel customer loyalty, insofar as their experiences may affect their cooperation 
and compliance with the police, and also in that their experiences are shared with 
others whose views of the police are influenced by the vicarious experience.
We measured citizens’ satisfaction with respect to how citizens were treated 
by police and, for people who called for service, satisfaction with how their prob-
lem was handled. Figure 4 summarizes citizens’ satisfaction with how they were 
treated by the Schenectady and Syracuse police; in the bar labeled for each city, the 
bar’s segments represent the proportion of contacts for which citizens reported the 
various levels of satisfaction: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatis-
fied, and very dissatisfied.1 About three-quarters were very or somewhat satisfied 
with how they were treated (78.9 percent of those with an opinion in Schenectady, 
and 77.1 percent of those with an opinion in Syracuse); slightly more than one-fifth 
were very or somewhat dissatisfied. Most people had an opinion about how po-
lice treated them, and most of those were at one pole or the other: very—and not 
merely somewhat—satisfied or dissatisfied.
While the levels of satisfaction in these two cities are quite comparable to one 
another, we would naturally wonder whether they are comparable to those found 
in other places for other police departments. Results from other surveys in other 
jurisdictions suggest that they are. Citizen satisfaction with Chicago police was 
somewhat lower, as 72.8 percent of respondents in that city were satisfied. Satis-
faction levels in the three municipalities surveyed in 2010 for the National Police 
Research Platform were somewhat higher than those in Schenectady and Syra-
cuse (81.5 percent satisfied), and satisfaction with New York City police about the 
same (74.4 percent satisfied), though the differences are quite small relative to 
sampling error.2
We also measured citizens’ satisfaction with how police handled their prob-
lems, though only among those who called for police assistance. A bit more than 
two-thirds (nearly three-quarters of those with an opinion) were very or some-
what satisfied with how their problem was handled; about one-quarter or fewer 
were very or somewhat dissatisfied. Again, satisfaction levels across the two sites 
were much the same: 70.3 percent very or somewhat satisfied in Schenectady, and 
68.5 percent satisfied in Syracuse.
Most people, then, were satisfied with the service that they received, though 
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eligible cases: 43,752 in Schenectady and 138,282 in Syracuse. Thus across these 
eighteen months of surveying, an estimated 8,925 people came away from their 
contact with Schenectady police dissatisfied with how they were treated, and an 
estimated 29,316 people were dissatisfied with their treatment by Syracuse police. 
Of the 33,880 who called for police assistance in Schenectady, an estimated 8,639 
were dissatisfied with how their problems were handled; 29,258 of 117,031 who 
called for service in Syracuse were likewise dissatisfied with the handling of their 
problems. When we consider the ways that these unsatisfactory experiences could 
ripple through the population, by way of the relatives, neighbors, and friends of 
those who have direct contact with the police, the significance of these experiences 
is multiplied.
Correlates of Satisfaction
Previous research suggests that citizens are more prone to accept police interven-
tion, and to be satisfied with their encounters with police when they or other 
citizens initiate the contact, compared with occasions on which police initiate 
the contact on their authority. The latter tend to cast citizens in the role of sus-
pected offenders, their participation in the interaction is not voluntary, and it is 
the officer who is responsible for their involvement. In the former, even citizens 
who are—or become—suspected offenders can attribute police intervention to 
another citizen, whose request serves to legitimize police involvement. We would 
therefore expect to find lower levels of citizen satisfaction in police-initiated en-
counters, and that is exactly what we do find in both sites. About half of those 
whose contacts were initiated by police were satisfied (slightly more than half 
in Schenectady and less than half in Syracuse); about 80 percent of those whose 
contacts were citizen-initiated were satisfied. As we found with respect to their 
treatment by police, citizens tended toward one pole or the other in their judg-
ments about how police handled their problems; about three-quarters of those 
who were satisfied were very satisfied, and two-thirds of those who were dissatis-
fied were very dissatisfied.
It surely comes as no surprise that people who were arrested were the least 
satisfied. Outcomes are not determinative of subjective experience, as we further 
discuss below, but they are not unimportant. It might come as a surprise, however, 
that more than one-third of the arrestees (and nearly half in Schenectady) were 
very or at least somewhat satisfied with their treatment by police, in spite of what 
is obviously an unfavorable outcome for them; refer to figure 4, in which the bars 
to the right of each city’s overall bar displays the proportions of each subpopula-
tion that were satisfied with their treatment by police. More than half of those 
who were stopped by police were satisfied with their treatment (with somewhat 
lower levels of satisfaction among those whose contacts culminated in a ticket, not 
shown in the figure).
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PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE
We posed to survey respondents a number of items that have been used in previ-
ous surveys to measure judgments about the procedural justice with which people 
were treated:
• The police treated me with dignity and respect.
• The police considered my views.
• The police tried hard to do the right thing.
• The police made their decision based on facts.
• The police respected my rights.
• The police paid attention to what I had to say.
• The police explained their actions.
• The police were very/somewhat [un]fair.
• The police were very/somewhat [im]polite.
In general, 70 to 80 percent of the citizens report very or somewhat favorable expe-
riences on each component of procedural justice, and the proportions are remark-
ably similar across the two sites, seldom with differences greater than 2 percentage 
points. Whether the judgment was favorable or unfavorable, respondents tended 
toward the extreme response categories—namely with strong agreement or dis-
agreement.3 For example, among the citizens who had contact with Schenectady 
police, 82 percent said that police treated them with dignity and respect, and most 
of those gave police the most favorable rating (i.e., “strongly” agree); among their 
counterparts in Syracuse, 81 percent reported that police treated them with dignity 
and respect. About 70 percent in each city said that police considered their views, 
an indicator of “voice.” About three-quarters said that police tried hard to do the 
right thing, and made their decision based on facts—reflections of the perceived 
quality of decision-making.
It is also clear that, in Schenectady and Syracuse as in the sites of previous survey 
research, these aspects of how police are perceived to exercise their authority are 
strongly associated with citizens’ satisfaction with their encounters with the police. 
In cases where citizens believed that police had acted with procedural fairness, all 
but small fractions (i.e., 10–15 percent), with few exceptions, were satisfied with how 
they were treated and how their problems were handled. But when citizens believe 
that police did not act with procedural fairness, they tend not to be satisfied with 
either how police treated them or with how police handled their problem, with satis-
faction levels ranging from 10 to 30 percent (again, with a few exceptions). We would 
add that these factors together may account for a large fraction—but not all—of the 
differences in satisfaction among the contact populations we surveyed—those who 
call for service, those who are arrested, and those who are stopped. There is good 
reason to believe that these cross-sectional associations are to a degree spurious, 
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however, insofar as they are produced by the common influence of prior attitudes 
toward the police, for which we cannot control.
Some previous accounts of procedural justice have distinguished the quality of 
authorities’ decision-making from the quality of their treatment of those on whom 
they act, while other accounts have drawn distinctions among four dimensions 
of procedural justice: voice; quality of interpersonal treatment; trustworthy mo-
tives; and neutrality. Be all that as it may, empirical analyses of survey items that 
tap these features of subjective experience tend to find that these various items 
are so strongly intercorrelated that these conceptually distinguishable dimensions 
cannot be discriminated from one another in citizens’ perceptions, such that the 
survey responses form just a single scale of procedural justice. That is what we 
find in the survey data collected in Schenectady and Syracuse: citizens who rated 
the police favorably on one aspect also tended to rate police favorably on others. 
This unidimensional structure holds among respondents in each city and in both 
combined.4 Either citizens do not differentiate among these dimensions very well, 
or these different facets of police performance are strongly associated in officers’ 
overt behavior. Thus we form a single index of procedural justice for further analy-
sis that more economically summarizes citizens’ subjective experiences; adding 
the numerical values assigned to the items’ response categories,5 the index ranges 
from -16 to 16. Figure 5, below, shows a simplified form of the index for tabular 
presentation, with four categories of equal range. The figure also depicts the mean 
scale scores for each contact population: calls for service; arrests; and stops or field 
interviews.
This summary index of procedural justice varies in expected ways across types 
of contacts. Among the people who called for service, most reported favorable 
experiences. In Schenectady, the mean score on the procedural justice index (9.9) 
was in the range that we have characterized as most favorable, and in Syracuse the 
mean fell just short of the lower bound of that range. The fraction who reported 
procedurally unfair treatment by police is rather modest, about 14–16 percent in 
all. We should add, however, that the absolute numbers are fairly large. Based on 
our sample, and subject to a margin of sampling error, we would estimate that 
across the eighteen months of the survey, 4,811 people who called for service in 
Schenectady and 19,544 who called for service in Syracuse assessed their experi-
ence with the police as procedurally unfair. More specifically, we would project—
again, subject to a margin of sampling error—that among people who called for 
service in these cities, 24,457 encountered police whom they considered very or 
somewhat impolite, 32,809 encountered police who did not pay attention to what 
they had to say, and 40,979 came away from their interactions thinking that police 
did not consider their views.
People who were arrested had less favorable subjective experiences, as we might 
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zero—just above the midpoint in Schenectady, and somewhat below the midpoint 
in Syracuse. Among those arrested by Schenectady police, 44 percent thought that 
their treatment was procedurally unfair; in Syracuse, 59 percent of the arrestees 
rated their treatment as unfair, on balance. Extrapolating to the arrestee popula-
tions, we would estimate that 2,988 of the 6,745 people arrested by Schenectady 
police and 5,197 of 8,779 people arrested by Syracuse police judged their experi-
ence with police to have been procedurally unjust. Similar projections for those 
who were stopped are 1,676 of the 3,127 people stopped in Schenectady and 4,166 
of the 12,472 people stopped in Syracuse.
A comparison of these levels of procedural justice to those reported in previous 
research on police-citizen contacts is complicated by differences in sampling, and 
particularly the representation of arrestees in this sample. But overall it appears 
that citizens’ subjective experiences in Schenectady and Syracuse are neither dis-
tinctly better nor worse than those in other cities that have been the sites of previ-
ous research (e.g., Rosenbaum et al. 2011; Skogan 2005, 2006).
SUBJECTIVE OUTC OMES
Citizens’ experiences are also colored by their judgments about the outcomes that 
they receive, even if they are not entirely determined by outcomes. Outcomes take 
different forms, and the relevant outcomes turn to a large degree on the role that 
citizens play. Suspected offenders may be taken into custody, issued a ticket, or 
released without any legal action. Citizens who request police assistance may have 
their problem resolved entirely by police at the scene, may be referred elsewhere 
for assistance, or find their situation unaltered by police intervention. Moreover, 
the quality of any of these outcomes is subject to citizens’ interpretations. People 
who request police assistance will make a judgment about whether police solved 
their problems. People who are arrested or ticketed will make a judgment about 
whether that outcome, which is in an objective sense clearly unfavorable for them, 
was one that they deserved.
People who called for service were, other things being equal, more satisfied 
with police when they judged that police were able to solve their problems, or at 
least made an effort to help; two-thirds said that police took care of their prob-
lem, while slightly more than three-quarters found police to be very or some-
what helpful. In general, experiences are also shaped by distributive justice—with 
whether people believe that the outcome was fair or deserved. Overall, nearly 
two-thirds of the citizens believed that they received the outcome that they de-
served. While people who were arrested tended to be less satisfied, more than 
one-third (35.7 percent) acknowledged that they deserved the unfavorable out-
come that they received.
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE ACROSS DEMO GR APHIC 
SUB GROUPS
Subjective experience varies somewhat across demographic subgroups of citizens, 
that is, by citizens’ sex, race and ethnicity, age, educational background, and 
employment status. The differences that emerge in each site tend to mirror the 
findings of previous research, and most of the differences are of fairly modest 
magnitude. Men and women on average report similarly favorable experiences. 
Citizens’ education is related to subjective experience, inasmuch as the college-
educated are more positive about their experiences, compared with either of two 
groups with less education: high school or less; and some college. People who 
are employed tend to be more positive about their contacts with the police than 
those who are not employed. Subjective experience is better with age: in general, 
the older the citizen, the more positive the experience with police. With respect to 
education, employment, and age, differences on the procedural justice index are 
greater than those in satisfaction levels.
Whites report more positive experiences than blacks do, though two-thirds or 
more of both whites and blacks are (very or somewhat) satisfied with their contact, 
and both groups have mean scores on the procedural justice index that are in the 
favorable range. Greater disparities can be seen at the extremes, with three-fifths 
of whites and fewer than half of blacks very satisfied with their treatment by police. 
Hispanics report less favorable experiences that whites do, and in Schenectady, 
their judgments about procedural justice are even less favorable than those of 
blacks.
Any of these simple bivariate relationships could be confounded by the other 
characteristics discussed here or by other factors, such as the nature of the con-
tact with police. Insofar as men, racial and ethnic minorities, the less educated, 
or the unemployed are overrepresented among those police stop, for example, we 
would expect differences stemming from these characteristics to be overstated in 
a bivariate analysis. So no firm conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships 
are warranted from such bivariate results.
SPATIAL AND TEMPOR AL PAT TERNS OF SUBJECTIVE 
EXPERIENCE
So that we might better understand the patterns of citizens’ subjective experi-
ences, we also dissect them in terms of the features of the encounters that we can 
identify in police records: the patrol beats in which the encounters occurred; the 
nature of the problems for which citizens called for assistance; the times of day 
during which the encounters transpired; and citizens’ judgments about police 
response time.
Procedural Justice in Citizens’ Subjective Experiences    79
Patrol Beats
We might expect to find variation across patrol beats in citizens’ subjective ex-
periences with police due to differences in the character of the problems and the 
backgrounds of the people, as well as perhaps differences across the officers as-
signed to those beats. In addition, since attitudes toward the police vary by neigh-
borhood context, and particularly with the social and economic disadvantage of 
neighborhoods—for example, the levels of poverty and social disorganization 
(Sampson and Bartusch 1998)—variation across beats could stem at least in part 
from features of the areas. We measured the concentrated disadvantage of police 
beats in Schenectady and Syracuse, interpolating as needed from Census tracts 
to beats, based on a factor derived from the percentage of the population that is 
black; percentage of children under eighteen living in a female-headed household; 
percentage of the population between five and seventeen years of age; percentage 
of households on public assistance; and percentage of the labor force unemployed.
Beat-specific estimates of the percentage satisfied are subject to sampling errors 
of 8 to 10 percent, in most instances; the procedural justice index scores have a 
margin of error of 1 to 2 or so. Some of the differences that can be detected among 
the beats in either city are likely real differences and not sampling artifacts, but in 
the main, the variations that we find across beats are not large relative to the sam-
pling fluctuation. Procedural justice, at this beat level, correlates moderately with 
concentrated disadvantage, with coefficients of -0.56 in Schenectady and -0.50 in 
Syracuse. Satisfaction levels are for the most part more weakly associated with 
neighborhood disadvantage, with correlations around -0.25 in Syracuse and -0.46 
and -0.71 for treatment and problem handling, respectively, in Schenectady.
Calls for Service
We would expect to find variation across types of calls, since different types of calls 
are more or less susceptible to resolution by police, and more or less contentious 
or interpersonally charged. For these analytic purposes, we have classified calls 
based on the code entered into the CAD system by dispatchers, and into generic 
categories first developed in 1982.6 These category-specific estimates of satisfaction 
are subject to sampling errors of 5 to 12 percent, in most instances. Some of the 
differences that emerge—for example, between traffic problems (such as crashes 
or disabled vehicles), on one hand, and interpersonal conflicts (disputes) or suspi-
cious circumstances (persons or vehicles) on the other hand—are likely real dif-
ferences and not sampling artifacts. We can say with a fair degree of statistical 
confidence that citizens whose calls concern interpersonal conflicts or suspicious 
circumstances have the least favorable experiences, and those whose calls concern 
violent crimes or nuisances (e.g., noise or other disturbances; animal problems) 
are less satisfied than many. That statistical confidence must be tempered by the 
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fact that the codes entered by dispatchers contain some error; a substantial frac-
tion are probably misclassified, through no fault of dispatchers, but rather due to 
the limitations and inaccuracy of the information available to them (Klinger and 
Bridges 1997).
Time of Day
We would expect to find variation across time of day, due to differences in the 
nature of the problems that police confront and the people with whom officers 
interact at different times of the day, and also perhaps due to differences in the 
composition of the police and in supervisory practices on different platoons. Thus 
we define times of the day to correspond to the platoons’ working hours, though 
we caution that these results are based only on a time-of-day breakdown, and not 
on the assignments of the individual officers involved in the encounters. (Officers 
assigned to one platoon, say the day platoon, might at times work a shift on an-
other platoon on an overtime basis.)
In general, citizens whose contacts with police transpired during the hours of 
the first platoon—the “graveyard” shift—reported the least favorable experiences. 
On daytime platoons, for example, the mean procedural justice index score was 
nearly or higher than 8.5, while the mean index scores on other platoons were at 
or under 8, and even as low as 5.59 on the midnight platoon in Syracuse. When we 
include statistical controls for the type of contact, beat, and call type, however, the 
differences across times of the day are reduced to negligible magnitude. We infer 
that differences in performance across the hours of the day are mainly a func-
tion of the kinds of problems that police handle and the people with whom they 
interact.
Response Time
The findings of previous research testify to the role of police response time, relative 
to citizens’ expectations of response time, in shaping citizens’ subjective experi-
ence. Citizens’ expectations are malleable to a degree, so long as call-takers advise 
them about likely delays and when the arrival of an officer can be anticipated; but 
such practices by telecommunications personnel are not ubiquitous, and citizens 
form their own expectations. We asked survey respondents whether police arrived 
faster than they expected, slower, or as fast as they expected, and their assessments 
of response time bear the expected relationships to subjective experience. When 
subjective experience is disaggregated in these terms, we find some wide dispari-
ties. Among those who judged the police response to have been faster than ex-
pected, 90 percent or more were satisfied with how police treated them, and 85–90 
percent were satisfied with how police handled their problems; procedural justice 
index scores among this group were 11.5–12.5. Citizens who thought that the police 
response was as fast as expected were somewhat less favorable, but not greatly so. 
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But among people who assessed the police response as slower than they expected, 
two-thirds to three-quarters were satisfied with their treatment, a bit more than 
half were satisfied with how their problems were handled, and procedural justice 
index scores were under 7 in Schenectady and under 5 in Syracuse.
These associations could be produced in several different ways. It might be that 
the celerity of the police response colors a citizen’s entire experience. It might be 
that officers who respond more quickly also tend to be more efficacious and proce-
durally just. Or it might be that citizens who are treated well and whose problems 
are addressed successfully by police tend to evaluate response time more favorably 
in retrospect. It might even be that citizens’ prior attitudes affect both their assess-
ment of response time and other elements of subjective experience. Not all of these 
accounts are equally plausible, but neither are they all mutually exclusive.
THE USE OF POLICE AUTHORIT Y
Procedural justice concerns how and not whether police authority is exercised, 
but certainly it is plausible that citizens’ subjective experiences are shaped by of-
ficers’ decisions to apply their occupational prerogatives. One form of authority 
is that to search or frisk. Of the (weighted) sample of those who were report-
edly stopped, 72 percent were stopped in a car and 28 percent on foot. Based 
on citizens’ reports through the survey, nearly half (46.8 percent) of those who 
were stopped were searched or frisked; one-quarter had their vehicle searched. 
Officers reportedly asked for permission to search or frisk the person in one-
fifth of the cases, and asked for permission to search the vehicle in 12 percent. 
Citizens reportedly consented to a search of their person—whether or not police 
requested it—in 23 percent, and they consented to a vehicle search in 11 percent. 
Across both sites, four-fifths of the searches were in connection with arrests, but 
we have no way to tell from the survey whether the search/frisk preceded or fol-
lowed the arrest.
Citizens’ subjective experience is associated with the exercise of officers’ author-
ity to search or frisk: in both sites, satisfaction and subjective procedural justice is 
greater in police-initiated contacts overall than in the subset in which citizens were 
searched or frisked. About half of those whose contact was initiated by police were 
satisfied with how police treated them, and in both cities, their mean procedural 
justice index score was positive, in the moderately favorable range. Of those who 
were searched or frisked, less than one-half (as few as one-third in Syracuse) were 
satisfied with their treatment, and their procedural justice index scores were be-
low zero, in the moderately unfavorable range. Comparable judgments are found 
among those whose vehicles were searched. Only about one-third (36.4 percent) of 
the citizens who were searched or frisked considered the search legitimate; nearly 
one-quarter of the citizens whose vehicles were searched considered the vehicle 
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search legitimate. Not surprisingly, subjective experience was substantially more 
favorable when citizens were subjected to a search that they considered legitimate.
Arrests vary with respect to:
• the seriousness of the charge(s)—felony, misdemeanor, violation, infraction;
• the basis for the arrest, such as a complaint, a crime in progress, or a warrant; 
and
• the immediate disposition of the arrest, particularly whether the arrestee is 
held or released.
Arrests also vary with respect to the legitimacy of the arrest in citizens’ eyes. In 
both Schenectady and Syracuse, subjective experience was most favorable when 
the charges were the least serious (less than a violation in the New York State penal 
code), but otherwise the seriousness of the charges was unrelated to citizens’ sub-
jective experience. Subjective experience was most favorable when arrests were 
based on warrants, whose execution is not (normally) a matter over which the 
officer exercises discretion, and least favorable when arrests were based on crimes 
in progress. Arrestees are, not surprisingly, more satisfied when they are released 
rather than incarcerated, though the immediate disposition of the arrest is also as-
sociated with procedural justice, index scores of which were much higher among 
those who received appearance tickets and released than among those who were 
held in custody. Finally, subjective experience is more favorable when the citizen 
regards the arrest as legitimate.
A PRELIMINARY MODEL OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
The simple bivariate associations reported above are of course potentially con-
founded by the effects of the other factors on subjective experience, and so we 
conducted multivariate regression analyses of satisfaction, procedural justice, and 
subjective outcomes based largely on the model depicted in figure 6. Citizens’ 
satisfaction is posited to be a function of subjective procedural justice, subjec-
tive outcomes, citizens’ backgrounds (sex, race, ethnicity, age, education, and 
employment), and the situational context, including the beat in which the encounter 
transpired, the platoon on which the encounter transpired, the response time rela-
tive to citizens’ expectations, the call type, and (as applicable) the arrest basis and 
arrest disposition, the charge seriousness, and a search/frisk of the citizen and/
or search of the citizen’s vehicle. Procedural justice and subjective outcomes are 
a function of citizens’ backgrounds and the situational context. We allow as how 
procedural justice and subjective outcomes could have reciprocal effects, but we 
believe that it is likely that procedural justice has a greater effect on subjective 
outcomes than vice versa, and so our equation for subjective outcomes includes 
procedural justice. We consider this analysis to be preliminary in the sense that it 
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includes only the constructs that we can measure with survey data and informa-
tion in police records; it omits the procedural justice of officers’ actions, which we 
will add in chapter 7. We note that since we do not have data on citizens’ attitudes 
toward the police prior to their contact with the police, prior attitudes are omitted 
from this model, and this omission is likely to produce inflated estimates of the 
effects of procedural justice and subjective outcomes.
Table 1 includes the regression coefficients estimated for this preliminary model 
of subjective experience. The baseline contact is an encounter initiated by neither 
the police nor the citizen—that is, by a third party. The principal findings from this 
set of analyses is the extent to which the elements of subjective experience are in-
terrelated, and the fairly weak explanatory power of either citizens’ backgrounds or 
the situational context of the contact. Satisfaction is driven mainly by procedural 
justice and subjective outcomes. Together these variables account for 74 percent of 
the variation in citizens’ satisfaction with their treatment by police, and 71 percent 
of the variation in citizens’ satisfaction with how their problem was handled. Very 
little explanatory power is added by citizens’ background characteristics or even 
characteristics of the situation. A few categories of calls have higher or lower levels 
of satisfaction (relative to the omitted category of nuisances), and satisfaction bears 
Figure 6. A Model of Citizens’ Subjective Experience.









Constant 2.37* 2.19* −0.89 −0.05
Call for service 0.17* — 5.08* −0.14
Arrest −0.04 — −1.48 −0.00
Police-initiated −0.07 — 2.34* 0.06
Citizen male −0.02 −0.02 0.81* −0.01
Citizen black 0.00 0.00 −0.70* −0.07
Citizen Hispanic 0.01 0.06 0.54 0.08
Citizen’s age 0.00 0.00* 0.04* −0.00**
Citizen’s education 0.00 0.02 0.15 −0.06*
Citizen employed 0.01 −0.02 1.10* 0.05
Neighborhood disadvantage −0.01 −0.04* −0.03 −0.02
Procedural justice 0.09* 0.05* — 0.13*
Problem solved −0.04* 0.24* — —
Deserved outcome 0.07* 0.27* — —
Perceived response time −0.02* 0.06* 2.17* 0.10*
Call: violent crime −0.01 0.08 −0.38 −0.04
Call: nonviolent crime −0.02 −0.00 1.64* −0.24*
Call: interpersonal conflict −0.06 −0.00 −0.19 −0.12
Call: suspicious circumstance 0.01 0.05 −0.78 0.01
Call: traffic −0.02 0.09** 2.53* 0.13
Call: dependent person −0.06 0.08 0.77 0.23*
Call: medical 0.01 0.28* −1.38 0.11
Call: other assistance 0.05 0.11** 0.54 −0.11
Call: other 0.15** 0.16 −4.47* 0.21
Call: unknown 0.07 0.20** −0.44 −0.01
Arrest: felony 0.09 — −3.27 −0.10
Arrest: misdemeanor 0.14 — −3.02 −0.22
Arrest: violation 0.25** — −3.10 −0.03
Appearance ticket −0.01 — 5.93* 0.11
Arrest: released −0.07 — 4.16* 0.09
Arrest: warrant −0.03 — 3.55* −0.06
Arrest: crime in progress −0.04 — 0.54 −0.13
Search/frisk person 0.09 — −7.56* 0.22
Search vehicle −0.06 — −3.97* 0.03
Citizen consent search/frisk −0.29* — 8.31* 0.24
Citizen consent search of vehicle 0.06 — 2.70 0.12
Platoon 2 (day) 0.00 −0.08* 0.54 −0.03
Platoon 3 (evening) −0.02 −0.08* 0.32 −0.06
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.72 0.22 0.57
* p < .05
** p < .10
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an independent relationship to response time (our measure of which captures the 
celerity of the response relative to citizens’ expectations, and is therefore itself sub-
jective), but for the most part, citizens’ satisfaction is not explained by the objective 
features of police-citizen encounters that are measured here.
Citizens’ judgments about procedural justice are shaped by a number of the 
factors analyzed here. Citizens who called for service and citizens contacted 
at police initiative tended to rate procedural justice more positively, compared 
with those whose contacts with the police were initiated by a third party. 
Response time affects procedural justice (or both judgments might be affected by 
another factor, such as prior attitudes). But some of the largest effects stem from 
the exercise of police authority. Searches detract from citizens’ sense of proce-
dural justice: among citizens who were stopped, those who were searched or 
frisked tended to rate the procedural justice of the police less favorably—3 to 7 
points lower.7 But citizens who consented to a search or frisk were more favor-
able, though not quite correspondingly so. Among arrestees, those who were 
either released in the field or issued an appearance ticket were more positive 
about procedural justice, and those who were arrested on warrants were more 
positive, relative to those who were held and those who were arrested on com-
plaints, respectively.
Citizens’ backgrounds are also related to procedural justice, all else being equal: 
citizens who were employed judged procedural justice more favorably, as did men; 
blacks tended to judge procedural justice less favorably. Assessments of procedural 
justice improved with age.
Subjective outcomes—whether the citizen believed that s/he got the outcome 
s/he deserved—are largely a function of the perceived procedural justice. With 
procedural justice omitted from the equation for subjective outcome, citizens’ 
backgrounds and the situational context together account for just 14 percent 
of the variation in subjective outcomes. The addition of procedural justice to 
the equation increases the explained variance to 57 percent. Remarkably, the 
objective features of outcomes—even whether or not the citizen is arrested and 
held—have fairly weak effects on subjective outcomes. Even with procedural jus-
tice excluded from the equation, the effect of arrest is substantively modest and 
statistically insignificant.
PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE AND TRUST
Procedural justice and trust are associated in Schenectady and Syracuse, as in pre-
vious survey research. Half of those who judged procedural justice in the most 
favorable terms exhibit the highest level of trust, while more than half of those 
who judged procedural justice in the least favorable terms exhibit the lowest level 
of trust. Nearly half of those with the greatest distrust judged procedural justice in 
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the least favorable terms, and nearly 90 percent of those with high levels of trust 
assessed procedural justice in very favorable terms. The two (continuous) indices 
are correlated at 0.64, with virtually identical coefficients in the two sites. (Proce-
dural justice is more weakly related to obligation; the two indices are correlated at 
0.36.) This cross-sectional association reflects the reciprocal effects of procedural 
justice on trust and of trust on procedural justice.
SUMMARY
Using survey items identical to those used in previous survey research, we find 
in Schenectady and Syracuse patterns of subjective experience similar to those 
reported in previous research. First, citizens overall reported fairly high levels of 
satisfaction with their contacts with police, with 70 to 75 percent very or somewhat 
satisfied with how police treated them and how police handled their problem, and 
fairly high levels of procedural justice, with 60 to 65 percent in the high range of 
scores on the procedural justice index and nearly 80 percent on the favorable side 
of the scale. As we detail in chapter 8, this was a stable pattern throughout the 
eighteen-month survey period, and so each department had a rather high baseline 
level of satisfaction and procedural justice at the outset of survey-based measure-
ment of police performance.
Second, procedural justice is comprised of a set of tightly associated features of 
subjective experience—that is, the components of procedural justice, as they are 
captured by the various survey items, exhibited the same strong intercorrelation 
here that they have displayed in previous research. One factor was distilled from a 
factor analysis, and the additive index formed by the nine survey items has a high 
level of reliability. The measurement properties of the procedural justice index 
appear quite satisfactory.
Third, these features of subjective experience—procedural justice and the two 
forms of citizens’ satisfaction—bear strong relationships to one another, as in pre-
vious research, and they are also related to other factors that previous research has 
reported as correlates of subjective experience: whether the contact is police- or 
citizen-initiated; citizens’ race, age, and education; police response time. Not all of 
these associations are the product of independent influences on subjective experi-
ence, however. The effects of citizens’ backgrounds and even of situational context 
on satisfaction and subjective outcomes are apparently mediated entirely by citi-
zens’ judgments about procedural justice.
Finally, and notwithstanding the modest differences between the two depart-
ments in trust that we reported in chapter 3, levels of subjective experience with 
police-citizen encounters were very similar across the two sites, and patterns of 
relationships between procedural justice and other hypothesized correlates were, 
with only a few exceptions, comparable.
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We analyze subjective experience further, and in terms of the actions taken 
by officers, in chapter 7, and we examine the longitudinal patterns in subjective 
experience in each site in more detail in chapter 8. But now we turn to a qualita-
tive analysis of citizens’ subjective experience, going beyond citizens’ responses to 
closed-end survey items and tapping dissatisfied citizens’ own words to describe 
the reasons for their dissatisfaction.
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Procedural fairness addresses how authority is exercised, and how people experi-
ence it, which affects their views about the legitimacy of authorities. We know that 
when citizens assess their subjective experience in an encounter with the police, 
their judgment turns to a large degree on process-based criteria about the quality 
of decision-making and the quality of treatment they received. But we also know 
that factors beyond the immediate interaction influence citizens’ subjective judg-
ments about the immediate interaction.
Our police services survey gave respondents who were reportedly dissatisfied 
an opportunity to describe the reasons for their dissatisfaction in their own words. 
Our description of the sources of dissatisfaction with police treatment stem from 
the responses of 824 respondents (363 of whom called the police for assistance and 
300 of whom were arrested). While there are differences in the overall number of 
individuals in each contact type, nearly all who were dissatisfied (ranging from 90 
to 97 percent) went on to attempt to articulate the source of their dissatisfaction, 
regardless of contact type. Those who called the police for assistance and who re-
ported that they were not satisfied with the way the police handled their problem 
were likewise given the opportunity to explain the source(s) of their dissatisfac-
tion. Here again, nearly all of those who stated they were dissatisfied attempted to 
articulate why (677 of 700).
The findings we derived from our analysis of respondents’ views provide further 
evidence that assessments of police are influenced by factors beyond the immediate 
encounter. These include preconceptions about law enforcement as well as judg-
ments about the interaction that are triggered at (and colored by) the earliest stages 
of the process, prior to interaction with the police (i.e., impressions of dispatch).
5
Citizens’ Dissatisfaction in Their 
Own Words
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We took an inductive approach to the textual analysis, as respondents’ own 
words led us to the categories we formed. We identified ten main categories of 
sources of dissatisfaction, several of which include subcategories under the main 
theme. While we organize the discussion around the individual themes we iden-
tified, we also tie them to one or more elements of procedural justice typically 
discussed in the literature. Our review of studies that have examined procedural 
justice (most of which are quantitative) suggests that the same or similar items 
have not consistently been applied to the same subscales that make up elements of 
procedural justice. Our approach to coding and presenting the textual data enables 
us to place a theme we identified in one or more of the domains of procedural 
justice commonly identified in the literature.
In doing so we are able to better understand the factors that influence citizens’ 
reported dissatisfaction. The closed-end items summarized in chapter 4 are cor-
roborated by respondents’ own words, indicating that the perceived character of 
the immediate interaction does shape citizens’ satisfaction. In addition, respon-
dents’ stated reasons for dissatisfaction shed light and provide further support for 
the view that citizens’ judgments are also shaped by forces outside of the immedi-
ate encounter, and often beyond the involved officers’ control.
We turn now to a discussion of the categories that emerged when we content-
analyzed stated reasons for dissatisfaction without discriminating by the nature 
of the contact. Any one respondent could cite more than one reason for his/her 
dissatisfaction.
STATED REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION
In order of descending frequency, the categories we identified included dissatisfac-
tion stemming from: (1) the outcome of the contact; (2) perceived disrespect/loss 
of dignity; (3) perceived lack of concern; (4) inability to have one’s voice heard; (5) 
perceived disparity in treatment and/or decision-making; (6) failure to provide 
information; (7) failure to respond to the scene; (8) failure to respect rights; (9) 
negative image of the police in general; and (10) external forces.
Outcome
When asked to provide a description of why they were not satisfied with how their 
problem was handled or how they were treated, many respondents focused on the 
outcome that followed the interaction. Within this category we identified two pri-
mary concerns: the officer was perceived to have not done enough (or even any-
thing) to resolve the problem, or the ultimate resolution was not appropriate. The 
comments below exemplify those we characterized as typifying the “did nothing,” 
“did not do enough,” or “failed to resolve the problem” sentiment. Here, displeasure 
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with the outcome seemed to rest on the perception that the police simply did not 
expend adequate energy or do enough toward problem resolution.
Nothing was done about the situation. Somebody had broke into my car they wrote a 
report and that was it.
They didn’t do anything.
I had a break-in and I thought a report was going to be made but nothing has hap-
pened. They were polite but other than that it was a waste of time.
For one, I’ve been calling the police department with proof of what my neighbor was 
doing. Neighbor’s son and herself have damaged my property and neighbor woman 
came up in my porch and spit in my friend’s face. Police said couldn’t do anything, they 
didn’t have proof.
Because I am a homeowner and I have someone living in my apartment. The person 
had someone in the apartment that was destroying the property. They didn’t do any-
thing. They won’t do anything.
I was assaulted by a former employee and they said there was nothing they could do.
I called several times about this problem, and still no tickets have been issued yet.
Because he tells me that they have to see it with their own eyes if my girlfriend had 
my baby in the car without the car seat. The officer overreacted when I showed them 
the car seat as proof that she took the baby without it and he got in my face and said, 
“I’ll arrest you right now.”
I called the police about my truck being stolen, they done nothing. I have made 
complaints.
They come to the scene and tell me there is nothing they can do about the drug deal-
ers selling drugs in front of my business. I would appreciate if they would at least ques-
tion the drug dealers. My property has been destroyed because the drug dealers know 
I’m calling the police, but the police don’t do anything about it.
They left and left the problem there.
Because the problem wasn’t handled they just swept it under the rug.
It was kids on my roof of my business and they were vandalizing my business. They 
said they could not do anything about it.
The work they did was superficial.
Because I feel further action should have happened with the situation, it makes you 
feel like why bother calling the police.
For others, the dissatisfaction turned not on police effort but on the outcome itself. 
Here, citizens felt that the officers’ determination of how to handle the problem 
was incorrect. The quality of the decision was deemed unsatisfactory because its 
outcome was not the outcome the citizen felt he/she deserved.
They told me that they would arrest my neighbor and they didn’t.
They should’ve charged someone with assault and no one was charged.
What happened was I gave the guy a ride and he stole my wallet out of the truck. 
It was on the dash. I was already driving away when I noticed it was gone and rushed 
back. I called the police when I noticed it was gone . . . I confronted him about the wallet 
and he gave it back. I was still on the phone with the police and they said because I got 
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the wallet back they didn’t need to do anything. I still wanted him prosecuted through 
and the police would [not] do anything.
The lady that was supposed to be arrested has not been arrested yet.
Among those who were not satisfied with the outcome, some went on to cite ex-
tenuating circumstances or justifications that should, in their opinion, have fac-
tored into the officer’s decision.
I felt like I could have been given a warning since it was the first time I had been pulled 
over for that certain offense.
I wasn’t trespassing and they wrote me a ticket for it and court was on a Saturday 
and I didn’t know and then they issued a warrant for my arrest.
I went through a stop sign unknowingly. When the police stopped me he ask “just 
didn’t feel like stopping at the stop sign today.” I told the officer that I didn’t see the sign 
and he just gave me a ticket.
Just don’t understand why they had to put me in the cell when I had turned myself 
in for a warrant and I was honest enough to go in. I don’t think that was necessary for 
them to do.
Respect/Dignity
We know that satisfaction is shaped by the extent to which officers interact with 
citizens in a manner that is perceived to be respectful and affords citizens the abil-
ity to maintain their dignity. And, indeed, this emerged in the open-ended re-
sponses. The respect category we formed captures the views of respondents who 
indicated that the basis for their dissatisfaction stemmed from their view that the 
officer(s) belittled them, were rude, and failed to show respect. In their own words:
He was being very rude and arrogant . . .
They treat you like an animal. I’m not used to being looked down on.
They talked to my mother and I and my sister like below human levels, like they 
didn’t care about us. Bad mouthing my mother which was uncalled for . . .
They were very impolite and they threatened me.
They were rude and conceited and aggressive.
They were taking a personal attitude instead of a professional attitude.
When he made me walk home instead of riding with my friend as I walked away he 
said “You’re a fucking liar.” I turned around and said “excuse me.” He said “don’t walk 
up at me.” He said “you’re going to jail.” The other one was motioning me just to go on 
like he knew the other guy is a jerk, I turned around to walk away and he said it again 
and I just kept on walking.
They talked down on me like I am a piece of shit.
The way I was treated. Like I was a second class citizen.
One of them was extremely rude and I told them that . . . One of the officers said 
he didn’t have time to argue and got in his car and left . . . I was really surprised how 
rude he was.
. . . Very rude and very nasty . . .
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The way they treated me in broad daylight. He walked up to me and said, “I.D.” 
They were very disrespectful. I know I did the wrong thing and threw a ticket on the 
ground. He started asking inappropriate questions, like how many tattoos I have and 
how many teeth are missing in my mouth and stuff that had nothing to do with what 
I was stopped for.
They always say something about my son, they laugh at him, they say, ‘oh you got 
your son dressed like a little gangster’, says the cops . . . I feel like they’re treating my 
family like crap.
Expressing Care and Concern
Some citizens’ dissatisfaction stemmed from the perception that police did not 
care about the problem and so minimized the seriousness of the respondents’ 
views. When citizens perceive that their own needs and concerns are viewed as 
a “waste of time” by either the officer or the department, this is a source of dis-
pleasure. Many times, citizens appear to draw this inference from specific actions 
or inactions (e.g., not getting out of the police car when speaking to the citizen). 
Similarly, department policy around response priority sends a signal about the 
worthiness of the problem; regardless of whether or not the citizen is able to dis-
entangle department policy on response priority from an individual officer’s de-
cision to take his/her time to the scene, the citizen is left unhappy. Responses in 
this category closely overlap with other themes we identify, particularly “respect,” 
“outcome,” and “voice.” However, we captured this category separately because it 
serves to explain directly why certain decisions or actions leave citizens question-
ing the motives of officers.
Showed no compassion. It was a very emotional situation, no human side of their selves 
showed, no compassion.
They were very unsympathetic with me. I felt they didn’t care at all about [my] being 
attacked in my own home.
They disregarded my state of mind and there were thirteen cop cars all men no 
women and I’m telling the officers I’m on parole and on house arrest and that I needed 
to go home and asked for a ride. When I was walking home the officer drove by me and 
honked the horn trying to be funny.
Because they didn’t think it was important enough for them to come. They don’t like 
to be bothered . . .
Because obviously they didn’t care about my call and they would probably be at 
Dunkin’ Donuts.
They acted like I was bothering them bringing it to their attention.
The regard and the seriousness of my situation was disregarded as non-important.
Didn’t care about the incident at all . . . We asked for assistance getting a tow truck 
and he told us it was on us to get one, and he was more worried about getting to where 
he was at and not concerned about the situation at all.
Because they should have gotten out of the car and spoken to her instead of just 
watching me fight with her.
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Because the officers didn’t get out of the car or anything. They sit and do nothing but 
play with computers and then do nothing.
Response time can depend on a variety of factors including staffing, call volume, 
and call type, and it includes both dispatch delays and patrol units’ travel time. 
Citizens’ satisfaction with response time is also influenced by their expectations, 
which may not be realistic. While the department should do what it can to manage 
citizens’ expectations regarding response time, it is surely the case that there will 
be those whose expectations cannot be met.
The response time, in trying to get an intoxicated person off the road, they never stopped 
by to even talk to me.
Because they don’t care about other people. I mean we got into an accident and they 
never showed up. It took hours before they showed up. That’s not right. He could have 
gotten hit again.
It took too long for them to arrive, and they were not helpful. It seemed like they did 
not want to be here and wanted to leave as soon as they could.
They never showed up for like three hours, and actually in that time span I saw some 
officers hanging out in a parking lot chitchatting.
My car was broken into and the cops didn’t show up until 3–4 hours later. Told me 
I was a low priority.
Voice
Citizens assess the quality of the service provided by police, at least in part, by the 
opportunity they are given to tell their side of the story, be heard, and to explain 
themselves. Several examples of respondents’ comments along these lines provide 
richer detail on why this is important to citizens and what they experience when 
they believe they have been denied the opportunity to express themselves.
Did not care about us or the situation . . . Didn’t ask any questions.
Because when they came up to my door after 911 call they wouldn’t let me tell my 
story. The officers told him that he should call CPS, said that they didn’t want to hear 
his side of the story . . .
They don’t like, listen to what you’re trying to explain to them about what’s going 
on. And they automatically jump to conclusions about how to best handle the situation.
They weren’t listening, not paying attention . . .
For some citizens, the issue was not simply that the officer failed to listen or get 
their input, but more so that they were perceived to have given more opportunity 
for other involved parties to be heard. The officers’ neutrality was in question. 
Displeasure stems from the belief that the officer gave more weight or input to the 
other party (in effect “taking the other person’s side”).
They wouldn’t let me explain my side of the story. I never once said anything wrong to 
them and they ignored me when I asked them questions . . .
94    Citizens’ Dissatisfaction in Their Own Words
The police don’t take the time out to listen to both side of the story.
I can’t figure out why he would take a pedophile’s word over mine, the officer, he 
blew me off.
After I got hit by the car I bought by my ex-girlfriend they were totally on her side 
because she called before I called. They did not take a statement from me at all. I haven’t 
signed anything yet. They did take a statement from my ex-girlfriend after the acci-
dent . . . They were taking the other person’s words over mine which was not right.
The female cop was sort of real cocky. She wasn’t listening to my side and I had every 
right to talk to the people, and she took their side and she wouldn’t listen to me.
Listened to the other guy more and took down his statement as gold and mine wasn’t.
Disparity
Satisfaction can turn on the extent to which a person believes they are treated fairly 
and shown neutrality. When the decision an officer makes or the way s/he treats a 
citizen is believed to be biased, citizens are dissatisfied. Citizens feel they have been 
treated unfairly when they believe that they are singled out for “special” treatment 
(e.g., stopped or ticketed) by virtue of personal attributes or perceived stereotypes 
inferred from such things as the type of neighborhood in which the citizen lives 
or the sort of car he or she drives. The following comments provide further detail:
.  .  . Very racist. I don’t remember exactly what it was but the officer was being very 
racial.
Because they seemed racist.
Because they don’t treat you like people. I feel because I’m black they treated me 
differently.
They told me to get out of the ambulance and then he said something I couldn’t 
understand and to me they were trying to be racist or something like that . . .
I feel like I was treated unfairly because I’m a black female.
It was more common for respondents to question the fairness or legitimacy of 
police actions or the officer’s honesty than it was for them directly to suggest racism. 
Respondents clearly believe they were singled out improperly (a violation of their 
rights) and received police attention they did not deserve.
Because they treated me differently from the way they were treating other people.
They know I’m on parole, they treat us like scavengers. So they pick on me . . .
I felt like I was being targeted. They didn’t have a legitimate reason to stop me . . . 
The cops know me from previous times so they target me.
Because I was in a not so nice area on the west side. I was treated like a criminal and 
I was being called names and treated not so nice.
Failure to Provide Information
Dissatisfaction also turned on the perception that officers failed to provide infor-
mation and explain themselves. We know that people want to understand what 
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they are experiencing, and in order to make sense of experiences they tap into 
available information, filling in missing information (accurately or inaccurately). 
Responses in this category encompass three related basic issues: (1) a failure to ex-
plain decisions and actions; (2) a failure to follow up to provide information after 
the immediate incident; and (3) the provision of incorrect information.
In some cases, the issue seems to be straightforward displeasure around not 
knowing what is happening or why decisions are being made as they are. In other 
cases, there is a deeper underlying issue. A failure to provide information opens 
the door for citizens to question the trustworthiness of officer motives. Specifi-
cally, when officers fail to explain themselves (at all or enough) to citizens’ satisfac-
tion, respondents question the basis for the police action or question the veracity 
of the explanation given for the action.
I feel like if you give someone a ticket you should be able to explain why.
My view is when you have rookies they always try and take control. When I asked 
what my charges were they wouldn’t tell me what they were. They need to fight real 
crime, not little petty crime.
The police gave me a ticket and could not explain why he gave me the ticket . . .
They would not tell me what I was being arrested for they just manhandled me. 
And didn’t explain until after I was in handcuffs. The one officer was somewhat under 
control. The other was a young punk and was above the law that was full of himself. I 
would have cooperated if they would have just tell me what was going on.
Very unprofessional, didn’t explain anything, I was completely unaware why I was 
stopped.
They did not inform me of anything.
They did not explain themselves.
I didn’t get an idea if anything was going to be done or not.
Perceived failure to follow up with citizens and provide information after an in-
cident (setting aside the issue of whether follow-up is warranted) is a source of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of police services. Some citizens simply described 
the problem as “no follow-up,” while others went on to explain how the failure to 
follow up made them feel. Here, displeasure is rooted in uncertainty about the 
outcome of an incident. It may be that satisfactory problem resolution need not 
involve an arrest or lengthy investigation. For some, it may be that managing their 
expectations (e.g., regarding the likelihood of a follow-up call or a full investiga-
tion) could have a positive impact.
I don’t know what the outcome was.
I reported a situation that was rather dangerous and no one did any follow-up. It 
was a child that might have been endangered.
I was very unsatisfied because the police officer that took my info didn’t follow up 
with anything . . .
They never called me back. They said a lot of stuff . . .
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I called the police about fireworks being set off in the neighborhood. No way of 
knowing if things were dealt with . . .
A gun was pulled out on my son. They told me that they would contact me back to 
let me know what they find out about the incident, and they still have not contacted 
me back.
He took a report and said that the detective would get back to me, and I still haven’t 
heard nothing.
Failure to Respond to the Scene
Dissatisfaction also stemmed from the belief (correct or incorrect) that no officer 
ever responded to the citizen’s call for assistance.
Because the dispatcher told us to stay in an area where I was in harm’s way and then 
the police didn’t show up. I was willing to put myself in danger to help someone, but the 
police were not.
Because the police never showed.
No one responded at all.
Personal Rights Violated
The belief that one’s rights were violated was a source of dissatisfaction. 
Responses in this category centered on either the use of force, failure to read an 
individual his/her rights, or perceived improper searches of a person or vehicle. 
Citizens in this category do not draw favorable inferences about officer motives. 
The following examples illustrate the use of force issues we characterize under 
perceived violation of rights. The perceived use of force fell along a continuum 
from unnecessarily tight handcuffs to displays of physical force including push-
ing and hitting.
When I was in the back of the car, my handcuffs were on extremely tight and I was 
losing feeling in my fingers, and I told the officer and when we were at the station he 
went and started talking to someone else when I felt that he could have loosened them 
up . . .
When the police pulled up on the scene I was injured and one arm and hand was 
injured, and I was put in cuffs anyway. When I requested to be handcuffed in the front 
they would not listen. I didn’t know how bad the injury was. I bled all over the police 
car . . . The guy in the ambulance saw how bad the injury was and he put the cuffs in 
the front.
They slammed me up against the wall, bent me over the railing and then pulled my 
arms behind my back and handcuffed me. I am only 5’6” and weigh 115 lbs. They were 
both over 6 feet . . . They just manhandled me . . .
They stun-gunned me. I fell to the ground. I was not resisting anymore and they 
almost pulled my arm out of the socket. Two officers jumped on me, and I had cuts and 
bruises all over me. I weigh 165 and two 240 pound [officers] jump on me. I was not 
resisting at this point. Pushing my face into the concrete.
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For others, a baseless police action was at the root of the perceived rights violation. 
In this category we capture comments from which we inferred the citizen was get-
ting at the issue of reasonable suspicion:
He acted like I was a felon and there was no reason to pull me over. I was behind two 
45 degree angles, claiming I ran a light but he was 500 yards behind me. You don’t have 
to lie, and pull me out of my car.
Because they took me out of the car and I wasn’t the driver. Also because there was 
no reason to pull us over.
I was stopped for supposedly the tint on the window, but when I was on X— street 
it was dark . . .
I wasn’t speeding, and they said I was. He was filling his quota.
I felt it was an inappropriate stop and the evidence of it being an inappropriate stop 
there was no ticket or warning.
They just arrested me just to make an example for my friends. I deal with this cop 
all the time.
I feel that they lied. He was not speeding when he was stopped at the traffic stop. His 
foot was not on the accelerator at all . . .
I didn’t like it when I was pulled over for an improper cause saying my lights didn’t 
work.
Some believed their rights were violated when the officer allegedly failed to read 
them their rights:
They had no reason to arrest me. They did not read my rights to me until in front of 
the judge.
They never read me my Miranda rights . . .
Also included in rights violation category were comments highlighting the citi-
zen’s belief that s/he had been subjected to an improper search, perhaps because 
s/he did not give consent or, even with consent, the search seemed unnecessary 
given the nature of the incident that gave rise to the police contact:
They didn’t ask to search my person and they had no right to search my person . . .
They pulled me over for a loud muffler which I didn’t have, and they searched my 
vehicle and that was kind of unfair to me.
There has been a few occasions that I have been stopped because my music is too 
loud and they have to search the vehicle, I don’t think that is right.
They wanted to search the vehicle. I said no and they said either they can give me 
tickets or they can search my vehicle.
Last, the personal rights category captures references to dissatisfaction driv-
en by a belief that one’s privacy was violated. For example, respondents who 
called the police to report a neighbor for loud music or to report drugs be-
ing sold in the area and who perceived that the police violated their right to 
confidentiality.
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When we call them to tell about drugs they go back and tell the people we called 
them on. I worry we could get killed. They tell the drug people and they know where 
I live.
Negative Image of the Police Generally
What emerged when some people described their dissatisfaction with how their 
contacts were handled were negative feelings about law enforcement in general. 
The responses in this category lend support to research findings that citizens en-
ter an encounter with preconceived views of law enforcement. We can suppose 
that these are people whose subjective experiences with the police are deter-
mined by their prior attitudes toward the police, and whose attitudes are prob-
ably not susceptible to change as a result of even superior police performance in 
an encounter.
Two primary issues emerged within the category of generally negative views of 
the police. The first centered on police officers and their perceived shortcomings as 
a group, and the second focus was at the specific department-level and its practices 
more generally:
I don’t really know. I just don’t like cops period.
The police have an attitude that they are always right no matter what the situation 
is. Frankly, I would not call them unless someone was being stabbed or flashing a gun.
Because they are just fucking assholes. They like to push you around and tighten 
handcuffs too tight. They are just known to be crooked SOBs. They are just as guilty as 
we are.
Because the police are a bunch of idiots.
Well for one, the majority of the officers cheat you. They have a problem. They judge 
you.
Police have the right for discretion, but regardless of the situation they need to main-
tain composure, respect, and self-dignity. If police go around acting like high school 
bullies then they are ignorant. Police need to be proactive not reactive. If they act like 
the criminals they apprehend then what makes them so different?
A lot of them like to take their badge and abuse their authority.
I just don’t like the way they talk down to you, they disrespect you and are forceful. 
I don’t have a high regard for the police department.
I believe that when [investigating] a break-in or vandalism that they should keep 
track and then inform you of the crimes in your neighborhood . . . they should take a 
proactive view.
External Forces
For some respondents dissatisfaction was shaped by other actors in the process. 
Among those who expressed dissatisfaction with the police, a number specified 
that their initial contact with dispatch was the cause of their dissatisfaction. Some 
respondents even went so far as to distinguish that they did not have an issue with 
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the responding officer or actions taken after they placed the call to dispatch. Oth-
ers appeared to be dissatisfied with how they were treated at the jail subsequent 
to an arrest:
The dispatcher was also very rude to my wife.
The dispatcher . . . he disrespected me by the tone of his voice.
Dispatchers were very indifferent about it, “Well we will try to get over there.”
While I was in jail they treated me terribly and it was cold . . .
When I was in the holding tank they put nine girls in one small tank, it’s dirty, we 
complained about something biting us . . .
They would not let me call my family. There were people in the jail that were there 
for something more serious than what I did and they were treated better than I was.
SUMMARY
The findings discussed above reveal the salient influences on dissatisfaction, shed 
light on why they are sources of dissatisfaction (the logic citizens apply when they 
judge an interaction), and how seemingly discrete factors “feed or fuel” one an-
other. With respect to factors associated with the immediate encounter, respon-
dents’ own descriptions of what shaped their dissatisfaction fit within categories 
previously identified in the literature. Further, respondents’ own words substanti-
ate findings from quantitative measures that while outcomes matter, satisfaction 
is also driven by elements of procedural justice, including voice and the quality of 
interpersonal treatment, and also the perceived quality of decision-making. We 
further find that citizens’ assessments of how they were treated or how their prob-
lem was handled are shaped by influences that are beyond the responding officer’s 
control.
One of the “values added” through letting respondents frame their experience 
in their own words is that the data provide a level of detail and context not gen-
erally available through quantitative data. This level of detail shows the concrete 
factors citizens attend to when assessing the quality of their interaction with the 
police and, moreover, shed light on why they matter to citizens. This level of de-
tail can give purchase to police managers and trainers striving to provide specific 
guidance to law enforcement on how to move toward a more procedurally just 
model of policing. They also “simplify” and reduce ambiguity around common 
procedural justice concepts and phrases.
Secondly, the open-ended responses corroborate what quantitative data has 
found, primarily through surveys of citizens. In addition, they reveal that citizens 
do not separate the behavior of the officer with whom they interacted from others 
in the process or from law enforcement more generally. While this is not surpris-
ing, it is important to draw out. Feedback from citizens is considered an impor-
tant piece of assessing police performance at both the department level and the 
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individual officer level. However, survey data offer citizens’ perceptions that are 
only partially shaped by officers’ performance. Also, departments seeking to pro-
mote more procedurally just policing could, perhaps, achieve more demonstrable 
success were these values to be inculcated among their own personnel, as well as 
among actors from other involved agencies including, but not limited to, dispatch 
and jail staff. Even with that, moving the dial on improvements in citizens’ percep-
tions of the procedural justice with which police perform is a difficult task.
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Previous research on citizens’ subjective experiences in their encounters with 
police has relied almost exclusively on surveys of citizens, and so extant evi-
dence leaves as an open question the extent to which citizens’ reported per-
ceptions are congruent with what officers actually do (and do not do) in those 
interactions. In addition to surveying citizens who had contacts with the Sche-
nectady police, we observed a subset of the encounters about which citizens had 
been interviewed, relying on the video and audio recordings of police-citizen 
encounters that are routinely made as a matter of police department procedure. 
In this chapter, we summarize findings about the procedural justice with which 
Schenectady police were observed to act, based on the judgments of trained 
independent observers who applied a standardized coding protocol to measure 
officers’ behavior.
We build on previous efforts to measure police behavior, in general, and of-
ficers’ procedural justice behavior in particular, and so first we review previous 
research that has informed our study. Then we explain how we conducted the 
observations and, on that basis, measured procedural justice, and we summarize 
our observations in those terms. We also present information on other pertinent 
forms of police behavior, and on features of the context in which officers act—for 
example, the resistance that citizens offer. Finally, we estimate the parameters of 
a model of officers’ procedural justice in order to better understand the factors 
in the immediate situation that influence the procedural justice with which of-
ficers act.
6
Procedural Justice in Police Action
102    Procedural Justice in Police Action
MEASURING PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE BEHAVIOR
Notwithstanding the volume of research on police behavior that has accumulated 
over the past five-plus decades, we know very little about the procedural justice 
with which police routinely exercise their authority, except insofar as citizens’ sub-
jective experiences are reliable indicators. Official police records do not open a 
window on these aspects of police performance, of course; offense and arrest re-
ports do not normally include information on officers’ adherence to the principles 
of procedural justice, and even if they did, officers’ self-reports of these behav-
iors would not generally be considered reliable for scientific purposes. But even 
though a number of studies have provided for direct, in-person observation of 
police officers at work in its natural setting, with copious data on police-citizen 
interactions, this research has dwelled much more on the forms of authority that 
officers exercise and the circumstances under which that authority is applied than 
on the procedural justice with which authority is wielded.
Furthermore, survey-based measures of citizens’ judgments about procedural 
justice are much better developed than observation-based measures of officers’ 
overt behavior. It is not only that most previous research using systematic social 
observation of police did not use procedural justice concepts, as such, to guide 
the construction of observation instruments. Part of the challenge, we surmise, 
stems from the fact that the distinctions among the four widely accepted elements 
of procedural justice—voice/participation, quality of interpersonal treatment, 
trustworthy motives, and neutrality—are not as clearly demarcated in forms of 
police action as they are in citizens’ interpretations of their experiences. Tom 
Tyler explains, for example, that “authorities can encourage people to view them as 
trustworthy by explaining their decisions and justifying and accounting for their 
conduct in ways that make clear their concern about giving attention to people’s 
needs.” But the same actions by police—explaining their decisions—from which 
citizens can infer trustworthy motives also offer transparency, from which citizens 
can infer neutrality: “evidence of factuality and lack of bias suggest that those pro-
cedures are fair” (Tyler 2004, 94).1 This may help to account for the lack of a con-
sensus among researchers about the translation of officers’ actions into procedural 
justice constructs.
We review this small but important body of empirical evidence here, and 
as much as possible build on that foundation. All of this research is based on 
systematic social observation (SSO) of police.2 Albert Reiss Jr. pioneered the ap-
plication of SSO to the study of police in 1966, and the instruments that Reiss de-
veloped have since been elaborated through several major studies and a number 
of smaller-scale, more focused studies. SSO has employed in-person observation 
of patrol officers as they perform their work in its natural setting, with research-
ers accompanying selected officers during their regular work shifts. SSO is sys-
tematic in two respects. First, the selection of officers to be observed is subject 
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to probability sampling, so that inferences from analytic results can be drawn 
with the benefit of known statistical properties. Second, observers are all guided 
in their observation by a single structured coding protocol that is formulated 
prior to the field research and directs observers’ attention to specified features 
of police work; thus their observations are captured in the form of standardized 
measurement categories, which are quantifiable and replicable. This research 
has been invaluable in describing and understanding how often and under what 
circumstances officers use various forms of police authority, including their au-
thority to make arrests, use physical force, and stop, detain, and search citizens.
SSO research on the police has been less informative about the procedural jus-
tice with which police authority is wielded, but some advances have been made 
in putting observational data to use in measuring procedural justice, and the de-
velopment of the observation instruments for coding the Schenectady encounters 
capitalized on the rich tradition of SSO-based research and on the recent advances 
with respect to measuring procedural justice. One study examined disrespectful 
behavior by officers toward citizens, which is of course a form of procedural in-
justice. Several studies have attended to the role of procedural justice in shaping 
citizen compliance with police requests, and the measures formed for these stud-
ies are instructive. One of those studies not only analyzed the data for which the 
structured observation instrument provided, but in addition exploited narrative 
accounts of police-citizen encounters prepared by observers, to derive indicators 
of procedural justice for which coding instruments did not provide. Finally, one 
recent study (Jonathan-Zamir et al. 2015) expressly built indicators of procedural 
justice into its coding instrument.3
Disrespect
In 2002, Stephen Mastrofski, Michael Reisig, and John McCluskey analyzed data 
collected in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, Florida, for the Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods (POPN) to describe and account for police disrespect toward citi-
zens. They found that in 9 percent of the observed police-citizen encounters in-
volving suspected offenders, the officer was disrespectful to the citizen. Such disre-
spect encompassed “name calling, derogatory statements about the citizen or the 
citizen’s family, belittling remarks, slurs, cursing, ignoring the citizen’s questions 
(except in an emergency), using a loud voice or interrupting the citizen (except 
in an emergency), obscene gestures, or spitting” (Mastrofski et al. 2002, 529–30).4 
They also found that in many of these instances, the officer was responding in kind 
to disrespect by the citizen; only 4 percent of the respectful citizens were subjected 
to “unprovoked” disrespect by police. Moreover, this study also found that officers 
did not respond in kind to displays of disrespect by citizens two-thirds of the time. 
Officers in these cities more often than not maintained a professional (i.e., civil) 
demeanor even in the face of citizens’ discourtesy.
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This study is very helpful, to be sure, but we should not mistake police disre-
spect for procedural justice. Disrespect is a form of only procedural injustice, and 
officers are not respectful by virtue of not being disrespectful; they can be neither 
disrespectful nor respectful. Police are respectful when, for example, they use titles 
(e.g., “mister”) or other terms of deference (e.g., “sir” or “ma’am”) to address citi-
zens. In addition, of course, police performance in their encounters with citizens 
can be described in terms of other elements of procedural justice: actively listening 
to citizens, explaining what they are doing and why, expressing concern or sympa-
thy for citizens’ situations, and asking citizens for their accounts of events.
Police Requests and Citizen Compliance
Observations in Richmond, Virginia (Mastrofski et al. 1996), in Indianapolis and 
St. Petersburg, Florida (McCluskey et al. 1999; McCluskey 2003), and in Cincin-
nati (Dai et al. 2011) have formed the basis for analyses of the procedural justice of 
police actions as a factor that conditions the success with which police obtain citi-
zens’ compliance when they make requests of citizens. The requests made of citi-
zens were for them to leave the scene or leave another person alone, discontinue 
their disorderly behavior, or discontinue their illegal behavior. All but one of these 
studies relied on the data coded by observers according to the observation in-
strument, and so the indicators of procedural justice were somewhat limited. For 
example, the initial study (Mastrofski et al. 1996) and the replication of that study 
(McCluskey et al. 1999) both operationalized voice or participation in terms of 
whether a citizen rather than police initiated the encounter (e.g., by flagging down 
the officer in the field, or placing a phone call to 911 or another police number); 
this of course leaves open the extent to which the citizen is given an opportunity by 
the officer at the scene to tell his/her story. The quality of interpersonal treatment 
was measured only as police disrespect toward the citizen, and trustworthy mo-
tives were captured only as police treating the citizen as having a situational status 
other than that of suspected offender. Mengyan Dai et al. (2011) did somewhat 
better—for example, voice reflected officers’ reactions to citizens’ requests—but 
was nevertheless limited by the coding instrument, which was not designed with 
procedural justice in view.
McCluskey (2003) escaped the limitations of the coding instrument by tapping 
the narratives prepared by observers to capture elements of the interactions that 
were not coded originally, and he thus was able to construct indicators that in-
dividually enjoyed greater face validity and that together better represented the 
range of actions that comprise procedural justice. So it was that McCluskey took 
into account displays of respect as well as disrespect, whether officers sought in-
formation from citizens and explained their actions. He found that, in encoun-
ters in which police requested compliance from citizens, displays of respect were 
nearly twice as common as disrespect, although neither respect nor disrespect was 
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displayed in about three-quarters of the encounters. Citizens were given “voice”—
that is, communicated facts about the situation to police—about one-third of the 
time, and had their voice terminated—officers “silenced” the citizen—in only 4 
percent of the encounters. In 12 percent of the encounters, officers explained to 
citizens that the circumstances of the case provided them with authority to invoke 
the law of which they chose not to avail themselves.
Since the focus of these studies was on citizen compliance, and not on proce-
dural justice as such, they analyzed only the subsets of encounters in which officers 
made a request for citizen self-control, and so of course they shed no light on 
the procedural justice with which police act more generally. The subsets were not 
large. McCluskey 2003, for example, focused mainly on 1,022 of the 5,623 citizens 
who interacted with observed officers across the two research sites. The degree 
to which officers’ behavior in these encounters is representative of their behavior 
more generally is impossible to say.
We would also note that in the context of this analytical framework, citizens’ 
interpretations of the justice with which police act are presumptively intervening 
but unmeasured variables, and we infer that associations between police actions, 
on the one hand, and citizen (non)compliance, on the other hand, reflect an effect 
of the former on the latter that is mediated by the subjective experience of citi-
zens. Overall, citizens complied in 69 percent of the encounters. But compliance 
was nearly twice as likely when police showed respect, and about 60 percent as 
likely when they showed disrespect, as when police displayed neither respect nor 
disrespect. The termination of voice cut compliance rates by half, while seeking 
information about the situation doubled compliance.
Procedural Justice
Tal Jonathan-Zamir, Stephen Mastrofski, and Shomron Moyal (2015) recently 
completed a small-scale observational study whose purpose was to develop and 
validate an instrument with which the procedural justice of police behavior could 
be measured. They built, as we did, on the protocols of previous observational 
studies of the police, but they also added items to the observation form to more 
completely describe procedural justice. Moreover, they offer a particularly careful 
and thorough assessment of previous studies—including those discussed above—
to advance the discussion about how to operationalize procedural justice in terms 
of data on police behavior. We should examine their study very closely, for it is the 
only previous effort to translate structured observations into a full complement of 
measures of procedural justice.5
Their study provided for observations of the pseudonymous “Everdene” police, 
who serve a small suburban city. Four trained observers accompanied twelve patrol 
officers on thirty-five work shifts, capturing information on 233 police-citizen en-
counters with 319 citizens.6 From these data they construct a measure of behavior 
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in each of the four domains of procedural justice and, in addition, combine those 
measures to form an overall index of procedural justice.
Jonathan-Zamir and her colleagues argue for the use of formative measures of 
procedural justice in action. They maintain that although survey items are prop-
erly treated as various reflections of an underlying perceptual construct when citi-
zens’ subjective experiences are measured, such that the items can be expected to 
exhibit strong associations, officers’ behaviors are not the manifestations or prod-
ucts of an underlying construct. Instead, they contend, officers’ behaviors form a 
measure of procedural justice: “because measures of procedural justice are not 
expected to develop from a single latent variable, and the various procedurally 
just behaviors are viewed as tapping different facets of the construct, they are not 
expected to be intercorrelated and are not interchangeable” (Jonathan-Zamir et al. 
2015, 852). We agree with this assessment, and we would add as further justification 
the situationally contingent nature of police action, as a consequence of which we 
might expect to observe in different situations different manifestations of neutral-
ity or trustworthy motives or quality of treatment.
For each of the four procedural justice domains, Jonathan-Zamir et al. formed 
a five- or six-point scale. Two of the scales (neutrality and trustworthy motives) 
were each a simple sum of binary individual actions, such as explaining why police 
became involved and explaining the choice of resolutions. One (participation) was 
in effect a weighted sum, weighting officer’s requests for information and citizens’ 
provision of information by the attentiveness with which police listened. And one 
scale (dignity) captured degrees of respect and disrespect, respectively, based on 
the duration or frequency of such behaviors, though disrespect was so infrequent 
that such distinctions were needed only for respect. The four scales were combined 
to form a single (unweighted) index of procedural justice.
They found a fairly high level of participation, with 43 percent of the police-
citizen interactions at the high end of the scale (4), and an additional 25 percent 
nearly so high (3). This would imply that officers asked for information and/or 
citizens provided information, with officers listening passively or actively. Neutral-
ity exhibited the opposite pattern, with 38 percent of the interactions in the “very 
low” category and an additional 43 percent in the “low” category. Dignity was 
more or less normally distributed, with only 5 percent of the interactions at the 
low (disrespectful) end and 6 percent at the high end (at which the officer showed 
“dominant” respect). Finally, the distribution of trustworthy motives resembled 
that of the neutrality scale, with nearly half of the interactions at the low end. The 
four scales were all positively intercorrelated, though fairly modestly, with cor-
relations ranging from .10 to .30. Each was correlated with the overall index, with 
correlations ranging from .59 to .70.
Jonathan-Zamir et al. (2015) estimated the correlations of the index of proce-
dural justice and each of its subscales with the “citizens’ behavioral manifestations 
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of satisfaction with the police,” as judged by the observers. In this way they were 
able to assess the criterion-related validity of their measure of procedural justice. 
Their observers were able to assess citizen satisfaction in about half of the cases, 
and among those, they found a substantial association between satisfaction and 
procedural justice overall. They also found statistically significant associations be-
tween satisfaction and three of the four subscales.
SCHENECTADY OBSERVATIONS
The Schenectady Police Department’s use of in-car cameras afforded us an op-
portunity to collect observational data on police-citizen encounters, and in that 
way to not rely exclusively on survey data to describe officers’ procedural jus-
tice. At the conclusion of the police services survey, we sampled from among 
incidents about which we had completed an interview with the citizen, and we 
requested copies of the video/audio files, with which the Schenectady Police 
Department obliged us.
To our knowledge only one previous effort has been made to conduct “arm-
chair” observation of police by using video recordings of police-citizen encoun-
ters, rather than conducting in-person observation, to collect systematic informa-
tion about police actions for analytical purposes (Dixon et al. 2008). That study 
focused on traffic stops only, and in addition, it was designed to examine the in-
fluences of citizen and police officer race on communication patterns, and par-
ticularly “communication accommodation”; it did not extend to the wide range of 
citizen and officer behaviors on which SSO of police has dwelled, or on procedural 
justice as such. However, this study affirmed the feasibility of coding police-citizen 
interactions from video and audio recordings, and the theoretical constructs and 
operational measures that it formulated were useful additions to extant SSO pro-
tocols in capturing how police authority is exercised.
Thus we drew from both lines of research to form observation instruments 
that are rooted in previous inquiry but also suited to the measurement of pro-
cedural justice. Like previous SSO research, we provided for information on the 
encounter as a whole, for example, the type of location in which the interaction 
transpired, and the nature of the problem that was the focus of attention. The in-
struments departed in some respects from previous SSO instruments, however, 
insofar as we were particularly interested in the officers’ behavior toward one 
citizen in each encounter—the citizen who was the respondent to our survey, 
and on whose subjective experience we wanted to estimate the effects of officers’ 
behavior. Hence we designated as the “primary citizen” the citizen whose name 
appeared in the police record, and whom we interviewed after his/her contact 
with the police, and we instructed observers to try in each incident to identify 
the primary citizen and code items accordingly. For each incident, observers 
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were provided with some identifying information to facilitate this task: the pri-
mary citizen’s name, race, and sex, as well as the nature of the contact (arrest, 
call, field interview). Citizens other than the primary citizen were treated as a 
single group for coding purposes. The “primary officer” was the officer who was 
assigned to the patrol unit that was dispatched to a call, or whose name appeared 
on the arrest report or field interview card, and whose microphone recording 
was included with the video; this was the officer who is analogous to the offi-
cer to whom an observer would be assigned in the context of an in-person SSO 
study. Other officers, like other citizens, were treated as a single group. Items 
concerning the primary citizen’s dyadic interaction with the primary officer 
comprised one instrument, and items concerning the primary citizen’s interac-
tion with other officers (if any) at the scene comprised a separate instrument. 
(See table  2.) Other citizens’ interactions with the primary and other officers, 
respectively, were captured in less detail on separate instruments. Thus we can 
describe the interaction of the primary citizen with the primary officer and with 
other officers; we can likewise describe the interaction of other citizens with the 
primary officer and with other officers.
Based predominantly on the observation instruments used for the Project 
on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) in 1996–97, the instruments captured in-
formation on requests that citizens made of officers and how police respond-
ed to those requests, requests or commands by officers and how citizens re-
sponded to those requests or commands, officers’ use of police authority (e.g., 
searching or frisking the citizen, the use of physical force, arrests, citations), 
and forms of disrespect by citizens and/or officers. In addition, observers were 
prompted to make summary characterizations of selected features of the in-
teraction, such as how much patience officers exhibited, how well officers lis-
tened to citizens, and how much consideration the officers showed for the 
citizens’ point of view.
Each sampled incident was assigned to two observers,7 who independently 
watched and listened to the recorded incident, took notes, and worked through 
the computer-guided data entry process, clicking on selected response options or, 
in some instances, entering information in a free-field format.8 An observer could 
watch all or a portion of any incident multiple times as needed.
Table 2 Observation Instruments
Encounter-level
primary citizen x primary officer
primary citizen x other officer(s)
other citizen(s) x primary officer
other citizen(s) x other officer(s)
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Sampling
The major SSO studies of the police have sampled patrol units, to which observers 
are assigned for the duration of an entire work shift, such that the observed police-
citizen encounters are those in which the officer assigned to that unit became in-
volved. Sampling has been structured spatially, by police beats, and temporally, by 
work shifts or tours of duty; normally, observations are concentrated somewhat 
on the more active beats, in which police-citizen interactions are more numerous. 
Some more focused observational studies have instead sampled first among of-
ficers and then, for sampled officers, among their work shifts, again observing the 
encounters in which those officers became involved.
Our sample was based on the sample of incidents about which we surveyed 
citizens, and so it was structured neither spatially nor temporally. We observed 
encounters that took place in any of Schenectady’s eight patrol zones and on any 
of the three platoons. We observed many individual officers multiple times—eigh-
teen officers at least ten times each, and one in as many as twenty-one incidents, 
as the primary officer. Our sample was not confined to the more active parts of 
the city. However, among the 1,800 incidents about which citizens were surveyed, 
we oversampled arrests and field interviews, on the assumption that these are the 
kinds of incidents in which procedural justice may be less readily practiced, and to 
ensure as much as possible that the subsamples would support separate analysis.9
Armchair observers need not negotiate access, as observers sometimes must 
do in the field when officers resist having an observer assigned to them, but offi-
cers can in effect resist observation by failing to activate the recording equipment, 
which we consider below in conjunction with our discussion of sample attrition. 
We also note here that not all of the incidents were recorded, because some of 
them involved foot or bicycle officers, and some transpired at the station desk. In 
addition, some incidents that involved the dispatch of a patrol unit did not involve 
a face-to-face interaction between the primary citizen, who called for assistance, 
and the primary officer; given our interest in the primary citizen’s subjective expe-
rience, we instructed observers not to code incidents in which the officer had no 
interaction with the primary citizen.
Our observers coded 539 encounters from among those that we sampled and 
obtained recordings of from the Schenectady police. We assessed the similarities 
and differences among the population of incidents we sampled for observation, 
the sample, the set of incidents for which we obtained recordings, and the set of 
incidents that were coded by both observers. Few noteworthy differences appeared 
among comparisons including the nature of the contact (call for service, arrest, or 
field interview), the survey wave, the patrol area in which the incident transpired, 
the time of day, the nature of the incident about which callers contacted the police 
(as recorded in CAD records by dispatchers), features of the arrests, and the re-
corded race and sex of those who were arrested and field interviewed. The principal 
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source of disparities between the population and the sample of incidents, on the 
one hand, and the incidents for which we obtained recordings and successfully 
coded, on the other hand, stemmed from the fact that ninety-nine of the sampled 
arrests took place at the police station when the arrestees turned themselves in on 
an arrest or bench warrant. These incidents were not captured on in-car cameras, 
of course, and so the incidents that we observed, compared to the incidents that we 
sampled, underrepresent arrests. In addition, and as a consequence, the observed 
incidents underrepresent incidents that took place in patrol area 1 (in which police 
headquarters are located), felony-level arrests, and arrests based on warrants. In 
all other respects, the observed incidents bear a strong resemblance to the popula-
tion. Among the recordings that we received, the sources of case attrition were (1) 
a mismatched event (i.e., the event captured in the recording was not the sampled 
incident—eight cases);10 (2) the poor quality of the recording, especially the au-
dio (seventy-five cases); (3) no detectable interaction between police and a citizen 
(twenty-one cases); and (4) other idiosyncratic problems (five cases).
Armchair Observation: Advantages and Disadvantages
As it has been conducted since 1966, SSO of the police places an observer in the 
field to see and hear directly what transpires in a police-citizen encounter. The ob-
server accompanies the officer to whom s/he is assigned as a part of the sampling 
plan, and is normally able to see and hear what that officer says and does, as well as 
what citizens say and do to the officer. At times, when multiple officers and citizens 
are involved, an observer may not see or hear what other officers say or do to other 
citizens, whose interactions may take place in other rooms of a house, say, or in 
other nearby locations. But in-person observation generally affords the observer a 
good opportunity to hear what is said around the observed officer and also to take 
note of nonverbal behavior as well. The limitations stem mainly from, first, the in-
herent ambiguity of some elements of a police-citizen encounter, as observers map 
the specific words and actions of the participants into analytic categories, and sec-
ond, the capacity of the observer to later recall and reconstruct the encounter, for 
which no replay is available, of course. The notes that observers take in the field are 
sparing, and the task of reconstructing the exchanges between officer and citizen—
or among multiple officers and/or multiple citizens—across a number of encoun-
ters observed during a full patrol shift is hard work. Since it is rare for researchers to 
be able to compare the observational data to other kinds of information about the 
same encounters, we lack evidence about the success with which observers capture 
the interactions in their entirety.11 And since the logistics (and costs) of in-person 
observation prohibit the placement of two observers in the same patrol unit, there 
are no (published) estimates of the inter-coder reliability of observational data.
“Armchair” observation that relies of recorded video and audio has advantages 
and disadvantages relative to in-person observation. One advantage is that it is 
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surely much less onerous a burden for the department than in-person observa-
tion. The department’s burden is borne mainly by the personnel whose duty it is 
to provide the recordings of sampled incidents; it was a time-consuming task in 
Schenectady to locate the specified incidents among the voluminous recordings, 
finding the right date and unit and then finding the right incident.
Another advantage concerns reactivity: the observer’s presence cannot alter the 
behavior of the officer if the observer is not present. Inasmuch as Schenectady’s 
police department has provided for in-car cameras since 2003, and recording is 
done routinely as a matter of policy and not on an episodic basis, we believe that 
officers have become accustomed to the fact that their interactions with citizens 
are captured on video and audio.12 The recordings are seldom reviewed absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, for example, to resolve a citizen complaint, and so with 
few exceptions, officers’ recorded behavior is not subject to adverse consequences 
for them.13 The SPD command staff was aware that we would review a sample of 
incidents about which citizens had been surveyed, but so far as we can tell, patrol 
officers were unaware of (or at least unconcerned about) our plans for such obser-
vation; no one mentioned (or complained about) it in our interviews with patrol 
officers and supervisors.
Still another advantage is that the observer is not limited to the real-time event: 
the dynamics of the police-citizen interaction can be replayed as many times as 
necessary. Furthermore, resources permitting, multiple observers can code the 
encounter according to the same observation protocol, without having to navigate 
the logistical challenges of deploying two in-field observers to a sampled patrol 
unit. Consequently, the observers’ respective judgments can be compared to one 
another, and their judgments on any one item can be combined, such that what 
one observer may miss the other observer may capture.
The disadvantages of armchair observation stem mainly from the limited field 
of vision that the camera affords, and this limitation is more pronounced for the 
dash-mounted cameras Schenectady provides than it would be for the body-worn 
cameras with which many departments are now outfitting their officers. For urban 
police, many of whose encounters with citizens—other than traffic stops—do not 
transpire in front of the patrol vehicle, much of what officers do is off-camera. 
In Schenectady, the audio was generally quite good (impaired mainly on windy 
days), but insofar as police-citizen interaction occurred outside the range of the 
camera, observers were limited to what they could hear, and so they missed non-
verbal behavior. We assessed our observers’ capacity to detect what transpires in 
the sampled police-citizen encounters in several ways:
• whether the primary citizen and/or the primary officer were visible and, 
whether or not they were visible, could be identified;
• the observer’s estimate of how much of the audio portion of the recording was 
unintelligible;
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• the frequency with which observers coded items as “not determinable”; and
• how much confidence the observer felt in his/her coding.
The methodological appendix includes details of these assessments. As we dis-
cuss there, the audio proved to be of greater value than the video, and for the 
purposes of measuring procedural justice, which is mostly verbal behavior, we 
believe that armchair observation was up to the task. We also evaluated the re-
liability of the measures of procedural justice based on these data, which we 
describe below.
PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE IN SCHENECTADY 
POLICE ACTION
We observed 539 police-citizen encounters drawn from among the 1,800 about 
which citizens had been interviewed. Arrests and field interviews are somewhat 
overrepresented in our observed encounters, based on the premise that such inci-
dents represent, on average, somewhat more challenging dynamics for officers to 
manage; overall results are weighted to represent the entire population of contacts 
during this time period.
Using the four domains of procedural justice as a guide to actions that signify 
procedural (in)justice, we will first describe the actions of Schenectady police in 
each of four domains, but we thereupon combine those domains for analytical 
purposes, as Jonathan-Zamir et al. (2015) did. However, unlike Jonathan-Zamir 
and her colleagues, we distinguish behaviors that are procedurally just from be-
haviors that are procedurally unjust, forming two distinct measures of the proce-
dural justice with which police act. Officers may take only procedurally just ac-
tions in their interactions with citizens, only procedurally unjust actions, or both 
(or neither) just and unjust actions, in any of the domains of procedural justice. 
Moreover, there is good reason to suspect that procedurally unjust actions have a 
greater (negative) effect on citizens’ subjective experience than procedurally just 
actions have a (positive) effect, as we discussed in chapter 3. So we believe that it 
is useful to separate the just and the unjust and specify two behavioral constructs: 
procedurally just action, and procedurally unjust action.
We exclude from measures of procedurally (un)just action those forms of 
behavior whose theoretical status is ambiguous, such as the overt use of police 
authority—conducting searches or frisks, using physical force, or even issuing 
commands. We agree with Jonathan-Zamir et al., who “regard force as an inap-
propriate indicator of dignity or any other procedural justice element. Force is 
an action that may aggravate or provoke a citizen, but the character of the social 
status that it signals to those at the scene is not inherently clear simply by knowing 
that some degree of coercion was applied” (2015, 856). Commands can be issued 
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rudely or disrespectfully, of course, but the rudeness or disrespect is captured in 
the measures of the quality of treatment.14 We do not exclude any of these actions 
from our analysis, hence we take them up below.
We also exclude from measures of procedural justice features of the context of 
police-citizen interactions, though we describe and include contextual character-
istics that may be relevant in our analysis. For example, the evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing, especially when it is sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest, 
may be important in shaping a citizen’s interpretation of police actions, but is not 
intrinsic to the action. Another feature of context is how the encounter begins: at 
the initiative of police, acting on their own authority, or at the behest of a citizen 
who requested police assistance—a difference that turns partly on the actions of a 
party other than the police.
Below we examine the frequency with which actions are taken in each of the 
domains of procedural justice, forming in each of the four domains a subscale of 
just action and a subscale of unjust action by summing across the coded actions 
in that domain. Then we form indices of procedural justice and procedural in-
justice by summing the respective subscale scores, and describe the distributions 
of scores along each construct. We focus mainly though not exclusively on the 
“primary citizen”—the citizen whom we interviewed, and whose subjective expe-
riences we will examine in the next chapter. Furthermore, we examine only the 411 
cases in which both observers were able to identify the primary citizen, and so we 
exclude 59 cases in which only one of the two observers was able to identify the 
primary citizen, and an additional 63 cases in which neither observer was able to 
identify the primary citizen.15
The primary citizen might interact only with the primary officer, that is, the of-
ficer whose unit was dispatched to a call for service, or whose name appeared on 
an arrest report or field interview card; the primary officer was in most instances 
the lead officer. We form a procedural justice scale and a procedural injustice scale 
for the actions of the primary officer toward the primary citizen in each encoun-
ter, averaging the two coders’ scores. Other officers were present and interacted 
with the primary citizen in 90 of the 411 encounters, and, as we show below, these 
officers tended to serve as backup, but primary citizens could also interact with 
officers other than the primary officer. Thus we also form corresponding scales of 
procedural justice and procedural injustice for other officers’ actions toward the 
primary citizen. Finally, inasmuch as officers’ actions toward other citizens in the 
encounter could influence the subjective experience of the primary citizen, we also 
construct scales for police actions toward other citizens.
We formed the subscales and the scales for each of the two observers for each 
encounter, and then formed subscales and scales for the encounter by averaging 
the individual observers’ scores. We assessed the level of inter-coder agreement 
in terms of the interclass correlations, which we report below in connection with 
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each of the scales.16 When agreement was less than perfect, the averaged scale 
scores are not integers.
Voice/Participation
Citizens want to have an opportunity to explain themselves and their circumstances 
to police—to tell their side of the story, and to participate in decision-making even 
if they cannot determine the outcome. Hence police are procedurally just when 
officers ask citizens to tell them what happened, to explain their actions, or to ex-
plain what they want the police to do. Police are procedurally just also when they 
listen to citizens and pay attention to them, and when they indicate that they are 
considering the citizen’s views. Observers characterized overall how well the of-
ficer listened to the citizen on a scale from 0 to 5, and they also characterized the 
extent to which the officer considered the citizen’s view on a similar scale; scores of 
4 and 5 on those scales were treated as procedurally just.
Furthermore, when officers make requests of citizens, or offer suggestions, or 
even try to persuade or negotiate, they are allowing citizens to make choices and 
in this way to participate in the decision-making, so we treat such actions by police 
as forms of procedurally just treatment. For example, an officer might ask a citizen 
to stop his/her disorderly or illegal behavior. Or an officer might try to persuade a 
citizen to leave the scene. (In previous research that was concerned with citizens’ 
compliance with police requests, such requests were a defining feature of the en-
counters and so could not be treated as a component of procedural justice.)
When these actions are combined to form a scale, the scores range from 0 to 8, 
and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.54. The actions that contribute to 
these scores especially include officers paying attention to what citizens had to say, 
asking citizens what happened, listening (at least 4 on a 0–5 listening scale), and 
considering citizens’ views (4–5 on a 0–5 scale).17 Across all of the contacts, the 
mean score is 3.43, as shown in table 3, with somewhat higher mean scores in en-
counters in which the citizen had called for police assistance and somewhat lower 
scores in encounters in which the citizen had been stopped or arrested. Even so, 
the scores for the different types of contact are not widely disparate.
By contrast, police are procedurally unjust when the officer does not pay atten-
tion to what the citizen had to say, does not listen, and does not consider the citi-
zen’s views. We also treat as procedurally unjust instances in which the officer in-
terrupted the citizen. When these actions are combined to form a scale, the scores 
range from 0 to 4, and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.64. The most 
frequently observed actions were the officers interrupting citizens, not consider-
ing the citizens’ views (below 2 on a 0–5 considered views scale), and not paying 
attention to what citizens had to say. Officers were seldom observed to act in any 
of these ways, however, though it was more common among encounters in which 
the citizen was arrested than in either calls for service or stops, as shown in table 3.
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Quality of Treatment
Citizens want to be treated with dignity and respect, and such treatment can take 
several forms. If officers greet citizens at the outset of their encounter, they can 
do so in ways that signal respect—for example, by using generically formal terms, 
such as “sir” or “ma’am,” or if the officer knows the citizen’s name, addressing him 
or her as Mr. or Ms. –––, or using the citizen’s first name. Similar considerations 
apply when the officer and citizen part ways at the end of the encounter. Further-
more, officers can through a friendly “manner” signal that the status disparity that 
stems from police authority need not be observed. We also consider as respectful 
treatment officers’ use of polite terms, such as “please” and “thank you.”
When these actions are combined to form a scale, the scores range from 0 to 
3.5, and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.61. The most frequent such ac-
tion is use of polite terms (e.g., “please” and “thank you”), followed by a friendly 
manner. We seldom observed these actions in any type of police-citizen contact, 
though, and the scores on this scale are very similar across types of contacts, as 
shown in table 3, above.
Officers’ treatment of citizens is procedurally unjust when officers greet or leave 
citizens in an insulting way (with name-calling abuse, for example), when officers’ 
“manner” is hostile, when the officer makes derogatory remarks or is otherwise 
disrespectful to the citizen, and when officers act in a patronizing, sarcastic, or 
angry way toward citizens. When these actions are combined to form a scale, the 
scores range from 0 to 6.5, and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.80.
Neutrality
Citizens believe that decisions are made fairly when they see evidence that 
decision-makers have considered objective facts and are evenhanded in their 
Table 3 Scales of Procedural Justice and Procedural Injustice in Action
Range All contacts* Calls Arrests FIs
Just: voice 0–8 3.43 (1.42) 3.64 (1.38) 2.76 (1.39) 2.69 (1.24)
Just: quality of treatment 0–3.5 0.56 (0.72) 0.55 (0.68) 0.57 (0.82) 0.57 (0.83)
Just: neutrality 0–3.5 0.92 (0.76) 0.85 (0.70) 1.29 (0.91) 0.89 (0.85)
Just: trustworthy motives 0–6.5 2.08 (1.20) 2.25 (1.18) 1.69 (1.19) 1.04 (0.72)
Procedurally just action 0–15 6.99 (2.96) 7.30 (2.81) 6.30 (3.30) 5.19 (2.88)
Unjust: voice 0–4 0.33 (0.56) 0.26 (0.48) 0.67 (0.79) 0.26 (0.41)
Unjust: quality of treatment 0–6.5 0.23 (0.73) 0.15 (0.54) 0.51 (1.10) 0.50 (1.20)
Unjust: neutrality 0–1 0.03 (0.14) 0.02 (0.12) 0.06 (0.19) 0.07 (0.18)
Unjust: trustworthy motives 0–2.5 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.28) 0.17 (0.35) 0.01 (0.08)
Procedurally unjust action 0–12.5 0.68 (1.35) 0.51 (1.09) 1.41 (2.06) 0.85 (1.48)
*Weighted results
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treatment of the parties involved. That does not imply slavish equality of treat-
ment, as Jonathan-Zamir et al. (2015) point out. One way that citizens can infer 
that police are basing their judgments on facts, and not on prejudices or biases, 
is in hearing officers explain their actions and decisions.18 This can take sev-
eral forms. An officer might explain to the citizen how the officer’s resolution is 
based on legal standards or requirements, or how it is that the officer is giving 
the citizen a “break,” with less punitive action than the law allows. Or the officer 
could explain, in response to a specific citizen request, why the officer cannot or 
will not oblige the request. Or an officer might explain to the citizen why s/he 
is conducting a search or frisk. Lest we fail to take account of the myriad other 
explanations that an officer might provide to a citizen, observers also character-
ized more generally how well the officer explained the reasons for the officer’s 
decisions or actions to the citizen, on a scale from 0 to 5; scores of 4 and 5 were 
treated as procedurally just.19 When these actions are combined to form a scale, 
the scores range from 0 to 3.5, and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.59. 
The scores on this scale are fairly low overall, but they are higher in arrests and 
stops than in calls for service, as shown in table 3 above. Indeed, an explanation 
of some kind(s) is modal in arrests and stops.
We rely on observers’ characterizations of how well the officer explained his/her 
reasons for decisions and actions to the citizen, treating as procedurally unjust a 
score of 0 or 1 on the 0–5 continuum. Such low scores were infrequent. In thirty-four 
encounters one but not both of the coders placed the officer’s actions in this respect 
at the low end of the continuum, and in five encounters both coders agreed on such 
a characterization. It was somewhat more common in arrests. The measure that we 
form, then, ranges only from 0 to 1, and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.38.
Trustworthy Motives
Citizens perceive that decisions are fair when they believe that authorities care 
about their well-being and are taking their needs into account. Police can exhibit 
such care and concern in several ways. An officer can comfort a citizen, prom-
ise to give the citizen’s situation special attention, tell or ask the citizen to call if 
the citizen’s problem recurs, or—at the officer’s initiative—provide information or 
physical assistance, or contact an agency for assistance on the citizen’s behalf. An 
officer also exhibits care and concern in fulfilling (or promising to fulfill) citizen’s 
requests, for example, to file a report, to provide information, or to have another 
citizen leave the scene. We also treat patience as an outward sign of such concern; 
observers characterized officers’ impatience with the citizen on a scale of 0 to 5, 
and we treat scores of 0 and 1 as procedurally just patience. When these actions are 
combined to form a scale, the scores range from 0 to 6.5, and the intraclass correla-
tion of the scale is 0.73. Some such action was nearly ubiquitous in calls for service 
and modal in arrests and stops, as shown in table 3.
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When officers ignore citizens’ requests, or refuse to fulfill them without expla-
nation, they do not exhibit trustworthy motives, leaving citizens to draw unfavor-
able inferences about the fairness of police decisions. When an officer tells a citizen 
not to call police if the problem recurs in the future, s/he may be taken to imply 
a disregard for the citizen’s concerns, as the officer does when s/he is impatient. 
When these actions are combined to form a scale, the scores range from 0 to 2.5, 
and the intraclass correlation of the scale is 0.58. These actions were seldom ob-
served in any of the types of contacts, as shown in table 3.
Scales of Procedural Justice and Injustice in Action
Like Jonathan-Zamir et al. (2015), we are persuaded that formative measures of 
procedural (in)justice are more compatible with the situationally contingent na-
ture of police work, in the context of which only some but not other types of ac-
tions fit the circumstances. In order to capture the levels of procedural justice and 
procedural injustice that officers’ actions represent, respectively, we map the coded 
actions onto the two conceptual constructs, and arithmetically sum across the ac-
tions in each category.
The scale of procedurally just action, which is formed by summing across the 
procedurally just subscales, ranges from 0 to 15 with a mean of 6.99, and it has 
an intraclass correlation of 0.73. This overall scale exhibits correlations with indi-
vidual subscales ranging from 0.50 to 0.85, respectively, with a mean correlation of 
0.67. The scale of procedurally unjust action formed by summing across the proce-
durally unjust subscales ranges from 0 to 12.5 with a mean of only 0.68, and it has 
an intraclass correlation of 0.80. This overall scale exhibits correlations with indi-
vidual subscales ranging from 0.4 to 0.86, respectively, with a mean correlation of 
0.70. Table 3 displays the scale means and standard deviations for the contacts as 
a whole and for each type of contact: calls for service; arrests; and field interviews.
The correlation between the two scales is, as expected, negative and of moder-
ate magnitude: -0.26. Scale scores are for the most part jointly concentrated in 
moderate-to-high procedurally just categories and none to low procedurally un-
just categories, with two-thirds of the cases in these four cells of a cross-tabulation.
Other Officers’ Actions
The primary citizen interacted with an officer other than the primary officer in 
ninety encounters, and so we should take account of those officers’ behavior in 
order to describe and understand the procedural justice that citizens experience. 
Both scales’ scores tend to be low, because other officers served as backup and 
thus seldom took action. In the ninety encounters in which other officers were 
present and interacted with the primary citizen, the mean score for other officers’ 
procedurally just action was 4.33, and the mean score for procedurally unjust ac-
tion was 0.72.
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Action toward Other Citizens
Police took action toward citizens other than the primary citizen in 60 percent 
of the encounters, and of course these actions could affect the subjective experi-
ence of the primary citizen. However, we would expect that the impact of police 
behavior—just or unjust—toward other citizens would be weaker than that of ac-
tions directed toward the primary citizen, and depending on the relationship of 
the primary citizen to the other citizen(s), even procedurally unjust action toward 
other citizens might not be unfavorably received by the primary citizen. The mean 
of procedurally just action toward other citizens was 4.49, while the mean of pro-
cedurally unjust action was 0.72.
OTHER POLICE ACTIONS IN SCHENECTADY
How police use their authority matters, but we might also expect that whether 
police use any of a variety of forms of authority matters as well. Officers may issue 
commands or warnings, use physical force, pat citizens down or conduct full-scale 
searches of citizens’ persons or vehicles, whether or not they are procedurally just 
or unjust.
Verbal “force” is one form of police authority, and the form that, as previous 
research shows, is the most commonly exercised. Here we treat as verbal force any 
occasion on which one or more of the officers: commanded or explicitly threat-
ened a citizen to leave the scene, cease disorderly or illegal behavior, or provide in-
formation; threatened to charge or cite the citizen, notify another agency, or to use 
physical force. Physical force encompasses the use of physical restraints (exclusive 
of handcuffing), the use of pain-compliance techniques, or the use of impact force. 
(No firearm discharges were observed.) Searches or frisks/pat-downs of persons 
were treated as a single category, as were searches of vehicles.
Verbal force was seldom used toward the primary citizen in the context of encoun-
ters prompted by the citizen’s call for police assistance (3.2 percent), as one would ex-
pect, and other forms of authority were rarely exercised in those instances—physical 
force in just 0.8 percent, and a search or frisk in 0.4 percent. In arrests and field inter-
views, however, each of these actions was much more common. Verbal force was used 
in nearly half of the arrests and more than one-fifth of the field interviews, physical 
force in slightly more than one-third of the arrests and one in seven field interviews, 
and a search or frisk was observed in nearly half of the arrests (not all of which were 
custodial) and 30 percent of the field interviews.
All of these actions are associated with procedural justice and injustice. In en-
counters involving verbal or physical force, the procedural justice scale score is 1 to 
2 points lower than in encounters with no force, and the procedural injustice scale 
averages about 2.5 (compared to 0.5 in other encounters). In encounters in which 
officers conducted a search, the procedural justice scale score is 1 point lower than 
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in encounters with no search, and the procedural injustice scale averages about 1.5 
to 1.7 (compared to 0.6 in other encounters).
We did not ask observers to make judgments about the legality of searches or 
the reasonableness of officers’ use of physical force; the practice of systematic so-
cial observation has prompted observers only for concrete description and not 
for legal opinions that they are not trained to make. Neither did we ask lawyers 
to make these assessments (see, e.g., Gould and Mastrofski 2004), and if we had, 
we might have found that it is illegal searches and unreasonable force that are 
associated with procedural justice and injustice. But some recent evidence—the 
only empirical evidence on the question—indicates that citizens’ assessments of 
the propriety of police behavior are not based on officers’ compliance with the 
technical requirements of Constitutional law, but rather on citizens’ perceptions of 
procedural justice (Meares et al. 2012). We return to this issue when we reexamine 
citizens’ subjective experience in chapter 7.
THE C ONTEXT OF POLICE ACTION
More than three-quarters (78 percent) of the field interviews (FIs) and almost half 
(44 percent) of the arrests were police-initiated encounters. Citizen-initiated inci-
dents could have been initiated by the primary citizen or by another citizen. The 
highest levels of procedural justice, on average, and lowest levels of procedural 
injustice were observed in calls for service. Among FIs and arrests, the proce-
dural justice with which officers acted was somewhat greater in police-initiated 
encounters than in citizen-initiated encounters, perhaps because police-initiated 
encounters call for some explanation of officers’ interventions. The procedural 
injustice with which officers acted was also somewhat greater in police-initiated 
arrests and FIs.
Officers’ procedural justice and injustice varies some across different types of 
problems. Both procedural justice and procedural injustice are highest in encoun-
ters that concerned violent crime, and also fairly high in interpersonal conflicts. 
Procedural justice was lowest in encounters that involved suspicious circumstances.
Based on the observations (and hence exclusive of information contained in 
police records), and following the practice of previous observational research es-
tablished in the mid-1990s (Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes 1995), we formed a 
scale of legal evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the primary citizen. The scale 
is a weighted combination of several pieces of coded information: whether the 
officer observed the citizen commit an offense; whether there was physical evi-
dence implicating the citizen; whether the citizen gave a full confession to an of-
fense; whether the officer heard eyewitness testimony implicating the citizen; and 
whether the citizen gave a partial confession. Assigning two legal “points” to each 
of the first three factors and one point to each of the last two factors, the evidence 
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scale can range from 0 to 8; in general, and somewhat loosely, we could consider 
scores of 2 and above to represent probable cause for arrest. In the encounters that 
we observed in Schenectady, the scale ranges from 0 to 5. Procedural justice de-
clines and procedural injustice increases with increasing evidence between 0 and 3 
on this scale, though this simple association could be driven by the citizen’s role in 
the encounter (as, e.g., suspect or complainant); this pattern reverses at the higher 
levels of evidence, though the numbers of cases become rather small.
Part of the context for police action is whether and how citizens resist or chal-
lenge officers’ authority or display disrespect toward police. Resistance can take 
different forms: passive resistance, by refusing or ignoring officers’ questions or 
commands; defensive resistance, by fleeing or trying to evade officers’ grasp; and 
aggressive resistance, by attacking or threatening to assault officers. Resistance in 
any of these forms was very infrequent in the Schenectady sample of encounters, 
and it was with rare exceptions limited to arrests and field interviews. Among ar-
rests, observers recorded passive resistance by the primary citizen in 17 percent 
(i.e., twenty-two encounters), defensive resistance in 7 percent, and aggressive re-
sistance in only two cases. Disrespect was more common, observed in 12 percent of 
the encounters, including 8 percent of the calls for service, more than one-quarter 
of the arrests, and one-sixth of the field interviews. Disrespect can consist of de-
rogatory comments about police and/or any of a variety of actions that would be 
widely interpreted as disrespectful in any social setting.20 Multiple forms of resis-
tance can occur in the same encounter, of course, and resistance can overlap with 
disrespect, but 78 percent of the occasions of citizen disrespect were not observed 
in conjunction with citizen resistance of any detected kind. Overall, neither resis-
tance nor disrespect was observed in 86 percent of the encounters.
The demeanor of a suspect has been a consistent predictor of police action in 
previous studies—officers respond punitively to those who show a disregard for 
their authority and thereby flunk the “attitude test.” This has remained true despite 
a debate among researchers regarding the appropriate definition and operational-
ization of “demeanor.” David Klinger (1994) first questioned the measurement of 
demeanor in previous research, arguing that prior studies had failed to adequately 
isolate and control for crime committed by suspects during their encounter with 
police (in particular, crime against the police). Although subsequent research 
found that the original findings regarding the influence of demeanor hold (e.g., 
Lundman 1994, 1996; Worden and Shepard 1996; Klinger 1995, 1996; Worden et al. 
1996), Klinger’s critique pushed research to exercise greater care in the concep-
tualization and measurement of demeanor (and its separation from suspect re-
sistance). However, despite all of the research conducted to date, the demeanor/
resistance question has still not been conclusively answered. That officers react to 
negative behavior on the behalf of a citizen is not in dispute. The forms that such 
behavior takes, however, and the ways in which officers interpret representations 
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of “attitude,” remain open questions if we approach police behavior as the outcome 
of a decision-making process. Although some forms of resistance (e.g., passive) are 
legal, officers may not make such a distinction in the field. It may be that officers 
view both disrespect and forms of resistance as equal affronts to their authority.
Resistance and disrespect are associated with the procedural justice and es-
pecially injustice with which officers act. Procedural justice is somewhat lower 
(less than 1 point lower on the scale) when citizens are disrespectful, and all three 
forms of resistance are associated with still lower levels of procedural justice. But 
it is procedural injustice that is more strongly associated with resistance and dis-
respect. Whether resistance or disrespect are cause or effect—a feature of the situ-
ation to which officers respond or a response by citizens to officers’ behavior—is a 
question that cannot be entirely resolved by these data, but we can at least partially 
disentangle the citizens’ disrespect toward the police and officers’ disrespect to-
ward citizens. Citizen disrespect followed police disrespect of the citizen in seven 
of sixty-one (unweighted) cases of citizen disrespect toward police; citizen disre-
spect was reciprocated by police in sixteen and not reciprocated in the remaining 
thirty-eight encounters. In sixteen other (unweighted) cases, police disrespected 
the citizen and the citizen did not reciprocate. In seventy-seven encounters in 
which one or both parties disrespected the other, police initiated the disrespect in 
twenty-three, or about 30 percent of the time. From these data we can infer with 
some confidence that more often than not, citizen disrespect is a context for of-
ficers’ behavior and not an effect of officers’ disrespect.
Another facet of the context for police action is the condition of the citizen with 
whom officers interact. We might expect that officers’ behavior would be affected 
by elements of the citizen’s capacity to communicate and act rationally, and so citi-
zens who exhibit signs of mental disorder or intoxication might be treated differ-
ently. Mental disorder was infrequent, observed in only eight encounters, in five of 
which the citizens were arrested. Intoxication was a condition observed somewhat 
more frequently, in just under 8 percent of all contacts, but was fairly prevalent 
among arrests, as more than one quarter of the primary citizens in arrest encoun-
ters exhibited mild (15 percent) or strong (12 percent) intoxication. The procedural 
justice with which police act does not appear to be strongly associated with any of 
these conditions, with scale scores averaging 6.2–6.4, but the procedural injustice 
with which police act is considerably greater under each of these circumstances, 
with scale scores of 1.6 to 2.3, than when citizens exhibit none of these conditions 
(an average scale score of 0.6).
TALES FROM THE FIELD
The virtue of quantitative analysis is in breaking police-citizen interactions into 
discrete pieces so that they can be carefully examined, piece by piece, but a sense 
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of the texture of behavior and interpersonal dynamics can be compromised by 
such fragmentation. It might be instructive, therefore, to consider some exam-
ples of the police-citizen encounters that we have analyzed above. For some of 
the observed encounters, an observer prepared a narrative description of the 
event; we draw on those narratives here. In each case, the primary officer ap-
pears as “O1,” and other officers as “O2,” “O3,” while citizens are “C1,” “C2,” and 
so on.
In one incident (case 6–1, below), police responded to a ‘keep the peace’ call 
shortly after 5 p.m. A landlord had called on behalf of one of his tenants, who had a 
guest stay past his welcome; but under state law, the guest had stayed long enough 
to claim the apartment as his legal residence. The officer listened to the tenant’s 
explanation of the situation, asked some clarifying questions, and explained that 
under the circumstances, the police could not take legal action. The officer also ex-
pressed his sympathy for the tenant’s predicament, and offered some advice about 
how not to make the situation worse. The entire encounter took only six minutes, 
but in that space of time, the officer’s actions manifested each element of proce-
dural justice: he gave the citizen voice in explaining the situation; he sought ad-
ditional information, so that his decision about how to proceed would be based on 
facts; he expressed concern for the citizens’ needs and well-being; and he treated 
the citizens with dignity and respect. The score on the procedural justice scale was 
13; the procedural injustice score was zero.
Case 6–1
O1 was initially greeted by C1 (male) on the sidewalk of a residential neighborhood. 
After O1 asked who called, C1 identified himself as the landlord and C2 (male) as his 
tenant. C1 explained that a friend of C2 and C2’s wife had recently moved in, despite 
not being on the lease. O1 inquired about the location of this person, and C1 says he 
is off scene.
C1 stated that his tenants wish for this person to leave. O1 asked C2 exactly how 
long their friend has lived there, as that is the main issue. After C2 stated his friend 
has lived there for “about a month,” O1 respectfully described to both citizens that 
C2’s friend legally lives in the residence, and C1 must have him legally evicted. O1 
explained that under different circumstances (if the “friend” did not have proof of 
residence) he could provide assistance in getting him to leave the property.
It is evident that O1 understands it is an unfair situation, and he expressed this 
understanding to the citizens. O1 explained that despite the fact the “friend” is not 
paying rent or helping C2 and C2’s wife, he is unable to help due to NYS law.
O1 advised the citizens to avoid the “friend” in the meantime in order to not 
turn the situation into a domestic dispute. O1 also advised C2 to respect the clause 
in the lease agreement that states no one may live with them in order to avoid the 
current situation. Before leaving O1 suggested that the citizens call the police when 
the “friend” returns so the police may talk to him, but they must start the eviction 
process in order to make him leave.
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In another case (6–2), an officer is called to a convenience store at nearly 11 p.m., 
where he encounters a man in a strongly inebriated state:
Case 6–2
O1 arrived at a convenience store and parked before walking toward the back of 
the building. O1 greeted C1 (male) by asking him, “What’s up?” C1 was noticeably 
intoxicated, and told O1 he was tired. O1 then asked C1 where he lived, and C1 asked 
him if he was a cop, to which the officer responded that he was indeed a cop. C1 then 
gave O1 his address, and O1 asked what he was doing at the convenience store; C1’s 
response was inaudible. O1 then asked C1 who he lived with, and C1 said he lived 
with his cousins and his mother. O1 then asked why C1 was drinking, and C1 said he 
had “a lot of problems on his mind.” C1 then began to tell O1 that “God told me it is 
better to be truthful,” and O1 patiently let C1 talk. C1 then told O1 he would be truth-
ful with him, so O1 asked what C1 would be truthful about, but C1 said he did not 
know. C1 then repeatedly asked O1 if he had a problem, and O1 simply said, “No.” O1 
then asked C1 how long he had been at the convenience store, and C1 said he thought 
he had been there for about an hour. O1 then asked C1 if he knew what time it was, 
and after C1 said he did not know, O1 told him to guess. C1 then asked the officer if it 
was morning (it was in fact 22:59). O1 said no, and told C1 the time. O1 then pointed 
out to C1 that he had an open container of alcohol, and asked C1 if he had ever gotten 
an open container ticket. C1 said no before standing up to retrieve his ID. C1 spoke 
unintelligibly for a few minutes while O1 examined his ID.
After several minutes C1 asked the cop if he had a warrant, and O1 told him that’s 
what he was waiting to find out. O1 also told him he was there because people had 
called and C1 was making people nervous. O1 suddenly asked if something that C1 
had in his possession was cologne or pills. C1 ignored the question and again asked 
if he had any warrants. O1 told C1 he did not have any warrants, and asked twice 
more if C1 was holding pills or cologne. C1 spoke unintelligibly while handing the 
item to O1, who determined it was cologne. O1 told C1 to wait where he was while 
he returned to his car.
After a few minutes O1 asked C1 if there was anything left in the alcohol container. 
O1 asked multiple times before C1 said it was empty. O1 then asked C1 if he was sup-
posed to be at the convenience store, and C1 said he did not know. O1 told him he 
was not allowed to be at the convenience store due to prior incidents. O1 proceeded 
to write C1 a ticket, and asked him various questions such as name, date of birth, etc. 
while doing so. When asked how old he was, C1 told the officer he was older than 
him. When O1 asked again, C1 replied by asking the officer, “How old do you want 
me to be?” O1 asked him why he was making the information gathering process so 
difficult, and warned C1 that he could take him to the station. C1 asked O1 where his 
car was, and O1 pointed to his car and said with a light tone, “That one, with the big 
dog in the back. It will bite your ass.” O1 then told C1 he had to take down C1’s in-
formation and then he could send him on his way. C1 then asked O1 if he liked him, 
and O1 told him “So far, yeah.” O1 lightly joked about C1 being “a little difficult.” C1 
did not give O1 much trouble for the remainder of the questions. Any lack of atten-
tion exhibited by C1 during O1’s questions could be attributed to his inebriated state.
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O1 returned to his car to complete paperwork and returned to C1 with a ticket 
and told him he had a court date the next Monday. O1 told C1 he was not supposed 
to be at the convenience store, and he needed to think about being “passed out and 
intoxicated.” C1 repeatedly told O1 he was “supposed to be his friend.”
O1 stayed for a few minutes after giving C1 his ticket to make sure he took his keys 
and his bike. O1 reminded C1 of his court date and that he was not allowed at the 
convenience store before leaving.
The officer is clearly very patient with the man, shows concern for his welfare, 
treats him with respect, and explains why he is there, what he is doing and why. 
The procedural justice scale score was 8.5; procedural injustice registered 2.5 on 
the scale.
Less procedural justice, and greater procedural injustice, can be seen in case 
6–3, as officers responded to a call for service in the late afternoon:
Case 6–3
O1 and O2 stopped on a residential street in front of a house with four citizens stand-
ing outside on the sidewalk. O1 and O2 approached the citizens on the sidewalk and 
O1 asked which of the citizens called. C1 (male) told the officer he called because 
C2 (male) had insulted him and a dispute had developed. As C1 explained, O1 then 
asked for the citizens to make a long story short and explain why the police were con-
tacted. C2 told the officers that C1 had held a knife to him. O1 asked what he wanted 
the police to do and C2 told the officers he wanted C1 to leave. As C1 was standing in 
the doorway of the house, O1 assumed he lived there and told C2 he could not make 
him leave. C2 then told the officer C1 was not on the lease, and O1 replied by telling 
him if he has been there for thirty days he must be evicted. C2 attempted to tell the 
officers that C1 had not been there for thirty days. O2 did not believe this, as he had 
been to the same address two months earlier and knew that C1 had been there for 
at least thirty days. O1 turned to C1 and asked how long he had lived there, and C1 
said he had been there for five months. Upon hearing this C2 began to argue with 
C1. As they were arguing, O1 said C1 must be evicted if C2 wanted him out of the 
residence. C1 then said that C2 had forced his way in and had put his hands on C1’s 
neck. After a brief moment of arguing between the citizens, O1 announced that he 
and O2 were going to leave, and C2 needed to have C1 evicted. C1 then said, “That 
guy [C2] attacked me and you’re just going to leave?” O1 simply said, “Yeah.” After 
a few moments of complaining by both citizens O1 told them to “cry about it.” The 
citizens continued to argue with the officers about not honoring their complaints, 
and O2 told them the officers must honor either both or neither complaints. Both 
officers left without any parting remarks.
The conflict between the citizens clearly makes the situation an emotional and 
perhaps volatile one. The officers showed little interest in learning about the situ-
ation or concern about either citizen’s well-being, however. One citizen claimed 
to be the victim of an armed assault, but the officers seemed quick to seize upon 
a definition of the situation that called for no police action, and even mocked the 
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citizens’ disgruntlement with the limited police response. The procedural justice 
scale score was 4.5; procedural injustice scored 7.0.
Finally, case 6–4 illustrates what observers captured as (predominantly) proce-
dural injustice by police in the context of citizen resistance and disrespect, likely 
owing at least partly to inebriation. In a 45-minute encounter that began just after 
midnight:
Case 6–4
O1 and O2 were driving through downtown and responded to a call at a bar. O1 and 
O2 approached C1 (male) on the sidewalk who was arguing with someone inside the 
bar. There were also approximately four other citizens standing outside around C1. 
C1 told the officers as they approached that a person in the bar had choked him and 
thrown him on the floor. C1 alleged that he was thrown out because his friend had 
thrown up inside the bar. C1 told the officers he had hurt his arm during the incident, 
and that the person involved with him in the incident tried to fight him. C1 told the 
officers his friend had a video of the encounter on his phone and that he wanted to 
press charges against the bar. At this point C1 was very agitated and began to argue 
with O1 and O2 as they told him he needed to calm down and listen. O1 asked C1 for 
his name, and C1 told him his name before continuing to shout about previous inci-
dents he had at the bar. C1 was not responding to the officer’s requests to calm down 
and lower his voice, and after repeated requests by the officers, C1 quickly said he was 
sorry before continuing to yell. O1 said he did not believe he was sorry and told him 
to shut his mouth. O1 told C1 he had lost his talking privileges, and C2 (male) told 
the officers he wanted to ask them a question. O1 asked C1 and C2 if they wanted to 
do jail time before both officers walked inside the bar while C1 and his friends stayed 
on the sidewalk.
Inside the bar O1 asked C3 if he worked there, and C3 (male) said he was the bar-
tender. O1 asked C3 what happened, and C3 told him C1 was in the bar with a friend, 
and the friend was falling asleep. C3 had told C1’s friend to either get up or leave, and 
he threw up two minutes later. C3 had then told C1 and the group C1 was with they 
had to leave. C1 refused to leave, so the doorman put him in an armlock and pushed 
him out the door.
The officers returned to the sidewalk and O1 asked C1 and C2 if they had been 
asked to leave. C2 then said, “This is the United States of America, I don’t have free-
dom of speech?” O1 again asked C1 and C2 if they had been asked to leave, to which 
C2 said yes, but for the wrong reasons, and C1 said he still wanted to press charges 
for assault. O1 asked C2 why they were asked to leave, and C2 told him it was because 
their friend was sick. C2 then said the bouncer had no reason to choke out his cousin 
(C1). O1 told C1 and C2 to listen, and told C2 it was apparent C1 was very intoxicated, 
very argumentative, and unable to keep quiet. O1 then said that C2 was having a hard 
time not talking over him. O1 then told C2 everyone inside the bar said C1 and his 
friends had been asked to leave, and everyone had also cited C1 as the main problem 
as he refused to leave and said the bouncer would have to make him leave. O1 then 
told C2 that because the bar is a private establishment, they may ask anyone to leave 
for any reason. O1 then told C1 and C2 they had to leave. C1 then yelled about being 
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choked out, and O1 warned him if he swore at the officers one more time he would 
be locked up. C1 angrily asked O1 if it was illegal to swear, to which O1 said it was, 
and C2 told O1 it was not illegal to swear. At this point O1 told the citizens to go. 
They did not leave, and C2 said he was in the Marine Corps and knew his rights. O1 
told C2 he was in the military too, and that just because C2 was in the Marine Corps 
did not mean he would not get locked up. C1 then said he needed new cops. O1 told 
C1 he could either leave or go to jail, and C1 began to argue about what he would 
be arrested for. C2 managed to get C1 to walk down the street before the officers 
arrested him. C2 asked the officers if he could tell them a story, and O2 said no and 
summarized the situation by telling C2 that C1 was acting like an idiot and everyone 
in the bar said C1 was asked to leave but refused. O1 said the officers were not having 
a conversation with C2. The citizens continued to argue with the officers about how 
C1 was assaulted, and O1 continuously asked the citizens to leave. Before leaving O1 
warned C1 and C2 if they came back that night they would be locked up for trespass-
ing. C2 continued to argue so O1 cuffed him. At this point C1 was also arrested. C2 
complained of the handcuffs hurting his wrists and said he was politely asking the 
officer to remove them. O1 sarcastically asked C2 why he all of a sudden wanted to 
be polite. O1 frisked C2 in front of his vehicle before putting him in the back seat. O1 
returned to the front of the bar and asked C4 (male) to recount what he had seen. C4 
told the O1 approximately the same story O1 had already heard, but included that C1 
had ripped his shirt off and spit on a girl. O1 thanked C4 and returned to his car to 
leave with C2 in custody.
After arriving at the police station C2 continued to argue with O1, and O1 refused 
to listen and told C2 to shut his mouth.
Officers are doubtless challenged to act with procedural justice in an emotionally 
charged situation, and with people who are intoxicated and not entirely in control 
of themselves. The officers’ patience is severely tested in this incident. The proce-
dural justice scale score was 1.5; procedural injustice was 8.5.
A MODEL OF PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE IN ACTION
We can describe more succinctly the respects in which procedural justice and in-
justice are shaped by the characteristics of the situations in which officers become 
involved and the citizens with whom they interact, and we can better isolate the 
independent effects that these factors have on officers’ behavior. Previous research 
(see especially Mastrofski, Jonathan-Zamir, et al. 2016) would lead us to hypoth-
esize that the (in)justice with which police act is influenced by:
• The race, ethnicity, sex, age, and social status of the citizen;
• The role that the citizen plays in the encounter—for example, as suspect, victim/
complainant, or something else (a third party);
• Indications of mental disorder or intoxication, which affect the citizen’s capac-
ity for communication and rational behavior;
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• Citizen resistance and/or disrespect for police;
• The nature of the problem;
• Whether the encounter was initiated by police or a citizen;
• Evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
Operationalizing these variables (excepting the initiation of the encounter) with 
the observational data, we find that a number of these hypotheses are supported. 
See table 4 above.21
Procedural justice is greater when the situation involves a violent crime or 
interpersonal conflict, and when the citizen is black. Procedural justice is lower 
Table 4 Regression Analysis of Procedurally Just and Unjust Action Scales
Procedurally Just Action Scale Procedurally Unjust Action Scale
Constant 5.83* 0.06
Citizen a suspect −1.20* 0.65*
Citizen a third party −4.64* 0.64*
Citizen resistance: passive −0.68 1.87*
Citizen resistance: defensive −3.49* 0.44
Citizen resistance: aggressive −0.17 0.28
Citizen disrespect 0.60 0.76*
Citizen mentally disordered −0.98 0.56
Citizen mildly intoxicated −0.10 0.62**
Citizen very intoxicated −0.15 −0.07
Citizen male −0.25 0.23**
Citizen’s age 0.01 0.00
Citizen Black 0.73** −0.34*
Citizen Hispanic −0.74 −0.06
Citizen’s education 0.12 −0.08
Citizen employed 0.27 0.04
Other citizen present 0.18 0.09
Police-initiated 0.24 −0.07
Evidence 0.24 0.02
Neighborhood disadvantage 0.05 0.08
Platoon 2 0.43 0.01
Platoon 3 0.19 0.15
Call: violent crime 1.70* 0.50
Call: nonviolent crime 0.23 0.12
Call: interpersonal conflict 1.07* 0.13
Call: suspicious circumstance −1.34** 0.34
Call: traffic 0.48 −0.26
Call: dependent person 0.47 0.40
Call: assistance −0.42 0.23
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when the citizen is a suspect or a third party, and when the citizen defensively re-
sists police authority. Procedural injustice is greater when the citizen is a suspect, 
a male, disrespectful, or passively resists police authority. Procedural injustice is 
lower when the citizen is black.
The citizen’s role in the encounter has a clear bearing on how officers act. Sus-
pects, relative to victims and complainants, are accorded less procedural justice 
and greater procedural injustice, even holding constant the actions—resistance 
or disrespect—or conditions—mental disorder or intoxication—that might be ex-
pected to affect officers’ behavior. Third parties are shown lower levels of proce-
dural justice, presumably because they are given less attention.
Treating resistance and disrespect as factors to which police respond, resistance 
matters, but different forms of resistance affect procedural justice and injustice dif-
ferently. Defensive resistance evokes lower levels of procedural justice, while pas-
sive resistance evokes greater procedural injustice, even controlling for disrespect. 
Disrespect evokes greater procedural injustice, but does not have a detectable ef-
fect on procedural justice.
Black citizens, compared with whites, are treated better on both dimensions of 
police behavior: other things being equal, blacks are accorded greater procedural 
justice and less procedural injustice. These estimated effects are in the unexpected 
direction, and they defy our attempts to account for them.
SUMMARY AND C ONCLUSIONS
Building on previous observational research on the police, we formed measures of 
police behavior that capture the elements of procedural justice. We formed sepa-
rate measures of procedural justice and procedural injustice, allowing for officers 
to exhibit either or both in a police-citizen encounter, and also allowing for the 
possibility that the effects of procedural justice on citizens’ subjective experience 
(which we estimate in the next chapter) would differ from the effects of procedural 
injustice not only in direction but also magnitude.
The construction of each of these two measures proceeded first by forming a 
subscale for each of the domains of procedural justice: voice/participation; quality 
of treatment; neutrality; and trustworthy motives. We classified officers’ actions, 
as observers coded them, in terms of these domains, and we assessed the level of 
consistency between observers by calculating the intraclass correlation for each 
subscale. We formed scales of procedural justice and procedural injustice, respec-
tively, by summing the subscale scores for each observer, and we estimated the in-
traclass correlations of the summed scales (0.70 or higher). We constructed these 
measures to capture the behavior of the primary officer and other officers toward 
the primary citizen—the citizen whom we interviewed about the encounter—and 
we also constructed measures of the procedural justice and injustice with which 
officers acted toward other citizens in the encounter.
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We examined the mean and distribution of each of the two scales in all con-
tacts and in the three types of contacts, finding differences of the expected nature: 
higher levels of procedural justice in calls than in arrests or field interviews, and 
higher levels of procedural injustice in arrests and field interviews than in calls for 
service.
We also formed measures of other actions by officers that might affect citizens’ 
subjective experiences, including the use of verbal or physical force, respectively, 
searches and frisks of citizens, and searches of citizens’ vehicles. We formed mea-
sures of the context in which police took action, including the availability and 
strength of evidence of criminal wrongdoing, resistance by the citizen, and dis-
respect of the police, and we found the expected patterns of procedural justice 
and injustice across these contexts, for example, greater procedural injustice when 
citizens are disrespectful to the police.
Finally, we estimated the parameters of a regression model that includes the 
factors that previous research suggests might affect procedural justice, finding that 
procedural justice and injustice bear readily interpretable relationships to a num-
ber of situational factors. These analyses offer further evidence that the scales of 
procedural justice and injustice are valid measures.
With these measures of procedural justice and injustice, derived through ob-
servations by trained observers and independent of citizens’ survey responses, we 
are prepared to examine citizens’ subjective experience in terms of officers’ behav-
ior. To that examination we turn in chapter 7.
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When previous survey research has analyzed the effects of procedural justice 
in police-citizen encounters, it has with few exceptions been with the (usually 
implicit) presumption that citizens’ subjective experience bears a fairly strong 
relationship to what police officers actually do in those encounters. When citi-
zens report that police treated them with dignity and respect, respected citizens’ 
rights, and paid attention to what they had to say, research has generally taken 
those reports at face value. When citizens report that police were impolite, did 
not consider their views, or did not make their decision based on facts, research 
has again taken those reports at face value. Inferences have been drawn from 
this body of evidence that if police were to improve their performance in these 
process-based terms, then citizens would have more positive experiences, police 
legitimacy would improve, and citizen cooperation and compliance would in turn 
improve. In this way, presumably, police can “create” legitimacy through their 
interactions with citizens.
Some previous research gives us reason to question this presumption, though 
any doubts about the strength of the connection between subjective experience 
and procedural justice in action are seldom reflected in the conclusions drawn 
from the evidence. As we discussed in chapter 3, panel surveys have shown that le-
gitimacy and other global attitudes toward the police tend to be stable over time. A 
single contact with the police has a fairly modest impact on subsequent attitudes; 
the subjective experience in that contact, however, is substantially shaped by the 
citizen’s prior attitude. The effects of prior attitudes could reflect the operation of 
selective perception by citizens, seeing what they expect to see—for better or for 
worse—from the police, and/or the effects of prior attitudes on citizens’ behavior 
7
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in their encounters with the police, to which officers respond. Most extant evi-
dence does not extend to whether and how subjective experience is affected by the 
overt behavior of police.
Some empirical evidence on this question has recently accumulated in experi-
mental studies of traffic enforcement. In the first study of this kind, the Queensland 
Community Engagement Trial (QCET), police were directed to follow scripts in 
their administration of roadside breath tests at traffic checkpoints; the scripts were 
formulated to provide for the elements of procedural justice. To date, the QCET 
design has been replicated in two published studies (and a third unpublished study 
of which we are aware), though its findings have not been replicated. Notwith-
standing the inconsistent findings, this body of research warrants our attention, 
and we will consider it first.
We thereafter turn to our analysis of the subjective experience of citizens who 
were interviewed about their contacts with Schenectady police, and whose en-
counters were captured in video and audio recordings that we used to code fea-
tures of the interactions. We begin by reexamining the relationships estimated in 
chapter 4, for all 1,800 sampled contacts, among only the 411 encounters for which 
both of our observers were able to identify the primary citizen. We reestimate the 
same model of subjective experience, using the additive index of procedural justice 
formed from the survey items. We then examine the relationships between citi-
zens’ subjective experience, on one hand, and the scales of procedural justice and 
injustice in action—hereafter simply officers’ procedural justice and injustice—and 
other actions of the police, on the other hand. We thereupon build a more com-
plete model of subjective experience, which incorporates the observed behavioral 
constructs, so that we can further contribute to filling the gap in extant evidence 
on the effects of police procedural justice.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE
The Queensland Community Engagement Trial (QCET) was a randomized con-
trolled trial that provided for an experimental treatment in the form of scripted 
traffic checks for drunk driving. Officers were trained to follow a protocol de-
signed to maximize the procedural justice of the brief interactions occasioned 
by the random breath testing (RBT). Scripts were formulated to incorporate the 
components of procedural justice into officers’ administration of the RBT; during 
half of sixty RBT operations, officers were directed to use the experimental script, 
and senior officers monitored their compliance with the protocol. Ordinarily these 
RBT encounters were brief—about twenty seconds long—and “very systematic 
and often devoid of anything but compulsory communication” (Mazerolle et al. 
2013, 40). The scripted procedurally just encounters were longer, at ninety-seven 
seconds on average, but still quite brief. Each driver who was stopped during these 
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sixty RBT operations was given a survey to be completed later and returned to the 
researchers. Response rates, for both experimental and control drivers, were about 
13 percent. The procedural justice treatment had the hypothesized effects on citi-
zens’ judgments, and of course a randomized trial has the unique virtue of strong 
controls for the effects of citizens’ prior attitudes and other potentially confound-
ing factors. The QCET’s design but not its results have been replicated, however 
(Alpert 2015; MacQueen and Bradford 2015; Sahin 2014).
An experimental treatment applied randomly, as in QCET, allows us to assume 
that the confirmation biases in citizens’ subjective judgments are distributed evenly 
across treatment and control groups and thereby isolate the effect of the procedural 
justice treatment. How much potential everyday policing allows for experimen-
tal scripting and direction is questionable. Traffic checkpoints that involve very 
brief encounters between police and citizens are susceptible to such prescriptions, 
but police-citizen encounters in most domains of police work—and especially in 
those with the potential for contentious interactions—do not lend themselves to 
such experimental manipulation. The QCET and studies like it cannot be written 
off as irrelevant eccentricities of police research, but we believe that a properly 
grounded understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of police-citizen interac-
tions, including but not limited to the subjective and (more) objective features of 
procedural justice, will require the application of nonexperimental approaches that 
provide for two forms of data: data on citizens’ subjective experiences, the likes of 
which have been collected through postcontact surveys of citizens; and data about 
police and citizen behaviors independently coded by observers.
A MODEL OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE,  REVISITED
In chapter 4 we estimated the parameters of a model of subjective experience, 
based on survey responses and police records (e.g., concerning the nature of the 
call, arrest charges, and the like) for all of the encounters in Schenectady and Syr-
acuse about which we interviewed citizens. Our analysis, however, omitted the 
behavior of police. It revealed that citizens’ satisfaction is driven by subjective 
procedural justice and subjective outcomes, and holding those factors statistically 
constant, satisfaction is only weakly related to citizens’ background characteristics 
or characteristics of the situation. Subjective outcomes are shaped by and large by 
subjective procedural justice. Finally, subjective procedural justice is driven main-
ly by how the encounter is initiated and especially by the use of police authority: 
searches or frisks, and the type and disposition of an arrest. Citizens’ race, employ-
ment, and age also affect procedural justice.
We estimated the parameters of that same model of subjective experience for 
only the contacts in Schenectady. The regression coefficients are very similar—
many are identical—to those based on an analysis of both sites. One of the few 
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exceptions is the estimated effect of the citizen’s race on subjective procedural jus-
tice; among encounters in both sites, Blacks rated procedural justice less favorably 
than whites did, other things being equal, but among the Schenectady encounters, 
race bears no independent relationship to subjective procedural justice.
Our assessment of the observation sample against the larger survey sample 
suggested that the observed encounters resembled the incidents from which they 
were sampled (see the methodological appendix). As reassuring as that is, we also 
estimated the parameters of the model for only the observed encounters in Sche-
nectady.1 The pattern of effects in the observed subset of Schenectady encounters 
is very similar to that found among all of the Schenectady encounters, though a 
number of the coefficients that achieve statistical significance in the latter analysis 
do not achieve statistical significance at a conventional level among observed en-
counters, given the smaller N, and a few differences among call types emerge that 
were not found among all of the Schenectady encounters. But the story remains 
much the same in this subset of encounters: satisfaction is driven by citizens’ judg-
ments about procedural justice and about outcomes, which explain all but a small 
fraction of the variation in satisfaction. Subjective outcomes are for the most part 
a function of citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice. Subjective procedural jus-
tice is shaped mainly by how the encounter is initiated and the use of police au-
thority, among the observed encounters as among all of the contacts about which 
citizens were interviewed. Thus this comparison of regression results further sug-
gests that the observed encounters are fairly representative of police-citizen con-
tacts in Schenectady, aside from the underrepresentation of routine traffic stops.
AN EXTENDED ANALYSIS
Our analysis of subjective experience in chapter 4 omitted a construct of signal im-
portance: the behavior of police, and particularly the degree to which officers’ ac-
tions toward the citizen either conform to or violate principles of procedural jus-
tice. Like previous research that relies mainly or exclusively on citizens’ responses 
to survey questions about their experience, we must make assumptions about the 
correspondence of citizens’ judgments to officers’ behavior in order to draw infer-
ences about how police can enhance police legitimacy through their contacts with 
citizens. With data on how officers act that are independent of citizens’ reports, 
however, we can instead treat as testable empirical propositions the connections 
between officers’ behavior and citizens’ subjective experience.
The model first presented in chapter 4 includes officers’ procedural justice (see 
figure 6). We have already considered some of the hypothesized relationships be-
tween features of the situational context and citizens’ backgrounds, on the one 
hand, and officers’ procedural justice, on the other hand, in the analyses presented 
in chapter 6. Here we consider, not the antecedents of officers’ procedural justice, 
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but rather its consequences. We posit that the most immediate effects of officers’ 
procedural justice are on citizens’ subjective procedural justice and outcomes. We 
further posit that the effects of officers’ procedural justice on citizens’ satisfac-
tion are mediated by subjective procedural justice and outcomes, though we will 
later allow for the possibility that officers’ procedural justice has direct effects on 
citizens’ satisfaction, in addition to any indirect effects that it may have. We begin 
with a detailed examination of the relationship between officers’ procedural justice 
and citizens’ assessments of procedural justice.
Subjective Procedural Justice
Measured by the procedural justice index, the procedural justice that citizens 
perceive and experience—which we simply call “subjective procedural justice”—
correlates in expected ways with the procedural justice that we observed in police-
citizen encounters, but the correlations are only of rather weak-to-moderate 
magnitude. The correlation of subjective procedural justice with the procedural 
justice with which the primary officer treated the primary (surveyed) citizen is 
only 0.14. Subjective procedural justice is inversely correlated, at -0.31, with the 
procedural injustice with which the primary officer acts. As previous research on 
citizen satisfaction might be taken to imply, the inverse correlation of subjective 
procedural justice with procedural injustice is larger in magnitude than the posi-
tive correlation of subjective procedural justice with procedural justice. Subjective 
procedural justice is also inversely correlated with procedural injustice by other 
officers, and correlated with procedural injustice toward other citizens in the 
encounter, though the coefficients (-0.15 and 0.11, respectively) are weaker still. 
Subjective procedural justice is also inversely correlated with the use of police 
authority—verbal and physical force, searches of persons and vehicles—with coef-
ficients ranging from -0.2 to -0.27.
The modest magnitude of the correlations between subjective procedural jus-
tice and procedural justice seems to stem mainly from rather generous character-
izations of officers’ performance by citizens. Figure 7 shows a cross-tabulation of 
citizens’ subjective judgments about procedural justice and the primary officers’ 
behavior, in bar-chart form, such that each segment of each bar depicts a cell in a 
cross-tabulation. Comparing subjective procedural justice (along the vertical axis) 
to officers’ procedural justice (along the horizontal axis), more than 40 percent of 
the cases overall are found in four segments (the blue and green in the upper left of 
the figure) that encompass police behavior of low-to-moderate procedural justice and 
subjective assessments of high-to-very-high procedural justice. In 50 percent of the 
cases of low procedural justice by officers, citizens rated procedural justice very high-
ly. In nearly two-thirds of the cases of only moderate procedural justice by officers, 
citizens assessed procedural justice as very high. Conversely stingy judgments—low-
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justice by officers—were much less common (7 percent of all of the cases), found 
in the lower right segments. Overall, in these bivariate terms, positive ratings of 
procedural justice by citizens do not appear to be very responsive to officers’ overt 
behavior, inasmuch as half to two-thirds of the citizens rated procedural justice 
very highly regardless of officers’ observed behavior.
Citizens were somewhat less likely to overstate the procedural justice with 
which officers acted when officers behaved in procedurally unjust ways. When of-
ficers acted with moderate-to-high procedural injustice (the two bars in the right 
of figure 8, below), citizens rated procedural justice as high or very high about half 
of the time.
Arrestees, as a group, are less generous in their assessments, and their scores on 
the subjective procedural justice index bear a closer correspondence with police 
behavior. Among cases in which observations showed procedural justice to be low, 
less than one-quarter of the arrestees rated procedural justice very highly, while 
nearly one-third judged it to be low. Positive ratings of procedural justice among 
arrestees appear more closely tied to overt behavior, with a larger spread in the 
proportion of very high ratings, from 23 percent to 58 percent.
Overall, these results contradict the phenomenon to which Wesley Skogan (ap-
propriately) draws our attention: that negative experiences with the police have 
more powerful detrimental effects on global attitudes than the beneficial effects 
of positive experiences, and more generally that “bad is stronger than good.” If 
we think of citizens’ perceptions that are incongruent with observed procedural 
justice as errors, then the false positive errors are far more numerous than the false 
negative errors. Our data allow us only to speculate on why many citizens make 
what appear to be overly charitable characterizations of how police performed in 
their contact with them, but piecing together these findings with those in chapter 3 
on the generally favorable attitudes of the survey respondents, and the findings of 
previous research on the powerful effects of prior attitudes on subjective experi-
ence, we could reasonably, albeit only very tentatively, attribute the false positives 
to citizens’ prior attitudes.
We can examine false negative errors more closely, though the subsample is 
small and the information limited. Fourteen (unweighted) respondents have 
scores on the procedural justice index that place them in the “low” category, yet 
the officers’ procedural justice was high or very high and procedural injustice was 
low or moderate. Thirteen of the fourteen answered open-ended questions about 
their reasons for dissatisfaction. The most common reason, cited by five, con-
cerned outcomes. Two of those five, and one other respondent, cited listening, and 
three other respondents cited respect.
Regression analysis shows that together the scales of officers’ procedural justice 
and injustice explain no more than 12 percent of the variation in subjective pro-
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can be attributed to what officers do stems primarily from the procedural injustice 
with which they act, which has fairly strong effects when those actions are directed 
toward the primary citizen. Procedural justice in this model has a substantively 
modest but statistically significant effect. As modest as these relationships are, they 
could be partially spurious, inasmuch as officers’ procedural justice is associated 
with other factors that drive citizens’ subjective experience. The effects of proce-
dural injustice are attenuated some by the inclusion of how the encounter was 
initiated and especially arrest in model II; all else being equal, subjective proce-
dural justice is more favorable when the citizen calls for police assistance and less 
favorable when the citizen is arrested. The estimated effect of procedural injustice 
is further attenuated by the inclusion of officers’ use of authority in model III; 
subjective procedural justice is less favorable when police search the citizen and/or 
Table 5 Five Models of Subjective Procedural Justice
I II III IV V
Constant 6.37* 5.27* 4.81* 3.56 3.70
PC x PO: procedural justice 0.40* 0.33* 0.28** 0.20 0.20
PC x PO: procedural injustice −1.73* −1.31* −1.01* −1.16* −0.72**
PC x OO: procedural justice −0.38 −0.28 −0.30 −0.31 −0.24
PC x OO: procedural injustice −0.84 −0.59 −0.45 −0.38 −0.45
OC: procedural justice −0.11 −0.14 −0.07 −0.12 −0.06
OC: procedural injustice −0.33 −0.40 −0.55 −0.64 −0.45
Citizen called for service — 3.39* 3.54* 2.27 1.51
Police-initiated — 0.58 1.42 2.46 1.50
Citizen arrested — −3.53** −1.29 −1.46 −0.86
Search/frisk person — — −3.56** −4.33** −4.57*
Search vehicle — — −6.21* −6.07* −5.97*
Citizen consent search/frisk — — 5.88* 5.19* 4.94*
Citizen consent vehicle search — — 4.92 4.40 3.31
Verbal force — — 1.29 1.39 1.16
Physical force — — −2.06 −1.95 0.45
Evidence — — −0.96 −1.00 −0.99
Citizen male — — — 2.11* 2.41*
Citizen’s age — — — 0.04 0.05
Citizen black — — — −0.23 0.32
Citizen Hispanic — — — −0.90 0.12
Response time — — — 1.96* 1.95*
Neighborhood disadvantage — — — −0.38 −0.46
Citizen disrespect — — — — −3.24*
Citizen resistance — — — — −6.58*
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.28
note: PC = primary citizen; PO = primary officer; OO = other officer(s); OC = other citizen(s)
* p < .05
** p < .10
Citizens’ Subjective Experience and Police Action    139
his/her vehicle (without consent) and when they use physical force.2 But even con-
trolling for these actions by police, procedural injustice toward the primary citizen 
affects that citizen’s judgments. Model IV adds the assessed response time and 
demographic variables: the citizen’s sex, age, race, and ethnicity, and the level of 
neighborhood disadvantage. Among the demographic variables, only sex has a 
large or statistically significant effect on citizens’ subjective procedural justice, and 
response time has a substantively significant effect.3
Finally, model V adds indicators of citizen resistance and disrespect, respec-
tively, both of which have a large bearing on subjective procedural justice.4 The in-
clusion of these variables attenuates but does not eliminate the estimated effect of 
the officer’s procedural injustice on citizens’ judgments about procedural justice, 
however, from which we would cautiously infer that the effects of prior attitudes 
on subjective experience found in previous research may reflect the combined 
influences of citizens’ selective perception and of citizens engaging in behavior 
that evokes from police a response that citizens judge unfavorably. If resistance 
or disrespect by citizens who hold negative attitudes toward the police were the 
mechanism that accounts for the relationship between prior attitudes and sub-
jective experience, then the inclusion of these variables in a model of subjective 
experience would substantially reduce or eliminate altogether the estimated effect 
of officers’ procedural justice. When citizen resistance and disrespect are added 
to the model, the coefficients for procedural injustice are reduced in magnitude 
to a degree but not eliminated; the coefficient for the use of physical force is also 
substantially reduced, as one would expect insofar as resistance is the factor that 
(should) prompt the use of physical force. Citizens who resist police authority tend 
to evoke the use of physical force by police and thus to rate the procedural justice 
of their contact less favorably. But holding resistance and disrespect constant, the 
pattern of other relationships is largely unchanged.
The use of police authority, and particularly searches, has a powerful impact on 
citizens’ subjective procedural justice. One previous study, Meares et al. 2012, sug-
gests that it is not the legality of the search but rather the procedural justice with 
which police act that shapes citizens’ assessments of the propriety of police action. 
We might expect, therefore, that citizens’ judgments that the police search was 
legitimate mediate either the effects of searches on citizens’ subjective procedural 
justice and/or the effects of officers’ procedural justice. When citizens’ judgments 
that the search was legitimate are included in model IV, however, we find that 
the estimated effects of citizens’ consent to searches are attenuated, but otherwise 
the pattern of effects is not altered. The search or frisk of the citizen continues to 
have a large coefficient (-4.92, compared with -4.33 in model IV), as does a vehicle 
search (-5.70, compared with -6.07). The primary officers’ procedural injustice re-
mains significant (a coefficient of -1.06, compared with -1.16 in model IV). We 
infer that citizens’ judgments about the propriety of police searches are associated 
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with citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice, but they do not mediate the effect 
of officers’ use of authority or their procedural justice on citizens’ subjective pro-
cedural justice.
We note that we have approached tests of statistical significance in a conser-
vative fashion, using two-tailed tests. If instead we applied one-tailed tests when 
the direction of expected effects was clear, the citizen’s consent to a vehicle search 
and procedural injustice toward other citizens would be significant at the .10 level 
in model IV. We also acknowledge that all of these estimated relationships are 
attenuated due to measurement error. The survey data contain error, just as the 
survey data collected in previous research contained error. The observational data 
contain error, just as observational data collected in previous studies using sys-
tematic social observation contain (inestimable) error. So we could suppose that 
the effects of procedural justice and injustice are somewhat greater than the esti-
mated effects, and we could suppose that the effects of other variables—the use of 
physical force, searches, consent to search—are also understated in these results 
as a consequence of measurement error. But even taking account of attenuation 
due to measurement error, the strength of the relationships between subjective 
procedural justice and officers’ procedural justice is modest—much too modest to 
support the inferences that have been drawn from previous analyses that rest on 
only survey data.
The weak to null effects of officers’ procedural justice on citizens’ subjective 
procedural justice probably has to do with the high ratings that citizens tend to 
give police even when officers’ behavior represents low-to-moderate levels of pro-
cedural justice. At the margin, better performance in procedural justice terms by 
the police cannot improve citizens’ subjective assessments very much.
Officers’ procedural justice might be expected to have different effects on sub-
jective procedural justice in different types of police-citizen contacts; in particular, 
we might expect that procedural justice would have pronounced effects in police-
initiated contacts and encounters involving an arrest. Analyzing each subset of 
encounters separately allows us to check for effects that are contingent on the type 
of contact, though it also compromises the statistical power of the analysis. Few 
effects that are contingent on the type of contact emerge from those analyses.
Among citizen-initiated contacts, and contrary to our expectations, procedural 
injustice has stronger effects than it has in either police-initiated contacts or in 
those ending in arrest. Some differences in subjective procedural justice can be 
seen across types of calls, which in this analysis rest on measures derived from 
the observational data; compared with citizens who called about public nuisances, 
citizens who called for assistance with respect to nonviolent crimes, interpersonal 
conflicts, suspicious circumstances and traffic problems were more positive, while 
those who summoned police with respect to a violent crime were less positive.5 
Men who called for assistance were more positive about procedural justice than 
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women. Response time was also a factor in citizens’ judgments about procedural 
justice in citizen-initiated contacts.
Among those whose contacts were initiated by police, neither procedural jus-
tice nor procedural injustice by officers has a detectable impact on citizens’ sub-
jective procedural justice. Searches, however, detract from subjective procedural 
justice. Among those who were arrested, regardless of how the encounter was 
initiated, searches detracted from procedural justice. Procedural injustice toward 
other citizens in the encounter detracts from arrestees’ sense of procedural justice, 
though officers’ procedural justice toward other citizens has no effect.
A somewhat more complicated picture emerges when subjective procedural 
justice (the procedural justice index) is regressed on the procedural justice sub-
scales in lieu of the combinatory scales, allowing for the four domains of pro-
cedural justice to have varying effects. When the subscales are included in the 
analysis, we find, first, that the effect of procedural injustice by the primary officer 
is comprised of the effects of three of the four procedural justice domains. Un-
trustworthy motives have an unexpectedly positive coefficient, but the estimate is 
statistically unreliable and not significant. Second, and moreover, the procedural 
justice subscales have detectable but countervailing effects, as trustworthy motives 
and quality of treatment improve subjective procedural justice, while neutrality 
detracts from it, though only two of the effects achieve statistical significance.
The negative effect of neutrality is anomalous on its face, but it may reflect the 
situationally contingent nature of police behavior, as officers act in accordance 
with the demands of individual situations, and the fact that procedural justice in 
action is not entirely an exogenous variable. Higher scores on the neutrality sub-
scale mainly reflect officers’ efforts to explain their decisions, in general, and to a 
lesser extent their efforts to explain more particularly the legal standards on which 
they based their actions. Higher scores on this subscale are associated with police-
initiated encounters, problems concerning either traffic or interpersonal conflict, 
arrests, and evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the citizen. Scores on this subscale 
are higher when the citizen is a suspect or disputant, and lower when the citizen 
is a victim or service recipient. We would speculate that officers act in these more 
procedurally just ways when the situation demands it, and that these situations are 
by their nature situations in which citizens are less likely to be pleased with the 
contact; indeed, officers might extend themselves to explain when citizens send 
signals that an explanation is expected. As plausible as this account may be, and al-
though the primary citizens’ requests for leniency (for him/herself or others) have 
a fairly substantial relationship to subjective procedural justice, it does not appear 
that citizens’ requests mediate the effect of neutrality, the estimated magnitude of 
which is largely unaffected by the inclusion of citizens’ requests.
These effects are of fairly modest magnitude, and together the procedural jus-
tice subscales together (and alone) explain no more than 12 percent of the variance 
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in subjective procedural justice. These results indicate that what officers do—that 
is, both the justice and the injustice with which officers act—is not entirely lost on 
citizens as they assess their contacts with police, but as we found previously, the 
effects of officers’ procedural justice on citizens’ subjective experience are quite 
modest. When further controls are added for the nature of the situation and of-
ficers’ exercise of authority, the estimated effects of several subscales are attenuated 
somewhat, though the addition of controls for citizens’ backgrounds does not alter 
the pattern of effects.
In view of previous research, we have compelling reason to suppose that 
the omission of citizens’ prior attitudes from these models leaves them mis-
specified; prior attitudes toward the police generally have a strong effect on 
subjective procedural justice. Thus we added our measure of legitimacy—the 
trust index—to the model in order to gauge the extent to which the estimated 
relationships are biased by the omission of prior attitudes. It is of course true 
that the trust index is not a measure of prior attitudes, as it is based on responses 
to the survey that followed the encounter in question, and it could instead be 
specified as an effect of subjective procedural justice rather than its cause. But 
based on previous research, it is fairly safe to say that the postcontact trust score 
is nearly the same as the precontact trust score, since global attitudes like this 
one tend to be stable, and moreover, the effect of the citizen’s subjective proce-
dural justice on trust is likely much weaker than the effect of trust on subjective 
procedural justice.
With only the officers’ procedural justice and the trust index in the model, the 
pattern of procedural (in)justice effects resembles that estimated earlier: proce-
dural injustice detracts from subjective procedural justice, while procedural jus-
tice contributes little. Trust bears a moderately strong relationship to subjective 
procedural justice, controlling for the officers’ procedural (in)justice. The coef-
ficient for trust is unaffected by the addition of controls for the officers’ use of 
authority. Furthermore, the estimated effect of trust is stable with the addition 
of controls for citizens’ characteristics and for citizens’ behavior (resistance and 
disrespect), respectively. The effect of trust is not diminished by the addition of 
citizen resistance and disrespect, suggesting that the effect of global attitudes on 
subjective experience is mainly a matter of selective perception by citizens, and is 
not mediated by citizens’ behavior.
The coefficient for trust, like those in all of the cross-sectional research, re-
flects the reciprocal effects of prior attitudes (for which we treat the trust index 
as a proxy) and subjective procedural justice on one another, but given the much 
greater magnitude of the effect of prior attitudes, we can surmise that most of this 
relationship is probably attributable to that effect. Moreover, the effects of officers’ 
procedural (in)justice on subjective procedural justice remain asymmetrical and, 
on balance, fairly small.
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Subjective Outcomes
Our model posits that officers’ procedural justice shapes citizens’ judgments about 
their outcomes. For the most part, however, subjective outcomes are not a function 
of procedural justice: together the scales of procedural justice explain 4 percent of 
the variation in citizens’ assessments of whether the outcome they received was 
the outcome they deserved; see table 6. The primary officer’s procedural injustice 
detracts from citizens’ judgments to a modest degree, and other officers’ proce-
dural justice also (and independently) detracts from the citizen’s judgment that the 
outcome was deserved. But in the main, citizens’ assessments of outcomes are not 
a reflection of officers’ procedural justice.
Table 6 Five Models of Subjective Outcomes
I II III IV V
Constant 0.47* −0.58* −0.43** −0.10 −0.03
PC x PO: procedural justice 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
PC x PO: procedural injustice −0.21* 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
PC x OO: procedural justice −0.08* −0.02 −0.02 −0.05** −0.05*
PC x OO: procedural injustice −0.08 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.00
OC: procedural justice 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
OC: procedural injustice 0.11 0.10 0.11* 0.09** 0.10**
Subjective procedural justice — 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14*
Citizen called for service — — −0.44* −0.41** −0.46*
Police−initiated — — 0.44 0.44 0.40
Citizen arrested — — −0.36 −0.37 −0.36
Search/frisk person — — 0.34 0.38 0.34
Search vehicle — — 0.29 0.25 0.16
Citizen consent search/frisk — — −0.01 −0.10 −0.11
Citizen consent vehicle search — — −0.53 −0.47 −0.41
Verbal force — — −0.33 −0.26 −0.22
Physical force — — 0.10 0.07 0.15
Evidence — — 0.04 0.04 0.02
Citizen male — — — 0.05 0.07
Citizen’s age — — — −0.01 −0.01**
Citizen black — — — −0.24 −0.22
Citizen Hispanic — — — −0.17 −0.16
Response time — — — 0.07 0.07
Neighborhood disadvantage — — — 0.04 0.04
Citizen disrespect — — — — −0.52*
Citizen resistance — — — — 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.62
note: PC = primary citizen; PO = primary officer; OO = other officer(s); OC = other citizen(s)
* p < .05
** p < .10
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Citizens’ judgments about procedural justice, however, have a powerful impact 
on subjective outcomes, independent of the officers’ procedural justice, and when 
subjective procedural justice is controlled, officers’ procedural justice has no effect 
on citizens’ judgments about their outcomes (see model II in table 6); the effect 
of officers’ behavior—and especially the injustice with which they act—is medi-
ated entirely by citizens’ subjective procedural justice. The nature of the situation 
affects citizens’ judgments only to a small degree, and officers’ use of authority 
(controlling for subjective procedural justice) has no detectable effects (in model 
III). Likewise, citizens’ backgrounds add little to the explanation (model IV), and 
the inclusion of citizen disrespect and resistance (in model V) also does not alter 
the pattern of effects. The hypothesized effect of subjective procedural justice on 
subjective outcomes is confirmed, but the hypothesized effects of officers’ proce-
dural justice on subjective outcomes are not confirmed.
Citizen Satisfaction
Our model holds that the effect of officers’ procedural justice on citizens’ satisfac-
tion is mediated by citizens’ judgments about procedural justice and outcomes, 
but we nevertheless estimate the parameters of regression equations that include 
officers’ procedural justice; insofar as officers’ behavior has effects on citizens’ sub-
jective experience, we think it valuable to have a full accounting of them. Officers’ 
procedural injustice affects citizen satisfaction; that effect is mediated for the most 
part, but not entirely, by citizens’ subjective procedural justice. Officers’ proce-
dural justice, by itself, accounts for no more than 11 percent of the variation in 
citizens’ satisfaction. The addition of subjective procedural justice pushes the ex-
plained variation up to 78 percent. Further additions to the model—for example, 
officers’ use of authority and citizens’ backgrounds—add nothing further to the 
explanation of satisfaction.
TALES FROM THE FIELD
Since percentages and coefficients can tell only part of the story of police-citizen 
interactions, as we commented in chapter 6, we offer here a couple of illustrations 
of incongruence between observed police behavior and citizens’ subjective experi-
ence, which may serve to put some descriptive flesh on the numerical skeletons of 
charts and regression parameters. We begin with a case in which the observations 
were indicative of fairly high procedural justice (a score of 11), no procedural in-
justice (a score of zero), and a citizen’s judgment that represented an unfavorable 
subjective experience (with an index score of -11).
Case 7–1
O1 (male) was driving through a residential neighborhood during daytime. O1 
stopped next to a house and greeted C1 (female) by saying, “How are you doing, 
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hun?” O1 asked how C1 was doing and asked if she wanted to talk to him away from 
C1’s children. O1 asked C1 what was going on and C1 told him she was picking up 
her daughter from her ex-husband/boyfriend and an altercation ensued. C1 said her 
ex was flagrantly insulting her, and she responded by pushing him. He pushed her 
back, and C1 said she punched him in the face after being pushed. C1 told O1 he hit 
her back, and followed that statement with showing the officer her reddened ear. C1 
then said she hit him a “good number of times” after being hit by her ex. O1 then 
told C1 he would be honest with her, and told her that because there was no visible 
injury and because she had told O1 she had hit her ex multiple times while holding 
her child, she was going to be arrested. C1 was noticeably confused, and asked the 
officer if he was serious. O1 told her she was endangering the welfare of a child. C1 
protested by saying her ex had put hands on her as well, and O1 responded by saying 
she had no visible injuries and from her story, she was the primary aggressor. O1 told 
C1 he would not arrest her in front of her children, and asked who was home with 
C1 at the time. C1 said her stepfather was home. C1 asked if she was going to stay the 
night in jail, and O1 said there was no bail. O1 then called to another police car to 
have them contact the ex so he could pick up his child. C1 calmly told the officers 
her actions were in self-defense, and O1 told her that was not the case according to 
her description of events. O1 told C1 that after seeing both C1’s face and C1’s ex’s face, 
and because he knew C1 was holding her child during the incident, the police deter-
mined C1 was the primary aggressor. O1 sympathized with C1 and explained as best 
he could why C1 was being arrested.
O1 was explaining the basis for C1’s arrest when C2 (male, C1’s stepfather) came 
to speak to C1 and the officers. C1 told C2 she was being arrested for endangering the 
welfare of a child, and C2 seemed confused and slightly angry. He said, to no one in 
particular, that C1’s ex had pushed her first. O1 said it did not matter. C2 then said C1 
was holding the baby, and O1 told him that was what mattered. C2 told O1 that C1’s 
ex had a history of being abusive. O1 explained to C2 that C1 had caused substantial 
physical injury to C1’s ex while holding her child, which was a greater offense than 
C1’s ex’s actions. C2 began to bring up other possible scenarios in which C1’s ex may 
have been determined to be the primary aggressor, and O1 told him he was not going 
to discuss it any further. C2 said the officer had to talk to him, and O1 said he did not.
O1 asked C1 to give her child to her father so O1 could speak to her for a minute. 
O1 told her if she wanted to press harassment charges against her ex, she may do that. 
O1 warned her that if she were to press harassment charges, Child Protective Services 
would get involved and may remove the child. O1 continued to explain to C1 that he 
fully understood the situation, and he understood that C1’s ex was not a good person. 
O1 said he was going to call his sergeant to see if they could press the issue of harass-
ment. O2 (male, unknown arrival time) began to speak to C1 and slowly went over 
the sequence of events during the incident. O2 pointed out that C1 hit her ex first, 
and continued to hit him after he hit her back. C1 then told the officers that her ex 
had accidentally hit her child as well.
O1 explained to C1 that NYS laws stated that when a child is endangered in a 
situation that at least meets the criteria for a misdemeanor, an arrest must be made. 
O1 told C1 the officers would have had more flexibility if the child had not been 
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involved. C1 then said her ex should be facing the same charges, and O1 told her that 
was not the case as C1 was holding the child during the incident.
C1 asked to change clothes before being taken to the police station, and O1 said 
they were not worried about her fleeing, and that she could go inside and speak to 
her stepfather about the situation.
C1 went inside to speak to her father. O1 and O2 spoke to each other about what 
options there were that would allow them to arrest C1’s ex. While talking to C1 both 
officers demonstrated their understanding of the situation, and stressed to her that 
her descriptions of events forced them to make the decision that she was the primary 
aggressor.
O1 went inside and asked C1 for her child’s identifying information. O1 asked C2 
if he could take care of the child after they left. O1 told C2 he was going to try to put 
the issue of child endangerment on C1’s ex, but it was not a promising option. O1 told 
C1 that he did not want to arrest C1, and that he wished the laws of New York were 
different. O1 also told C1 that he appreciated her honesty.
O1 told C2 they were going to leave C1’s daughter with him. O1 said that the of-
ficers talked to their supervisor and C1 must be considered the primary aggressor. O1 
said he had to contact Child Protective Services to let them know about the incident, 
but he would explain to them that C1’s actions could have been in defense of herself 
and her child. O2 then confirmed that C2 could take care of the child while C1 was in 
jail. O1 then asked C2 for his identifying information. O1 explained where C1 would 
be arraigned in the morning and that he may bring an attorney for C1 if he wished.
O1 asked C1 if she had anything in her pockets, to which she said she did not, 
before putting her in the back of his vehicle and leaving the scene with O2 in the 
passenger seat.
During the ride C1 told the officers she believed she had an order of protection 
against her ex that expired the day of the incident. O1 told C1 he did not think she 
was a bad person, or that she did more wrong than her ex during the incident, and 
he said he believed she was the better parent when compared to her ex. C1 told the 
officers she thought her mother was going to her house to pick up her daughter, and 
O2 said that her father would be taking care of C1’s daughter that night. C1 made a 
small joke by asking the officers if she could ride in the car with them while on patrol 
instead of spending the night in jail.
Considering the circumstances, both officers made a considerable effort to com-
fort C1 and assure her they were doing everything in their power to help her. They 
were friendly, calm, and honest with C1 about every aspect of the situation.
The officers were courteous and sympathetic toward the citizen, explained the con-
straints of the law, showed concern for her (and her child’s) welfare, and showed 
other consideration in allowing her to change her clothes. Yet the citizen’s judg-
ments, as they are captured in her survey responses, reflect none of these elements 
of procedural justice.
On the other hand, and as we noted above, sometimes citizens’ judgments 
give police more credit for procedural justice than independent observation sug-
gests is warranted. Consider case 7–2, in which the observation-based scores for 
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procedural justice and injustice were 4.5 and 5.5, respectively, and in which the 
primary citizen gave police high ratings:
Case 7–2
O1 and O2 stopped on the street in front of a house with three citizens on the porch 
and another citizen walking by. O1 got out of his vehicle and he immediately shouted, 
“Yo bro, get over here” to the citizen walking down the street (C1). As the officers 
approached C1 he attempted to give a name, but did so with exceptionally slurred 
speech. O1 told C1 to put his hands behind his back and handcuffed him. C1 asked 
what happened and O1 responded by saying C1 was drinking on the street, which 
is illegal, and he was harassing people for money. C1 asked who he was harassing, 
and O1 responded by telling him people had called about C1. O1 asked C1 if he had 
anything in his pockets before he frisked C1. C1 did not respond. O1 frisked C1 and 
found two daggers. When asked what he needed the daggers for C1 told the officers 
he found them in his girlfriend’s house. C1 told the officers he was fixing the house 
for his girlfriend, but most of C1’s words were slurred and unintelligible. O1 further 
restrained C1 by putting him on his knees, and C1 told O1 he was not going to fight 
back. O1 asked if he had any ID or warrants, and C1 produced an ID and said he 
did not have any warrants. C1 handed the ID to O2, who briefly tested C1 on the 
information from the ID. C1 apologized for drinking on the street. O1 then walked 
C1 over to the police vehicle and poured out C1’s alcohol. O1 told C1 he was going to 
get a ticket and then placed him in the back of the car. The officers then left the scene 
with C1 in custody.
Approximately a hundred feet down the street the officers were hailed by two 
citizens on the side of the street. The officers told them they had someone in the back 
and if the citizens wished to make a complaint they must contact the station. The of-
ficers then continued towards the police station. C1 asked if he was being brought in 
for the drinking, to which O1 replied he was bringing him in to give him a ticket, but 
he would not be locked up. C1 told the officers his name, and asked for O1’s name. O1 
gave C1 his name, which was the same name as a popular video game. Upon hearing 
this C1 told the officer, “No disrespect, but I’m sorry.” O1 then told C1 the main issue 
was not the fact that he was drinking on the street, but that he did not tell the officer 
he had two daggers. O1 told him he was going to let him go until he found the dag-
gers. C1 attempted to explain how he came across the daggers in his girlfriend’s house 
and took them because he liked them. C1 continuously told O1 he understood and he 
was being honest. O1 reprimanded C1 for lying about the daggers, to which C1 told 
him he did not lie, and only did not answer.
The video ended when they arrived at the station.
It is certainly possible that, in responding to our survey a few weeks after the sam-
pled incident, the citizen in case 7–2 suffered greater memory decay than the av-
erage respondent, given that he had been drinking. Memory decay can affect any 
respondent’s judgments, even with the passage of only two or three weeks’ time. 
We would suppose that any gaps in citizens’ recollection tend to be filled by their 
prior attitudes toward the police, to either the benefit or the detriment of the 
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police, and that citizens who are intoxicated at the time of their encounter with 
police would be all the more susceptible to such bias.
SUMMARY
Extant empirical evidence leaves as an open question the degree to which offi-
cers’ behavior in police-citizen encounters affects citizens’ subjective experience; 
instead, such hypotheses are typically treated as assumptions, because research has 
relied exclusively on survey data on the citizens. We subjected these hypotheses to 
empirical testing here. We found that officers’ procedural (in)justice has effects on 
citizens’ judgments about procedural justice, though the effects are fairly modest 
in magnitude and they are asymmetrical: procedural injustice has substantially 
greater negative effects on citizens’ judgments than procedural justice has positive 
effects. The procedural justice with which officers act accounts for a rather small 
fraction of the variation in subjective procedural justice. Furthermore, officers’ 
procedural justice has very small effects on citizens’ judgments about outcomes, 
and they are mediated by subjective procedural justice. Similarly, officers’ proce-
dural justice has little direct effect on citizen satisfaction.
These findings are quite compatible with the findings of previous research con-
cerning the effects of citizens’ prior attitudes on subjective experience; moreover, 
the effects of officers’ procedural justice on subjective experience do not appear to 
be mediated to a large degree by citizens’ behavior, in the form of resistance or dis-
respect, suggesting that previous findings about the effects of prior attitudes stem 
from citizens’ selective perception and not from citizens’ behavior toward police.
This is not to say that officers’ behavior has no effect on subjective experience. 
The use of police authority has a bearing on subjective experience, independent of 
the procedural justice with which authority is exercised. Searches especially have 
a strongly negative effect on subjective experience, which is by and large neutral-
ized when citizens consent to a search, and the use of physical force also appears 
to influence citizens’ subjective experience.
The asymmetrical effects of procedural (in)justice do not spring from a negativ-
ity bias, however. To the contrary, it appears that citizens are rather generous to 
police in their judgments about procedural justice, relative to the more concrete 
accounts of officers’ actions by trained, independent observers. Insofar as citizens 
tend to overstate the procedural justice of their interactions with police when of-
ficers do not exhibit high levels of procedural justice, we do not find that subjective 
experience is responsive when police act with higher levels of procedural justice. 
Police can detract somewhat from the subjective experience of citizens through 
procedural injustice, but they do not add substantially to subjective experience 
through procedural justice.
149
As we observed in chapter 1, police systems of management accountability do not 
normally measure all of the outcomes that are important, and one of the outcomes 
that is omitted is the procedural justice with which police act in their encounters 
with citizens. We sought to rectify this omission, if only for a finite period of time, 
by administering the police services survey and summarizing results on a monthly 
basis at departmental Compstat meetings. With these survey-based figures, we 
supplemented the departments’ continuing attention to crime as an outcome. The 
survey measures each month served both as inputs to Compstat and as the previ-
ous month’s outcomes; we analyze change over time below.
We heard, albeit unsystematically at Compstat meetings, from mid-level man-
agers—captains in Syracuse and lieutenants in Schenectady—about the efforts 
that they made to manage these outcomes. But we also conducted two waves of 
semi-structured interviews with patrol officers and patrol supervisors about what 
their commanders were doing to manage these dimensions of police performance. 
We analyze their responses to understand the managerial efforts that were made 
to affect officers’ performance, which we discuss here, and also to understand their 
interpretations of the administrative priority—that is, the sense that they made of 
the push toward procedurally just policing, which we discuss in chapter 9.
MEASURING WHAT MAT TERS
The police services survey included numerous items on citizens’ subjective experi-
ences with police. We thought it better to present the counts of citizens’ respons-
es to specific questions—for example, whether police were polite— with which 
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respondents could agree or disagree, either strongly or somewhat, rather than a 
summary scale like the procedural justice index (introduced in chapter 4), on the 
assumption that the command staff would find concrete response categories for 
specific survey items more readily interpretable than artificial scores on a deriva-
tive indicator, and that specific items might offer them some clues about what 
officers were doing and not doing that could be better managed. But we did not 
want to overload the command staff with information, and so we looked for a way 
to economize in reporting survey results. Upon compiling a baseline of survey 
results (seven survey waves in Schenectady and ten in Syracuse), we analyzed citi-
zens’ satisfaction in terms of process-based factors to identify those that appeared 
to be particularly important in citizens’ overall subjective experience. From those 
analyses we distilled eight items that we thereupon treated as the measures around 
which future reporting would revolve:
• Satisfaction with treatment by police
• Satisfaction with how police handled the problem
• How helpful police were
• Whether police took care of the problem
• Whether police considered the citizen’s views
• Whether the police treated the citizen with dignity and respect
• Whether police made their decision based on facts
• Whether police respected the citizen’s rights
All but the fourth listed item above allowed for four categories of response, so that 
stronger or more intensely held views could be distinguished from less intensely 
held views; only whether the police took care of the problem was a binary yes/no 
item.
Performance Measures in Compstat
We introduced the project to the command staffs at Compstat meetings in 
September, 2011; the survey was under way at that time, but we did not report 
results then. On December 21, 2011, we appeared at the Schenectady Compstat 
meeting to present the summary of baseline survey findings, and to illustrate 
the survey items that we would be charting for them month-to-month. We sum-
marized a larger number of items at that time, in order to place the focal items 
in context and explain the rationale for making those items the recurring indi-
cators on which we would concentrate. We also broke survey results down by 
contact types—calls for service, stops, and arrests—and summarized the distri-
butions on several measures of legitimacy. Our corresponding appearance at the 
Syracuse Compstat meeting was on January 11, 2012.
Figures 9 and 10 below are excerpts from the PowerPoint presentations at 
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Compstat meetings; we also converted the PowerPoint slides to pdf documents 
and sent copies to our department liaisons. Each chart depicts the baseline levels 
of performance and subsequent monthly levels (labeled as survey waves).
We supplemented these routine reports with additional analyses at times. In or-
der to provide measures of outcomes for which platoon commanders might feel a 
greater sense of individual responsibility, we provided for quarterly breakdowns by 
individual platoons, as shown in figure 10. We also undertook additional analysis 
as command staff raised questions about the patterns, for example, in Schenectady, 
we summarized the measures by patrol zone and by (CAD-recorded) response 
time. Both departments’ command staffs expressed curiosity about how the results 
for their department compared to those for other cities, in response to which we 
shared with them the comparisons (to, e.g., Chicago) summarized in chapter 4.
Interim Reports
In addition, we prepared interim reports for each department. One report sum-
marized survey findings in more detail than we did in Compstat meetings, based 
on the first twenty waves of surveys. Much as we reported in chapters 3 and 4, we 
summarized findings on trust and subjective experience, and also provided break-
downs of subjective experience by contact type, call type, and patrol zone or beat. 
We also summarized a qualitative analysis of open-ended survey responses about 
the reasons for citizens’ dissatisfaction, as we reported in chapter 5.
A second report for each department was based on information gathered 
through interviews with patrol officers and supervisors. Detail on the interview 
methods is included below. The report focused on the views of the rank and file 
regarding the emphasis on customer service, how (if at all) expectations were be-
ing communicated down through the ranks, and potential sources of resistance 
to a customer-service orientation. In addition, we provided recommendations to 
address the barriers to efforts to manage these aspects of police performance.
MANAGING WHAT ’S  MEASURED
We anticipated a priori several reasons why measuring procedural justice perfor-
mance would not result in detectable improvements over time. First and perhaps 
most basically, both of the study departments exhibited high baseline levels of sub-
jective experience, leaving only so much room for improvement. The high baseline 
levels were received quite favorably by the command staffs, respectively, at the 
meetings at which the baseline results were reported. The Syracuse command staff, 
recognizing that 100 percent satisfaction was not an achievable goal, seemed satis-
fied that their officers were doing quite a good job of meeting citizens’ expectations 
and treating them properly. These high levels of subjective experience, citywide, 
are not unique to our study departments, of course, and even without reference 
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to our findings about the tenuous relationship between officers’ procedural jus-
tice and citizens’ subjective experience, they raise questions about how much the 
implementation of a procedural justice model could increase measurable subjec-
tive experience.
There are a number of other reasons to doubt that change would be observed 
once police managers were given measures of procedural justice performance, 
some of which are specific to this project. First, the measures based on the survey 
reflected the performance of the entire department and only occasionally that of 
individual platoons, which we would suppose had the effect of vitiating individual 
commanders’ sense of personal responsibility. It was only on a quarterly basis that 
we could summarize the performance of individual platoons, and quarterly mea-
sures of performance are probably not sufficiently frequent to motivate managers 
to attend to the outcomes in question (Behn 2008). Second, everyone on the de-
partments’ command staffs was aware that the project provided for surveys that 
would extend over only eighteen months, and so performance measurement was 
a fixed-term proposition. Neither city had the funds to continue such surveying 
indefinitely; indeed, we are aware of no city that does (or has done) such ongoing 
surveys with sufficient frequency that they are useful for management account-
ability. The fixed-term nature of the measures of procedural justice could be ex-
pected to compromise the investment of effort that managers would make with 
a view to this outcome. Third, and finally, we were given the task of reporting on 
the procedural justice performance measures each month, which may have made 
it seem like an academic interlude to the Compstat meeting, and not an outcome 
that the departments’ executive staffs embraced.
Yet another reason to be doubtful that change would be observed, and which is 
probably not confined to the study departments or this project, is that Compstat 
as executed did not stress accountability. As in Compstat mechanisms in other 
departments (Willis et al. 2007; Weisburd et al. 2003), platoon commanders and 
other unit heads did not succeed or fail by results, and we might suppose that as in 
other departments, Compstat was loosely coupled with street-level performance. 
We interviewed commanders in the study departments to learn more about cur-
rent expectations of those involved in Compstat. In both departments the percep-
tion of platoon commanders was that the assessment of police performance was 
nearly exclusively numbers-driven (e.g., number of tickets, number of drug buys, 
number of field contacts, number of arrests, number of crimes). They described 
expectations for their role as it relates to Compstat in terms of “being on top of the 
numbers,” “identifying patterns,” and being prepared to explain during the meet-
ing what they had done to address the patterns or numbers. While the introduc-
tion of feedback on citizens’ subjective experience with police represented an addi-
tional set of numbers, interviewees did not anticipate this would have implications 
for how they managed their subordinates or for their role in Compstat. Most went 
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on to explain that they already managed this aspect of police performance on an 
individual basis and they already knew the character and ability of their officers. 
Independently and systematically collected information (the survey) was seen as 
a potentially positive development insofar as it could reinforce or confirm what 
they already knew (akin to the purpose we see many in law enforcement attribute 
to crime mapping). Commanders correctly anticipated that feedback on officers’ 
performance would not alter expectations for their role in Compstat. In neither 
department was Compstat used to hold commanders accountable for achieving 
results in the ends of policing (crime reduction, disorder control, or improve-
ments in the quality of life), and it was not a mechanism for holding command-
ers accountable for improvements in outcomes measured through the survey. We 
seldom heard administrators ask unit commanders to explain what steps they had 
pursued to manage and promote procedurally just policing.
All of these obstacles to the management of street-level procedural justice ar-
guably pale by comparison to the larger structural obstacles in American police 
departments. As Michael Brown observes, “police administrators and supervisors 
are caught between demands for loyalty to the men on the street and demands 
from the public that police power be used in a specific way or even curtailed” 
(1981, 91). On the street, police work is performed in an environment marked by 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and danger, in the face of which officers cope by pulling 
together. Administrators must depend on officers to perform this arduous work 
satisfactorily, and as Brown points out, “the pressures for loyalty and solidarity 
are refracted throughout the police bureaucracy” (90), with norms that prohibit 
second-guessing and micromanagement.
The implementation of community policing in Chicago hit a cultural “wall” 
whose foundation is set on these structural conditions. Wesley Skogan (2006, 81) 
describes the reluctance of police officers to perform tasks that are seen as not “real 
police work,” and also their “aversion to civilians playing any role in telling them 
what to do or evaluating their performance.” Officers do not believe that anyone 
who has not done police work can understand it, and they tend to dismiss police 
administrators who introduce change as “out of touch” with the street (also see 
Skogan 2008).
The intrinsic demands of the work on the street and of cultural norms probably 
account for the limited success of training that is geared toward shaping how of-
ficers relate to police clientele. In her study of the effects of a recruit training cur-
riculum into which the concepts and skills of community and problem-oriented 
policing had been integrated, Robin Haarr (2001) found positive changes in re-
cruits’ attitudes, which subsequently dissipated as the new officers went into the 
field and were exposed to the work and to cultural norms. More to the point of 
the procedural justice model, the Quality Interaction Training Program of the 
Chicago police had limited and mixed effects in the context of the academy (Schuck 
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and Rosenbaum 2011; Rosenbaum and Lawrence n.d.), and modest effects in its 
in-service form (Skogan et al. 2014); we might expect that even these effects would 
decay over time without consistent reinforcement. Many departments have offered 
training in “verbal judo,” and although we are aware of no empirical evaluations 
of the impacts of such training, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not always 
well-received by officers. The content of training along these lines—“quality inter-
action” or “verbal judo”—is for many officers not compatible with the multiple and 
conflicting demands of the work as they experience it.1
Managerial options are, then, limited. Platoon and other unit commanders 
could exhort their officers, directly and indirectly through first-line supervisors, 
to be more mindful of the utility and propriety of interacting with citizens with 
procedural justice. They could explain the benefits in the form of citizen compli-
ance with police direction and citizen cooperation, as well as the standing of the 
department with the community. Armed with information on citizens’ subjective 
experience, they could reinforce the exhortation with measures of police perfor-
mance. Ultimately, however, the efficacy of such exhortation turns on the sense 
that supervisors and officers make of commanders’ expectations.
Commanders and supervisors could engage in greater direct oversight of offi-
cers’ interactions with citizens. This takes time, of course, and moreover, it carries 
other risks. Violating the norm of not second-guessing the judgments of the officer 
who is handling a situation, direct oversight risks antagonizing officers and under-
mining the routine, day-to-day cooperation of subordinates in performing basic 
police tasks. Schenectady supervisors are expected to routinely complete a Service 
Quality Control Report (SQCR) as a means of exercising oversight over the qual-
ity of interactions between officers and citizens. This practice did not appear to be 
resisted by supervisors or to be objectionable to officers. We suspect this could be 
because sergeants did not appear to use them as a means to prove that an officer 
had done something wrong or to show them how they might do something better 
(which would violate the norm of not second-guessing officers’ judgments), and 
the occasions on which officers were the subject of a report were few (policy calls 
for four SQCRs per sergeant, per month).
Administrators have some additional options. In-service training could be of-
fered. Indeed, Schenectady planned to make procedural justice the subject of in-
service training in the fall of 2012, but those tentative plans were derailed when the 
assistant chief of the Field Services Bureau sustained an injury and was out of work 
for some time. Syracuse contemplated a podcast by the chief to be played at roll 
calls. As we recounted above, however, the content of training and exhortation is 
filtered through officers’ understanding of the requirements of their work.
Still other administrative options for managing street-level procedural justice 
are administrative rule-making and early intervention systems. Rules could be 
promulgated—for example, rules that require officers to explain to those whom 
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they stop the reason(s) for the stops, and to give citizens an opportunity to explain 
themselves. As we explained in chapter 2, however, the capacity of police adminis-
trators to enforce such rules is directly proportional to the visibility of the conduct 
to which the rules apply, and the procedural justice of officers’ actions is of decid-
edly low visibility. Early intervention systems could be structured to flag repeated 
citizen complaints about discourtesy and other forms of procedural injustice, but 
citizen complaints are of dubious validity as indicators of procedural injustice, and 
early intervention takes the forms of either training or counseling, whose impacts 
on officers’ performance depend on the sense that officers make of the content.
Patrol Interviews
We conducted interviews with patrol sergeants and patrol officers in order to as-
sess the views of the rank and file regarding the emphasis on customer service, 
how (if at all) administrative expectations were reverberating down through the 
ranks, and any sources of resistance to a customer-service orientation. In our con-
versations with uniformed personnel, we did not use the term “procedural justice,” 
which would likely not have been recognized by or meaningful to them. Instead, 
we framed “customer service” and “citizen satisfaction” with police performance 
as the topic of the interviews. In retrospect, the term “customer” may have set a 
less neutral tone for the interviews than, say, “citizens’ assessment of the quality 
of police service” or “the quality of police citizen interactions” might have done. 
However, we and the command staff used the term “customer service” from the 
outset of the project, and so the use of that term during the interviews was consis-
tent with prior practice.
Two waves of interviews were conducted in each department, the first in June 
2012, after five to six months of survey feedback to command staff, and the sec-
ond in February 2014, well after the final feedback. We asked sergeants what, if 
anything, they and their platoon or unit commander had done to direct officers’ 
attention to the importance of customer service. In addition, we asked patrol of-
ficers what, if anything, their field supervisors had done to direct attention to the 
importance of customer service. The structured interview protocol also assessed 
perceptions of the extent to which customer service is an organizational prior-
ity, how officers’ performance in terms of customer service was measured, aware-
ness of the ongoing surveying of citizens, and the extent to which respondents 
felt citizen input was an appropriate means to monitor police performance. We 
conducted a total of eighty-seven interviews with patrol sergeants and patrol of-
ficers in the study departments: fourteen and eleven sergeants in Syracuse and 
Schenectady, respectively; thirty-one patrol officers in each department. We did 
not detect meaningful differences in the nature of the responses between waves 1 
and 2. The wave 2 instruments paralleled wave 1, with the exception of a question 
to determine whether the respondent had been interviewed during the earlier 
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wave (seven respondents indicated they were interviewed two times and two were 
uncertain). For the most part we did not detect a difference in managerial styles 
between the two departments, so we combine responses, and highlight the excep-
tions to this rule of interdepartmental congruence.
THE MANAGEMENT C ONTINUUM
The presumption guiding our work was that police legitimacy can be enhanced 
when measures of relevant performance are made available to managers. Of 
course, simply making the information available is insufficient; managers must 
believe they are accountable for managing performance and must take steps to 
communicate the chiefs’ expectations and their own expectations to their subor-
dinates. We identified three patterns that formed a management continuum. Su-
pervisors who did nothing fell at one end of the spectrum, and those who seemed 
to routinely address the importance of customer service at the other; supervisors 
whose approach was best characterized as intermittently directing attention to 
customer service fell in the middle. See figure 11.
Supervisors’ Responses
In both departments, very few respondents stated that either they or their com-
mander were not communicating expectations about the importance of proce-
dural justice as an outcome for which their subordinates were responsible. The 
few individuals who did not direct attention to customer service either ignored 
the departments’ push to stress procedurally just policing or more actively spoke 
against it. For example, when asked what if anything they had told their subordi-
nates about the importance of customer service, we heard responses such as: “I tell 
them officer safety is the goal, not customer service”; “It is kind of difficult. I can’t 
go to every call and hold their hand.”
Supervisors whose efforts were intermittent reported mentioning that patrol 
should do its best to “be respectful” or “watch your tone” when handling calls, or 
“try” to emphasize customer service “when possible.” “It’s hard to tell adults [patrol 
officers] what to do. But I say things like don’t swear and treat people with respect. 
Even if you think it is ridiculous you need to listen and don’t curse.” Their efforts 
generally reflected a commonsense approach, because their own expectations were 
very straightforward. Most of them presumed that reinforcing these statements at 
roll call every so often was sufficient, with only a subset going on to hold officers 
accountable by reviewing the feedback we provided each month or observing of-
ficers on calls and using concrete examples to reinforce their directives.
Most respondents reported making a regular effort to direct attention to the 
importance of customer service. Generally, this included sharing the information 
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customer service during line-up or roll call. In Schenectady, the importance of 
regularly completing Service Quality Control Reports (SQCR) was emphasized 
as a means to routinely direct attention to customer service. Among those who 
routinely stressed the importance of customer service at line-up or roll call, three 
basic messages were delivered. One was the message that customer service was 
important to command staff, so, like it or not, patrol needed to go along with it. 
While the supervisor did not personally support the emphasis—and made that 
clear—s/he was still going to monitor subordinates’ performance in these terms 
because they recognized that their own performance turned on platoon-level 
measures of customer satisfaction. The second message communicated was that 
customer service was important, but without reference to why it was important. 
The final message delivered by managers was that customer service was a priority 
to command staff and to the field supervisor. In addition, these supervisors dif-
fered from others in that they seemed also to articulate to their subordinates why 
it was important:
“The better you are with customer service the less frustrated you will be on the street.”
“I tell them it isn’t a big change from what they do now. They just need to be clear 
with what they are doing, don’t use jargon, and explain why you are doing what you 
are doing. It makes people feel better, which makes your job easier.”
“I’ve spoken to officers saying talk to people don’t demand things. When you treat 
someone like an ass you’ll end up fighting with them.”
For the most part, the message communicated to officers by supervisors who regu-
larly drew attention to the importance of customer service mirrored that of those 
who only intermittently addressed this dimension of police performance. Most 
managers explained that it is part of a supervisor’s job to monitor officer behavior, 
so they routinely reminded their officers to “be courteous” or “explain what’s hap-
pening.” “Treat those you treat as if they were family.” You “treat them like your 
mom should be treated.” Supervisors who connected positive interactions with 
citizens and improved outcomes for officers were in the minority.
We detected one meaningful difference between the two sites in what supervi-
sors emphasized when discussing customer service. Managers in Syracuse were 
more likely than Schenectady supervisors were to frame their discussion of cus-
tomer service in terms of monitoring, responding to, and directing subordinates to 
avoid citizen complaints. This emphasis was also apparent in officers’ descriptions 
of steps supervisors had taken to manage this dimension of police performance.
Among those who framed supervisory efforts to enhance customer service in 
terms of citizen complaints, supervisors either did so privately on an individual 
basis or they addressed the individual officer and also drew lessons from the inci-
dent-level to bring to the platoon. Some supervisors did express their view that cit-
izens should be treated with dignity and respect, and that when they were not, the 
result would be a justified complaint. We contrast supervisors who acknowledged 
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the appropriateness of citizens expecting quality treatment with those supervisors 
who did not focus on what citizens should rightfully expect. These supervisors 
focused on officers and managers and the value to them in avoiding the attention 
brought on by complaints.
The responses below characterize the responses of supervisors who focused on 
citizen complaints as the avenue for enhancing the quality of police interactions. 
When asked what, if anything, they had done to communicate their expectations 
of how subordinates should treat citizens to subordinates, we heard the following:
“If people get complaints, we handle them and do what we should. We don’t want 
young guys treating people poorly. We hold them accountable.”
“Even if the complaint is unfounded, follow up with officers on how they could 
have handled it better so there would not have been a complaint. A lot of complaints 
are that the officer was rude, etc., not polite.”
“Nothing per se. We have a system in place where at the sergeant-level, if a citizen 
has a complaint with an officer we address it.”
“We make sure individual complaints are taken care of.”
“When we have issues that we hear or see we’ll bring them up at roll call and 
explain the issues related to the complaints.”
“Handle complaints if we get them . . . don’t want anybody looking at the platoon 
poorly, so will get angry sometimes.”
While the content of (valid) citizen complaints overlaps somewhat with procedur-
ally unjust policing, complaints represent only the tip of the proverbial customer 
disservice iceberg, and moreover, high-quality police service in the form of proce-
durally just performance is not equivalent to action that provides no grounds for 
complaint. In the typical U.S. city, complaints are filed in a small fraction of the in-
cidents in which citizens believe that police have acted improperly, and even when 
valid complaints are filed and thoroughly investigated, evidentiary constraints of-
ten forestall administrative action in individual cases. Furthermore, and perhaps 
more important, procedurally just policing is more than taking no actions that are 
complaint-worthy. We return to this below.
Patrol Officers’ Responses
We also asked patrol officers what, if anything, their field supervisors did to direct 
their attention to the importance of customer service. Their responses corrobo-
rated supervisors’ descriptions. Patrol responses supported the three management 
styles described above and shown in figure 11. Managers whom we describe as tak-
ing no steps to direct attention to customer service were described by their subor-
dinates as doing “nothing” or “nothing really.” Intermittent efforts were described 
by officers in the following ways:
“I’ve heard them say watch your attitudes with people. No swearing. Do what you 
have to, but don’t lose your cool right away.”
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“Mention it occasionally. Just mention it to us on heated calls. Not all people are 
super nice all the time, and cops are people.”
“He touches on it once in a while. He tells us not to yell and swear if you don’t 
have to.”
“Been times at line up, reminders to be courteous and watch language.”
“Once in a while they might bring it up. No lecture every day.”
“Every now and again they reinstate [sic] the fact they want us to figure out the 
call and ‘leave everyone happy.’ ”
Officers whose descriptions of field supervisors’ management style suggested rou-
tine efforts to direct attention to customer service made comments such as:
“Roll call training and [the supervisor] brings it up in general conversation to remain 
professional, regardless of other person’s demeanor.”
“Reminds us of how important it is to be courteous to people. Reminds us to act 
appropriately.”
“Supervisors regularly go over calls, review calls. They show up on-site and af-
terwards they give us feedback. They are making sure we are being professional and 
getting back to people.”
“We are made aware of the surveys. Supervisors regularly show up on calls and 
give us regular reviews.”
“They tell us: ‘We have an image to uphold, remember to follow the policy, and 
don’t use excessive force. Remember, you are always being watched.’ They [supervi-
sors] are always reminding us. They do a good job of reminding us.”
Again, in Syracuse in particular, monitoring performance in terms of customer 
service was perceived by many officers as a primarily reactive, initiated by man-
agement only in response to a civilian complaint. In officers’ own words, it was:
“More reactive than proactive. But that is the nature of the beast.”
“Always stress not to get civilian complaints.”
“Address when there is a complaint and what you can do better.”
“Hands-off attitude unless there is a complaint.”
“Only when there is a complaint.”
“I don’t know. If there is a complaint they address it and explain how to properly 
handle the call if they don’t like what they did.”
In our observations and interviews, we did not sense strong efforts to actively under-
mine the administration’s desire to inculcate a customer-service orientation within 
the departments. To be sure, some managers felt that the customer-service emphasis 
was inappropriate, and these individuals tended to frame the administration’s empha-
sis as reflecting a deliberate choice to prioritize citizens’ needs over officers’.
IMPACT OF MEASURING PERFORMANCE
Schenectady command staff first saw a report of the survey-based perfor-
mance measures at the Compstat meeting of December 21, 2011. If we think 
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of the initiation of procedural justice performance measurement as an inter-
vention or treatment, then the first post-intervention contacts in Schenectady 
would have been in the latter half of December or perhaps the first half of 
January (survey wave 11 or 12). Since the corresponding meeting in Syracuse 
was on January 11, 2012, the first post-intervention contacts in Syracuse would 
have been in the latter half of January (wave 13).
Subjective Experience
Given the fairly weak connections between officers’ procedural justice and citi-
zens’ subjective experience, we would expect little or no detectable change in the 
procedural justice index, based on the police services survey data, over time. We 
would therefore expect that even very effective efforts on the parts of platoon com-
manders and others would be manifested in only small and perhaps undetectable 
changes at the margins in citizens’ subjective experience. The survey items each 
provide for a rough calibration of citizens’ perceptions, with arguably greater dif-
ferentiation when they are combined, but even so, the procedural justice index is 
limited in the differences that it can capture. Moreover, a sample size of fifty per 
wave or even a hundred per month limits our capacity to distinguish real (but 
small) change from sampling error.
Analyzed as monthly means over time, the procedural justice index fluctuated 
between 6 and 10, with few exceptions. The post-intervention mean was somewhat 
higher than the pre-intervention mean in Schenectady, though that reflected one 
spike that began prior to the intervention and another toward the end of survey-
ing, and somewhat lower in Syracuse.
A simple comparison of pre- and post-intervention means takes no account of 
other factors that affect subjective experience, and whose effects would not neces-
sarily even out over time. Using the same preliminary model of subjective expe-
rience that we presented in chapter 4, therefore, we estimated the difference in 
subjective experiences that followed the initiation of measuring performance in 
the context of a regression model. We add a linear trend variable and a nonlinear 
trend variable to the models to account for temporal variation other than that at-
tributable to the initiation of measurement.
The regression results (details of which can be found in Worden and McLean 
2016) by and large replicate what appeared as month-to-month fluctuation. Sche-
nectady exhibits a modest (but statistically insignificant) increase in overall sub-
jective experience in the post-intervention period, while a negligible difference 
can be seen in Syracuse. Across all three platoons together in each department, 
no improvement over time can be detected. Allowing the pre-/post-intervention 
difference to vary across the three platoons, there is some evidence that different 
platoons followed different trajectories, but only in one case (that of Syracuse’s 
platoon 3) is the difference large enough to be statistically significant. The addition 
of the controls for the characteristics of individual incidents provides a similarly 
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mixed set of estimated changes over time, none of which is statistically significant. 
Estimated changes in Syracuse are not all in the same direction, though none of 
them can be reliably differentiated from zero.
Observed Police Behavior
Observational measures of officers’ procedural justice and injustice much more 
directly tap the outcomes that we might expect police managers could affect. 
The timing of the observations, which were done after the survey, meant that the 
measures based on observational data could not be incorporated into Compstat 
reporting of procedural justice performance measures. But insofar as manage-
rial efforts were made to improve these outcomes, we might expect to find evi-
dence of it in the observation-based measures of officers’ procedural justice and 
injustice. The pre-intervention levels of procedural justice fluctuated between 
6.4 and 7.5, with an overall mean of 7.0, while the post-intervention means fluc-
tuate between 6.2 and 7.7, with an overall mean of 7.0. Procedural injustice varies 
between 0.3 and 1.3, with pre- and post-intervention means of slightly over or 
under 0.7.
When we take into account any possible trends over time and the other factors 
that we included in the models of procedural justice and injustice in chapter 7, 
we find only one meaningful difference in the post-intervention period on either 
measure: procedural justice improved on platoon 3 subsequent to the introduction 
of measuring citizens’ subjective experience. No reliable difference can be detected 
on the other platoons or in the measure of procedural injustice. See Worden and 
McLean 2016.
From the interviews with patrol officers and supervisors on Schenectady’s 
platoon 3, we gather that routine efforts were made to direct attention to the 
importance of procedurally just policing. Sergeants indicated that the platoon 
commander generally followed up with them to share the survey results after 
the monthly Compstat meeting. Following that, either they or the lieutenant 
would share this information at line-ups following the Compstat meeting, in ad-
dition to routinely issuing general reminders to officers to be mindful of the way 
they interacted with citizens. Officers’ descriptions of their supervisors’ efforts 
to manage police performance in these terms corroborated this management 
style. Some supervisors on the other platoons described themselves, and were 
described by their subordinates, as taking some of the same steps, but we did not 
detect as much platoon-level consistency in the management approach. And that 
is an important point: it would probably not be sufficient for the platoon com-
mander to draw subordinates’ attention to the virtues of procedural justice (or 
“customer service”); all or most of the first-line supervisors would also need to 
be on board, and it appears that in the case of Schenectady’s platoon 3, they may 
have been on board.
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SUMMARY
Measuring procedural justice performance did not generally result in detect-
able improvements over time. Despite the fact that the administration’s push to 
make departments more customer-service-oriented was a top-down initiative, 
developed without input from rank and file, and included civilians in defining 
the latter’s performance—two conditions often associated with thwarted efforts to 
promote change—we did not sense that overt resistance played a meaningful role 
in limiting improvements over time. Several factors may explain why broad im-
provements in performance were not detectable, none of which we presume to be 
confined to the study departments. First and most simply, both the study depart-
ments began with high baseline levels of subjective experience, leaving little room 
for improvement. Furthermore, monthly measures of police performance were 
injected into Compstat mechanisms that, as in other police departments, do not 
heavily emphasize accountability. And of utmost importance, even had managers 
directed more attention to this aspect of police performance than they previously 
had, our data suggest that what officers do and do not do is only weakly related 
to subjective experience. In the case of one of Schenectady’s platoons, however, 
whose commander and supervisors all gave the quality of police-citizen interac-
tions regular attention and also drew connections to valued outcomes, officers’ 
procedural justice improved at the margin.
In addition, and despite our efforts to explain concepts, the idea of procedurally 
just policing was ambiguous for many officers and supervisors, and their efforts 
to make sense of the concept and the implications it represented for their daily 
work may have colored both the extent to which managers embraced more ac-
tively managing this aspect of police performance and the extent to which officers 
altered their behavior in meaningful ways. To this we turn in chapter 9.
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We sought to understand whether, how, and with what consequences police man-
agers would make use of information about the quality of officers’ performance in 
managing their subordinates. To do so, we conducted semi-structured interviews 
with patrol officers and patrol supervisors that tapped their views with respect to 
the emphasis on customer service. The methodology is described in chapter 8. We 
analyzed their responses to understand their interpretations of the administrative 
priority, that is, the sense that they made of the push toward procedurally just polic-
ing. We begin with a discussion of sensemaking as an organizational phenomenon, 
and then turn to the qualitative data to extend the discussion to Syracuse and Sche-
nectady in order to understand and interpret the complex reality behind efforts to 
translate into practice the top-down mandate of procedurally just policing.
SENSEMAKING AND STREET-LEVEL RECEPTIVIT Y
Police departments adopt new practices or programs such as community polic-
ing, Compstat, or democratic policing to meet instrumental goals. However, we 
know that the path from reform to implementation is far from straight. It is well 
documented in the policing literature that efforts to bring about change in polic-
ing often fall short of expectations (Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Skogan 2008). 
Often, the “technical core”—in policing, the street-level work of patrol officers or 
detectives—is, in effect, buffered from the structures with which the work is not 
compatible. “[D]ecoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legiti-
mating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical con-
siderations,” (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 357; also see Orton and Weick 1990).
9
Procedural Justice and Street-Level 
Sensemaking
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Organizations are “inhabited” by people, as one body of literature on institu-
tional theory reminds us, and those people translate structural demands into prac-
tice. Police officers are particularly resistant to initiatives that involve civilians in 
defining their work or evaluating their performance (Skogan 2008). Furthermore, 
initiatives and new programs are less likely to be adopted when department lead-
ers neglect to solicit officers’ views about major issues of policy and practice and 
are not transparent. Officer cynicism is also a key element that drives employee re-
sistance to change, seriously thwarting innovation in policing (Wykoff and Skogan 
1994; Lurigio and Skogan 1994). Another force that shapes employees’ willingness 
to be responsive to directives is the extent to which they are committed to the 
organization and internalize its values. As Beth Bechky observes, “It is clear that 
the most direct line into practice and meaning is the people doing the work and 
interpretation” (2015, 1163).
Uncertainty characterizes police life. Situations officers are tasked with han-
dling are dynamic and ill-defined, direct supervision is uncommon, and the exer-
cise of discretion is the norm. Organizational rules and regulations are developed 
to decrease the uncertainty that is characteristic of policing (Manning 1989). 
But organization theory tells us that people do not simply implement policies. 
Rather, they respond to the situations they face and their interpretations of these 
situations (Blumer 1969). Moreover, many policies and reforms (e.g., community 
policing, democratic policing, procedurally just policing) are replete with ambi-
guity leaving the members of police organizations to “interpret, label, enact, or 
otherwise make sense of innovations and reforms in their environment (Maguire 
and Katz 2006, 506). In an uncertain organizational environment, actors have the 
leeway to form their own interpretations as they seek to impose order and routines 
in order to carry out their duties. Karl Weick (1995) describes this as a process of 
“sensemaking”— making sense of or “structuring the unknown” (Waterman 1990, 4). 
When a reform is introduced, organizations and actors within must first define 
what they understand the reform to mean at a broad level and also for their every-
day work life. How an organization’s leadership sets the stage for reform and com-
municates expectations downstream (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991), and the extent 
to which employees are able to understand the nature and purpose of the change 
(Lurgio and Skogan 1994; Amburgey et al. 1993) influence the extent to which re-
forms are adopted.
Employee support or resistance to reform efforts turns, in part, on the mean-
ing actors attribute to the change (George and Jones 2001; Bartunek et al. 2006), 
particularly to the implications of change for improving or reducing the quality of 
their work life (Bartunek and Moch 1987). Where there is ambiguity, people inter-
pret and insert their own understanding in order to translate policy into practice. 
Wesley Skogan describes the impact ambiguity can have on change efforts in this 
way: “Sergeants interpret the operational meaning of official policies at the street 
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level, so when roles and rules are up for grabs, they have to have a clear vision they 
can support if change is really going to occur there” (2008, 25).
Thus, we found it productive to apply two concepts from organization theory—
sensemaking and loose coupling1—to frame our understanding and discussion of 
the extent to which a quality management strategy was enacted in the study police 
departments. Weick introduced the concept of loose coupling in the 1970s. His 
examination of educational systems led him to posit that organizations cannot be 
understood in terms of their formal structure, goals, and functions. The different 
components of an organization are typically not tightly connected, creating un-
certainty in the organizational environment and the need for adaptations. Weick 
(1976) notes several features of a loosely coupled system, including several means 
to reach the same end, lack of coordination, and limited regulation. We turn now 
to the feedback gathered through interviews with patrol officers and frontline 
police supervisors.
Frontline Sensemaking
From our interviews with patrol officers and supervisors in Syracuse and Sche-
nectady, it appears that uniformed personnel strongly resisted neither adminis-
tration’s efforts to make police more customer-service oriented. However, even 
where managers and officers seemed willing to accept that customer service was 
an appropriate consideration in assessing police performance, there was some 
slippage in taking the measures of performance that we provided and actively 
managing them. The interviews we conducted with field supervisors and officers 
are useful in unpacking the thought processes around deciding what customer 
service meant for them, how it might impact their daily routine, and whether this 
implied a positive or negative change to their daily work. We would suppose that 
the conclusions to which officers came influenced decisions about how to act on 
management directives and, similarly, the conclusions to which frontline supervi-
sors came would influence their reactions to upper management and also whether 
and how they assessed subordinates’ performance in terms of the quality of their 
interactions.
The interpretive process of sensemaking is influenced by the setting of expecta-
tions. In our examination, it began when command staff conveyed their expec-
tations to mid-level managers. The latter in turn then conveyed both their own 
expectations and their understanding of command staff expectations to their sub-
ordinate officers. Dennis Gioia and Kumar Chittipeddi use the term “sensegiving” 
to describe such efforts “to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction 
of others” (1991, 442).
Field supervisors and officers in our study used similar logic in assessing or 
making sense of the appropriateness of emphasizing the quality of police-citizen 
interactions.
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We turn now to a discussion of the factors involved in the interpretive process 
and that influenced resistance to or acceptance of the change. The two different 
ranks viewed the appropriateness of assessing police performance using nontradi-
tional metrics, and made sense of “customer service” and “procedural justice,” in 
similar ways. We detected little change in views between the two waves of interviews 
or across the two departments, so we combine interview responses from the two 
different time periods and departments, and note exceptions to these more general 
rules. We turn first to patrol officers’ responses to a series of questions designed to 
understand how they interpreted and judged the administrations’ efforts to assess 
their performance in terms of the quality of their interactions with the public.
Patrol Officers
Officers had mixed feelings about the appropriateness of the departments’ empha-
sis on the importance of customer service: a number felt it was appropriate; others 
held that it was “appropriate but with a caveat”; and a third group believed the 
focus was not appropriate. These judgments shaped the extent to which officers 
resisted or accepted the departments’ decision to measure and direct attention to 
the quality of the service they provide. They form a continuum of resistance, as 
shown in figure 12 below.
As respondents talked to us about the emphasis on the quality of their interac-
tions with citizens, the starting point for many centered on the idea of conceiving 
of citizens in police encounters as customers or clients. Officers shared with us a 
range of reactions to the idea that a customer-service orientation should be ap-
plied to police work, and also to the appropriateness of making service quality the 
partial basis for assessing their performance. At one end of the continuum were 
those who expressed the view that their department’s emphasis on service quality 
was appropriate. These officers did not find it troubling to think of the citizens 
with whom they interacted as consumers of a service the police provide. To them, 
the nature of the service police provide was compatible with a customer-service 
orientation, so the departments’ emphasis was appropriate:
“We are there for the people and community. It would be unfair if we weren’t treating 
people fairly or appropriately in accordance with the law.”
“It [service quality] is very important. That is who we work for.”
“Yeah, I think it is fair that they place an importance on it [service quality]. It’s a 
service business.”
“Yes, absolutely. . . . If I called the police what would I expect from them. Regard-
less of station in life, treat everyone the same.”
“Part of my performance is to help people. Even when I’m arresting people I say 
to them, ‘Is there anything I can do to help you when you get out?’  .  .  . There are 
certain things I have to do, but if you explain that to them then sometimes they’ll say, 
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“We deal with everyone. All the victims and people with their cat in a tree, but 
you need to treat them all the same. Just because it is not an emergency to us, if they 
are calling us, it is to them.”
Another set of officers expressed the same view that administrations’ focus on cus-
tomer service was appropriate but offered caveats. These officers are represented in 
the middle of the resistance continuum. Typically the caveat offered centered on 
the notion of citizens in police encounters being conceived of as customers and/
or lumping citizens into a single group. Officers talked about the importance of 
administrators and supervisors not losing sight of either the “types” of people with 
whom police interact or the nature of the situations. These officers were accepting 
of the decision to measure their performance in terms of the quality of their in-
teractions as long as supervisors understood it wasn’t reasonable to expect “high-
quality” service with all people or all situations. A theme that comes through here 
is the “we/they” mentality described as part of the police culture (Kaeppeler et al. 
1998; Skolnick 1966):
“The emphasis is appropriate. You try to be as professional as you can, but at a point 
though you have to raise your voice. You try to be nice and polite, but some people 
don’t get that.”
“If you have decent people skills you won’t have a large amount of complaints. . . . 
But, some individuals just aren’t happy because they don’t get what they want even if 
what they want isn’t an option.”
“Not all people are worthy of high-level customer service.”
“Your action is dictated by their [citizens’] behavior.”
On the far right of the resistance continuum were those officers who strongly op-
posed assessing their performance in these terms. The reasons they shared were 
similar to those described by officers who fell in the middle of the continuum. 
The difference between the two groupings of officers was that these officers saw 
no situations or circumstances under which to accept administrators’ focus. Many 
believed that the concept of customer service was being inappropriately applied to 
policing. Disagreement was also rooted in the belief that the type of citizens with 
whom the police interact simply could not and would not ever be satisfied. These 
officers presumed that the nature or outcome of the encounter would be determi-
native of the citizen’s subjective experience:
“We don’t have customers so there is no customer service. It shouldn’t apply. We 
aren’t providers. The people we talk to don’t want something. We [the police] need 
something. Who do we deal with? They don’t call for no reason on a good day.”
“I think the focus is overzealous. People call in complaints but some are not legiti-
mate. Useless. Normally we deal with people on their worst day. We handle the call 
however we do. If I pulled you out of your home, how would you like it?”
“Administration has it as a high priority. They want to . . . mend relationships as 
it has had a rocky road. Do I care? No. We aren’t there for a good reason. We just put 
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them in jail and ruined their life. People try to get out from under charges by saying 
things happened.”
“It think it is stressed too much. Everyone knows the level of people we deal 
with. Not a lot of pleasant people. It is hard to react with politeness when people are 
abrasive and cursing.”
“No because we are stuck between a rock and a hard place. People don’t like us 
to begin with.”
Another reason for the avowed skepticism and resistance to the emphasis on cus-
tomer service was that it was perceived to symbolize the relative importance of the 
police force and the community, respectively: some officers inferred that citizens’ 
concerns and citizen satisfaction were more important to the administration than 
in-house levels of satisfaction and morale. This group was also concerned that the 
departments’ priorities were out of balance, believing that concern with citizen 
satisfaction outweighed the emphasis on fighting crime and disorder, enforcing 
the law, meeting victims’ needs, and, of great concern, that it even outweighed 
concern for officer safety. The perceived failure of the administration to direct at-
tention in-house was seen as a stressor and as a contributing factor to low morale:
“Need to boost morale. Happy employees would boost what we do out there, and 
they would have better customer service in the end.”
“ It’s the public opinion department. Policy dictated by opinion. But we don’t deal 
with the best of people.”
“I am not looking for a pat on the back but just respect and not to be treated like 
a ‘kid.’ ”
“It is all about pleasing the people. Not about us. That is their [command staff ’s] 
main concern.”
“Focus so much on the public, they [the administration] forget about us. Patrol is 
underappreciated and always told to do more. The feedback to us is always negative. 
We do small things that administration doesn’t see. They rush to judgment without 
asking what happened. They just assume we’re wrong, and it’s very stressful to work 
in this type of environment.”
“It is too much. But I guess it is about PR. . . . There is too much non-police work. 
We are too soft.”
“We treat suspects as innocent until proven guilty, but the uniform guy is guilty 
until proven innocent. It’s how the department treats you.”
“Everyone here should be able to treat people with respect but not at the expense 
of officer safety. We could be right but management doesn’t see it that way. Officers 
should come first.”
“It should be . . . public safety, then my safety, then customer service. Not gonna 
[sic] compromise my safety for customer service.”
“I certainly see the value .  .  . but, priority shouldn’t be customer satisfaction. It 
should be a second priority. Safety of people and yourself is first.”
“In some respects they [administration] put the emphasis in the wrong place. 
They need to worry more about the true victims and less about the people that don’t 
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deserve it. We need more emphasis on true victims than the perceptions of a wife 
beater. Who cares what he thinks?”
Research tells us that the sensemaking and sensegiving processes are iterative 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). Indeed, we found support for our hypothesis that as 
experience accumulated and allowed supervisors and officers to assess the actual 
impact that managing the elements of procedural justice had on their day-to-day 
work, their early perceptions might change. We had only some of the same respon-
dents in the two waves of interviews, so we can only make cautious comparisons 
about the predominant themes that emerged in wave 1 interviews, compared to 
wave 2. The most meaningful difference we detected between the interviews con-
ducted at the outset of the project compared to those at the conclusion of the project 
was in the prevalence of officers who seemed outright resistant to their department’s 
emphasis on customer service and the appropriateness of assessing their own per-
formance in these terms. Concerns appeared to diminish over time. It would seem 
that uniform personnel were girded to offer some resistance, but that resistance 
may have diminished as officers realized that the heightened emphasis amounted to 
no meaningful change in their everyday work life. It was loosely coupled. Moreover, 
it seemed that with the passage of time, officers were more at ease with supervi-
sors’ ability to be fair—to treat them in a procedurally just manner—when mak-
ing decisions about the quality of the service officers delivered. In wave 2, some 
respondents who touched on the argument that you cannot expect all people to be 
“happy” went on to give command staff and supervisors credit for differentiating 
“real” complaints from “false” and giving officers the benefit of the doubt. Of course, 
the difference between waves might also simply be the result of interviewing differ-
ent people in each wave.
“Command staff understand who we are dealing with. Upset people that go to jail 
whether an officer has done them wrong or not. . . . They [command staff] accurately 
assess the situation and the citizen complaining.”
Frontline Supervisors
Frontline supervisors can play a key role in efforts to bring about organizational 
change. Therefore, as we did with officers, we explored sergeants’ views on the ap-
propriateness of viewing the quality of police service delivery through a customer-
service lens. Perhaps not surprisingly, since sergeants are only one step removed 
from officers, we found consistent themes when we compared officers and ser-
geants’ responses.
A handful of frontline supervisors expressed the view that a customer-service 
orientation “fit” when applied to police work and stated they were receptive to 
assessing performance in those terms. Many supervisors went further and iden-
tified pragmatic reasons to support the administration’s focus. This additional 
source of support was more common among sergeants compared to officers. 
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For examples: community support makes the job easier; it lowers the chances 
of getting a complaint filed against you or a subordinate; and it helps to build a 
supply of support from the community into which they may need to tap.
“Part of why we are here is to help the public, and if we treat them with the respect 
they are due, they are more apt to help us with future investigations.”
“If someone isn’t happy it is a headache for everyone. You are making work for the 
sergeant if the citizens don’t like you.”
“With an enlightened department, such as us, it starts in the academy. I see more 
kids being taught that this is how you do things, as opposed to a run-and-gun show. 
Your job is harder if the citizen isn’t satisfied. If you start out screaming and yelling, it 
is hard to go down. You can always escalate, but it is hard to go the other way.”
“Sure, bottom line here is service to the public. They are our employers. We are 
here to serve the public like any business. The fact that you can satisfy people is im-
portant. You need to maintain your role and enforce the law. Some won’t be happy 
about it, but that’s the way it is. Ten people at a call, and five are happy. I think that 
is a success.”
Just as some officers were guarded in their willingness to embrace fully the deci-
sion to assess police performance in terms of service quality so, too, were frontline 
supervisors. A group of frontline supervisors said that they would support their 
commanding officers’ directives to assess the quality of subordinates’ interactions 
with the public in these terms, so long as the administration understood that not 
all people or situations would allow for equal service quality, and, in addition, they 
would also need to take into account factors they judged to influence citizens’ per-
ceptions, but that were outside the control of the officer in the immediate situation 
(e.g., response time, policy/law, global views about police):
“Need to treat people how they deserve to be treated . . . can’t always be pleasant and 
respectful.”
“Customer service is low because of call volume. . . . You try to address people’s 
issues but they get lost because no one can get back to them.”
“Too much sometimes. A lot could be solved with manpower. They want to cut 
back money, but they want customer service, but officers are there on calls and have 
two or three more holding. People want and expect something, but the officers are 
overworked, and the people they deal with are belligerent half the time.”
“Yes, to an extent. You have to realize that people they [officers] interact with 
might not be happy with you.”
Frontline supervisors offered rationales for resisting an emphasis on procedural 
justice that were very similar to those expressed by officers on the far right of 
the resistance continuum. Supervisors here indicated that they believed the idea 
of conceiving of a citizen in a police encounter as a customer was inappropriate, 
which in turn colored their view of their department’s move to assess performance 
in terms of the quality of the police-citizen encounter. Others did not buy into this 
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proposition because they recognized that the citizens with whom their subordi-
nates interact bring to the encounter preconceived views about police that would 
color citizens’ judgments of the officer in the immediate encounter, yet might have 
little connection with what the officer actually did. As we heard with officers, some 
sergeants portrayed the administration’s decision to fold measures of citizen sat-
isfaction into assessments of police performance as one that prioritized the views 
of external customers over internal customers and would result in negative out-
comes:
“No. We are not in a customer-service business. We have a job to do. We are meeting 
with people when something is wrong so they aren’t happy anyway. . . . I think no one 
is happy with us anyway. . . . People don’t like the police. . . . I feel you would get bad 
ratings no matter how you do your job.”
“Customer service? We don’t charge for our service. I don’t understand the ques-
tion. This isn’t a fair question. . . . No one calls the police to say hello. We only see 
them at their worst. We are in an uphill battle. All the smiles and service doesn’t 
make people happy. . . . You can’t compare law enforcement to anything else. It is not 
a counter at the mall.”
“There is a fine line between customer service and having the edge to do the job 
correctly. We are more customer-service-based here than a PD [should be].”
“We aren’t going to make everyone happy. We aren’t doing our job if everyone is 
happy. We have to protect people’s safety.”
“Do they worry about the guys? They need to worry about the guys. Patrol takes a 
beating. . . . We need less emphasis on customer service. I shouldn’t be looking at my 
job saying I only have x more years to go. I love my job, but it has been a long x years.”
“They are very concerned with public views of the agency and don’t seem to 
worry about combatting crime . . . It is important, but the core mission should be to 
police. We need to solve and reduce crime.”
“I don’t think it is the most intelligent thing from a police or administration view. 
Don’t focus on customer service because then safety becomes less important. Focus 
on the end product, which is us [patrol]. Whether people are safe. The humans that 
work for you are just as important as people [citizens].”
Officers’ Perceptions of Supervisors Buy-In
We expected variation in the extent to which frontline supervisors agreed with 
the top-down directive to manage subordinates’ performance in terms of proce-
dural justice. And, indeed, that variation emerged in their descriptions of how 
they felt about the directive. This variation was further corroborated in themes 
that emerged in officers’ discussion about the extent to which they detected differ-
ences in the message conveyed by different sergeants regarding the importance of 
customer service. We turn now to a discussion of how officers perceived sergeants 
to differ in terms of buy-in to the customer-service-oriented approach adopted by 
the departments.
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Officers attributed some of the variation in the message supervisors delivered 
about the importance of customer service to individual supervisors’ orientations 
up or down the chain of command. Some were tapping into a perception that 
alignment with officers versus mid-level management, or “the streets” versus “the 
administration,” influenced supervisors’ perceptions:
“Half and half [buy-in]. Direct supervisors understand our way of thinking and they 
separate us from the administrative side.”
“Varies per shift. Some are in the back seat of the administration, so it’s impor-
tant, but as you get further from administration they don’t care as much.”
“They were in our shoes too, and they know it is tough. There is a lot of situational 
customer service.”
“It trickles all the way down. Sergeants see more of what we go through, so they 
are more sensitive than their higher-ups.”
“Different by old school policing versus new school policing. The old school still 
pushes that you do what you want to, what you know, and you are in charge. New 
school is that you listen more. You see this across supervisors.”
“Patrol supervisors are still on the road ‘obviously the shit rolls downhill. So they 
are in a hard position.’ They need to keep it as real as possible, ‘but the street is the 
street.’ ”
Others did not detect much variation across supervisors, nor did they expect that 
what supervisors really thought would matter. They presumed that if command 
staff ordered frontline supervisors to focus on this aspect of performance, the lat-
ter would fall in line, given the nature of police organizations.
SUMMARY
Our intention was to understand officers’ and frontline supervisors’ views on the 
appropriateness of their administration’s emphasis on procedurally just policing 
and assessing police performance in these terms. Our findings are consistent with 
the research that suggests that the fairness officers attribute to their organizational 
environment influences their own willingness to embrace service-oriented po-
licing (Myhill and Bradford 2012). Consideration of internal procedural justice 
emerged as a factor for officers. They expressed resistance to the external focus on 
fairness and satisfaction because they felt the administration failed to take account 
of internal satisfaction. Others believed the external orientation would come at 
an expense; it would detract, for example, from community safety, officer safety, 
and concern and care for victims. Our findings are consistent with research that 
has found connections between officers’ sense of “organizational justice”—that 
is, officers’ perceptions of the procedural justice with which their superiors treat 
them—and officers’ acceptance of and compliance with organizational rules and 
regulations (Tyler 2011; Skogan et al. 2014; Wolfe and Piquero 2011; Trinker et al. 
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2014). Employees who believe that they are treated in a procedurally just manner 
are more likely to identify with and support the organization and its values (Tyler 
and Blader 2003; Bradford and Quinton 2014). How strongly officers’ perceptions 
of organizational justice are rooted in the actual practices of their organizations is 
an open question, but since their perceptions are real in their consequences even 
if they are ill-founded, their perceptions are important.
Judgments made by uniformed personnel about the soundness of assessing 
police performance in terms of citizens’ subjective experiences also turned to a 
large degree on the nature of the citizens with whom officers interacted and the 
types of events that brought them together. For some, this did not preclude them 
from finding some value in measuring police performance in these terms, so long 
as managers and the highest levels of administration did not lose sight of “the 
streets.” For others, however, citizen satisfaction and customer service were viewed 
as ill-fitting in the law-enforcement context, given the police task and the nature 
of their “clientele.” It was clear from these comments that the underlying presump-
tion was that citizen satisfaction had to compete with other departmental priori-
ties. Most respondents indicated no awareness that research tells us that citizen 
satisfaction could assist in achieving goals of crime control, citizen cooperation, 
and citizen compliance—and thus officer safety.
The themes of this chapter reflect the sensemaking process. Both internal and 
external factors emerged as influential in either thwarting or supporting efforts 
to bring about change. We turn next to a review of the principal findings of our 
research and their implications.
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In this concluding chapter we first summarize the principal findings of our re-
search and the contributions to knowledge that the findings represent. We then 
consider the implications of the findings for: (1) understanding procedural justice 
and police legitimacy; (2) police efforts to promote public trust and confidence; (3) 
police reform more generally; and (4) future research on procedural justice.
WHAT WE FOUND
Our analysis of Schenectady rests on a broader foundation of data, including not 
only the survey data on citizens’ satisfaction and their judgments about the proce-
dural justice of the police in their contact, and the interviews with commanders, 
patrol supervisors, and patrol officers, but also the observations of police-citizen 
encounters and the direct comparison of subjective experience and officer behav-
ior. So we begin with what we take to be the principal findings from Schenectady, 
and then we consider the respects in which those findings are corroborated (or 
contradicted) by the findings from Syracuse.
In Schenectady, we observed moderate levels of procedural justice and low 
levels of procedural injustice in officers’ behavior. These findings are not directly 
comparable to those of Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski, and Moyal, who constructed 
a single measure of procedural justice/injustice, and whose research was conduct-
ed in a suburban jurisdiction that they describe as a “professional, well-trained po-
lice agency, with leaders committed to several of the currently popular progressive 
police reforms, such as community and problem-oriented policing” (2015, 865). 
Insofar as comparisons can be drawn, officers in both Schenectady and “Everdene” 
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exhibited procedural justice that varied across the procedural justice domains, and 
which was overall moderate. In Schenectady, we found low levels of procedural 
injustice.
We found that officers’ patterns of procedural justice and procedural injustice 
are shaped in important ways by elements of the situations in which officers be-
come involved and the behavior of citizens with whom officers interact. Proce-
dural justice was greater in incidents that involved violent crime or interpersonal 
conflict, greater when the citizen was black, lower when the citizen was a suspect 
or third party rather than a victim or complainant, and lower when the citizen 
resisted the officer’s authority. Procedural injustice was greater when the citizen 
was male, a suspect, intoxicated, resisted police authority, or disrespected police; 
injustice was lower when the citizen was black. As Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski, 
and Moyal did in Everdene, we can see room for improvement in the level of pro-
cedural justice in Schenectady, but such improvement might not be instrumental 
in improving either citizens’ subjective experience or, through that experience, 
public trust and police legitimacy.
Citizens’ subjective experiences are rather weakly related to the forms of officers’ 
overt behavior that comprise procedural justice. Officers’ procedural justice and 
injustice together explained no more than 12 percent of the variation in citizens’ 
subjective experience in Schenectady. Procedural injustice had the greater effect on 
subjective experience, by far, such that we found asymmetry in the effects of justice 
and injustice that parallel previous findings based only on survey data. However, 
the Schenectady data suggest that this asymmetry stems not from the relatively 
strong effects of negative experiences but rather from citizens’ tendency to overes-
timate the procedural justice with which police act in their encounters. The rela-
tionship between officers’ procedural justice and citizens’ subjective experience is 
weak partly because citizens tend to be fairly positive in their ratings of police per-
formance, even when the procedural justice that we observed was fairly low. This 
pattern probably reflects the impact of citizens’ more general attitudes toward the 
police on their perceptions of police actions in individual encounters with police.1
Citizens’ judgments about procedural justice are also affected by whether (if not 
so much how) officers exercise forms of police authority: conducting searches or 
using physical force. Searches of citizens have strong effects on their assessments 
of procedural justice, unless citizens accede to them, while the use of physical force 
(but not verbal force) has a substantively notable effect as well. We have treated 
these forms of behavior as distinct from procedural justice as such. We believe that 
this treatment is consistent with the best judgments in previous research (which 
displays no consensus on these matters) and with the procedural justice model, 
which correctly holds that tough enforcement can nevertheless be fair (Schulhofer 
et al. 2011). We did not make a distinction between legal and illegal searches, nor 
did we make a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable force, but extant 
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evidence suggests that citizens’ judgments about the propriety of police action 
turns on their perceptions of procedural justice and not on the legality of officers’ 
behavior, per se (Meares et al. 2012).
In this connection, we would note that unfavorable subjective experiences are 
more prevalent in police-initiated contacts but certainly not confined to those 
contacts. In fact, given the volume of citizen-initiated contacts through calls for 
service, in a fraction (about 15 percent) of which citizens judge procedural jus-
tice unfavorably, negative subjective experiences are more numerous, in absolute 
terms, in citizen-initiated contacts.
Neither indicator of police performance—a survey-based indicator or an ob-
servation-based indicator—revealed consistent changes that ensued from the sur-
vey-based measurement of performance. Overall, the month-to-month changes 
in measures of citizens’ subjective experience were by and large within a range 
of sampling fluctuation, and with no change that could be attributed to the in-
troduction of performance measures to monthly Compstat meetings. Given the 
weak connections between what officers do (and do not do) and what citizens later 
think about it, we might well see little or no change in survey-based measures of 
performance with good faith—even herculean—efforts by platoon commanders 
and field supervisors to manage their officers’ behavior in police-citizen encoun-
ters. But neither did we see consistent changes in the observation-based measures 
of officers’ procedural justice.
However, platoon commanders and especially first-line supervisors approached 
the management of this police outcome in different ways, which we characterized 
as forming a continuum. Some gave regular attention to the quality of police-
citizen interaction during line-ups, and in that context shared survey results that 
had been delivered at the monthly Compstat meeting. They explained both what 
procedural justice means and why it is important. On one platoon, this appeared 
to affect officers’ performance. On others, however, commanders and supervisors 
either attended to the issue only intermittently, alluding to what it means for of-
ficers’ conduct but not its rationale, or were skeptical or even dismissive of the 
importance of “customer service.”
This continuum reflects “sensemaking” by Schenectady’s sergeants—that is, 
interpretation of what customer service or procedural justice represents and the 
appropriate emphasis to be placed on the quality of police-citizen interactions in 
the context of the demands of street-level police work. Based on their interpreta-
tions, some were receptive to the administration’s emphasis on “customer service,” 
finding it quite appropriate, while others were more guarded in their willingness to 
embrace the idea, or flatly opposed to it. This same process of sensemaking played 
out among patrol officers.
In Syracuse, we found patterns very similar to those in Schenectady on ev-
ery score that we were able to measure. Citizens’ subjective experiences were of 
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a generally comparable nature, and they tended to bear the same relationships to 
other factors, including legitimacy, even though legitimacy was somewhat higher 
in Syracuse than in Schenectady. We also found similar patterns of variation in the 
management of procedural justice, and similarly mixed receptivity to a customer-
service emphasis among patrol officers and supervisors.
No one study can be definitive on any question of social cause-and-effect, and 
no pair of police departments can be taken as representative of American police 
organizations, so firm conclusions will await replication of this study, but we can 
address some issues concerning the generalizability of these findings. We would 
observe, first, that if mid-level managers and frontline supervisors in mid-sized 
departments like Schenectady and Syracuse exhibit diversity in their interpreta-
tions of and support for a procedural justice model, we can safely anticipate that in 
larger agencies, mid-level managers and frontline supervisors will also diverge in 
the extent to which they embrace and actively manage the procedural justice with 
which their subordinates act, even when this outcome is measured on a regular 
basis.
Second, insofar as the more complete story could be told about the Schenectady 
police, whose officers’ behavior we could observe through its video and audio re-
cordings, we should be cautious in generalizing in view of the department’s recent 
history and efforts to escape that history. The misbehavior of some Schenectady 
police officers was well publicized in local media, and a DOJ investigation sug-
gested that the department suffered not only from its inability to terminate some 
sworn miscreants but also from systemic administrative deficiencies; the city’s 
mayor openly considered disbanding the department. Be that as it may, scores on 
the trust index among Schenectady survey respondents were not very much dif-
ferent from those for the presumptively more typical Syracuse Police Department, 
and patterns of subjective experience were not much different across the two study 
departments.
Might the performance of Schenectady police have been elevated by the intro-
duction of in-car cameras? The adoption of in-car cameras could be expected to 
improve the department’s legitimacy, if only as a visible organizational reform and 
even if the operation of cameras was only loosely coupled with day-to-day police 
work. We cannot say whether and, if so, how much the introduction of cameras 
altered the routine performance of Schenectady police. Cameras were a matter of 
procedure that applied to all patrol units, day-in and day-out, and to which we 
believe (but cannot demonstrate) officers had become accustomed. In any case, 
we found only moderate levels of procedural justice and low levels of procedural 
injustice by officers as cameras rolled. Only their (infrequent) injustice had detect-
able effects on citizens’ subjective experience. We would not suppose that proce-
dural justice would be better managed in the absence of cameras, or that it would 
have greater effects on citizens’ subjective experiences. Whether procedural justice 
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could be better managed by making more extensive use of camera recordings is a 
question that we consider below.
An Institutional Perspective
Institutional theory is useful in understanding how the administrative emphasis 
on customer service in Schenectady and Syracuse was—and was not—translated 
into policing on the street, and more generally how the procedural justice model 
is likely to fare in police departments. This perspective directs our attention, first, 
to the fact that police work is comprised of a variety of functions, all or many of 
which are performed in a task environment that is heterogeneous, ambiguous, un-
certain, and dangerous. The situations in which police intervene are complex. The 
goals of policing, and the information on the basis of which officers must make de-
cisions, are ambiguous. The outcomes of alternative courses of action that officers 
might choose are uncertain. And in even the more seemingly mundane matters 
to which police attend a deadly risk is a part of the background. The technol-
ogy of policing—that is, how the raw materials of citizens and their problems or 
behaviors are transformed into organizational outputs—is inevitably “intensive” 
(Thompson 1967), requiring that officers assess the many contingencies in a situa-
tion, choose a course of action on that basis, assess the immediate consequences of 
that choice, and potentially make additional and different choices as required. The 
tasks and technology of policing call, then, for the kind of discretion and judgment 
that society vests in occupations that are professions in every sense of the word – 
such as medicine or law. Indeed, the analogy between policing and medicine has 
frequently been drawn: both call for diagnostic skills and for prescription in order 
to remedy a problem.
The professionalization of police produced not true professionals, however, but 
rather police bureaucracies (partially) insulated from their political environments 
(Brown 1981). A Weberian bureaucracy is well suited for industrial settings that 
apply an assembly-line (“long-linked”) technology to standardized raw materials, 
and where the task environment is homogeneous, the procedures for transform-
ing raw materials into work products are well understood and can be specified in 
advance. But the same bureaucratic form is not so well suited for policing. Insofar 
as the bureaucratic structure conflicts with the nature of the work—the “technical 
core”—it is loosely coupled with what officers do. Michael Brown argues that the 
bureaucracy has actually made matters worse, in that a punitive system of super-
vision has amplified the uncertainties with which officers must cope. Notwith-
standing these contradictions, however, the bureaucratic form has remained, as 
constituencies inside and outside policing take for granted that it is appropriate.
Recent reforms—community policing, public accountability mechanisms, and 
Compstat—have been superimposed on the existing structures, in spite of the fact 
that they are themselves not entirely compatible with the technical core, with the 
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existing bureaucratic organization, and/or with one another. Community policing 
is in fact compatible with the work that police do, though not with the crime-
fighting emphasis that was incorporated into the professional model, and even as 
community policing advocates sought to expand the police role, such that its suc-
cess would not turn on its effect on crime, we are consistently drawn like a moth to 
flame to ask whether community policing reduces crime. Partly as a consequence, 
community policing has been a tough sell with the rank-and-file. Insofar as the 
profound structural changes that community policing requires have not been 
made, implementation has been shallow.
Public accountability through citizen oversight has left complainants unhappy 
and its advocates disappointed, and it appears that it has left officers largely unaf-
fected in how they go about police work. More recent efforts to promote police 
accountability turn largely on administrative rule-making, which is compatible 
with the facets of police work that are also most compatible with the bureaucratic 
model: wherever police administrators can specify the circumstances under which 
police authority should or may not be exercised (e.g., arresting spouse abusers and 
not shooting at fleeing felons, respectively) and administrators can enforce com-
pliance with the rules (i.e., sanction noncompliance). Many of the routine choices 
that police must make are beyond the reach of administrative rules, though it is 
possible that policies governing the use of less-lethal force could be coupled with 
police practice to the benefit of police and citizens alike, a possibility that we con-
sider below.
In the New York City Police Department, Compstat appears to have achieved 
a level of managerial accountability that stimulated greater attention to the ends, 
and not merely the means, of police work. Compstat-like mechanisms introduced 
in other agencies have not, however, emphasized accountability or led to innova-
tive problem-solving.
Superimposed on existing structures, the procedural justice model is likely to 
be similarly loosely coupled with police practice. If procedural justice is not mea-
sured reliably (or at all), no one would need to confront the fact that procedur-
ally just policing has not become routine practice. A procedural justice model, 
we learned in our interviews with patrol officers and supervisors, is incompatible 
with police work as some officers experience it. We doubt very much that this is 
simply a manifestation of generational or personality differences among officers. It 
is more likely, we believe, attributable to the nature of the work that police perform 
and the cultural norms that grow out of that work. It is still appropriate to observe, 
as Brown did more than three decades ago, that “if there is a lesson to be learned 
from the experiences of the most recent generation of reformers, it is that simply 
enveloping policemen in a maze of institutional controls without grappling with 
the grimy realities of police work does not necessarily promote accountability and 
may only exacerbate matters” (1981, 303). Moreover, there is good reason to doubt 
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that the practice of procedural justice by police in citizen encounters will sub-
stantially affect citizens’ subjective experiences and, consequently, improve police 
legitimacy.
We should add, in this connection, that if a key element of the procedural jus-
tice model is the “organizational justice” with which police departments treat of-
ficers, it implies internal structures that depart from current structures in some 
important respects, and whose effects on officers’ perceptions and behavior are 
open questions. Some empirical evidence suggests that the procedural justice with 
which a police agency is perceived by its officers to operate affects officers’ views of 
the agency’s legitimacy, and legitimacy in turn shapes officers’ conformity to orga-
nizational regulations (Tyler, Callahan, and Frost 2007; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). 
This evidence is consistent with a claim made long ago that police officers’ treat-
ment of citizens is influenced by the police department’s treatment of its officers 
(Guyot 1991). However, we have to allow for the possibility that officers’ percep-
tions of organizational justice are as weakly connected to the actual administrative 
practices of police departments as citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice are 
to the behaviors of police officers that comprise procedural justice. Altering the 
internal structures of police departments to better conform with principles of pro-
cedural justice may well have many benefits, but improvements in legitimacy and 
officer performance might not be among them.
We might also add—though our point is based on only casual observation—
that police executives’ interest in private-sector management prescriptions should 
be tempered by a careful consideration of the respects in which those prescrip-
tions apply to police organizations. We have, for example, heard police chiefs talk 
enthusiastically about the Oz Principle (Connors et al. 2004), the three laws of 
performance (Zaffron and Logan 2011), and the Six Sigma methodology. (With 
the assistance of General Electric, Schenectady police command staff were trained 
in Six Sigma.) The analysis and advice that managers find in these sources might 
well be helpful, but they should not presume that what works effectively in manu-
facturing or other private-sector organizations will work equally well in the police 
environment.
IMPLICATIONS
Understanding Public Attitudes and Procedural Justice
One implication of the findings reported here for understanding public trust in 
police and procedural justice is that it is imperative to draw a sharp distinction 
between procedural justice as citizens’ subjective experience and procedural jus-
tice as officers’ overt behavior. They are different phenomena, even if we can use 
the same conceptual framework to define and operationalize them. Most previous 
research has relied on surveys of citizens to measure procedural justice, and most 
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previous research on police behavior has not measured procedural justice. Using 
survey and observational methods to measure both citizens’ perceptions and of-
ficers’ behavior, respectively, we find the former are not straightforward reflections 
of the latter.
We already knew that citizens’ judgments about procedural justice, and their 
satisfaction, in police-citizen encounters are very much subjective. But we may 
have underappreciated the degree to which they are subjective. Most survey re-
search is cross-sectional; panel surveys are difficult and expensive to execute. 
But the handful of panel surveys show not only that subjective experience affects 
global attitudes toward the police, including trust and confidence, but also and 
especially that global attitudes have a large bearing on subjective experience. These 
reciprocal effects are far from balanced. What citizens take away from their en-
counters with the police in the form of their attitudes toward the police is shaped 
by what they brought to their encounters much more than by what police do. Citi-
zens’ subjective experience with the police is also influenced by broader contextual 
frames, such as the reputation of the police department and (for blacks) a history 
of discrimination, and by citizens’ related interactions with personnel from other 
agencies, such as 911 center dispatchers or jail staff in booking facilities. Only a 
small fraction of the variation in subjective experience is attributable to how offi-
cers at the scene actually act. From the relationships between citizens’ perceptions 
of procedural justice and citizens’ satisfaction or beliefs about police legitimacy, it 
is safe to draw only inferences about the connections among these outlooks and 
not inferences about how these outlooks are shaped by what police do.
In order to describe, analyze, and understand procedural justice as it is enacted 
by police, it is necessary to observe it directly (in person or through recordings). 
We cannot rely on citizens’ responses to surveys. Systematic social observation is 
a well-established method for measuring police behavior, and it can certainly be 
adapted to the measurement of procedural justice by police. Doing so potentially 
opens an analytic door to answering a wide range of questions about the levels 
of procedural justice that prevail in police-citizen encounters and the forces that 
influence procedural justice by police—all of the situational, individual, organiza-
tional, and community factors that have been examined in extant research on the 
use of police authority (see Worden and McLean 2014b).
Creating Police Legitimacy
If future research replicates our findings from Schenectady concerning the rela-
tionship of citizens’ subjective experience to officers’ procedural justice, then our 
interpretation of survey-based measures of the quality of police performance in 
citizen encounters must be more circumspect. From this analysis it appears that 
subjective assessments do not reflect officers’ performance very well. The survey-
based procedural justice index varied with the nature of the contact (a call for 
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service or a police-initiated contact) and the forms of authority that police ex-
ercised, but it varied with procedural justice mainly insofar as officers behaved 
in procedurally unjust ways, and overall procedural justice and injustice together 
accounted for little of the variation in citizens’ judgments. Encounters in which 
officers performed very well in terms of conforming to principles of procedural 
justice—such as explaining their actions or listening to citizens—were not much 
more likely to yield positive assessments by citizens than encounters in which of-
ficers did not exhibit procedural justice. As a source of information about how well 
officers perform in procedural justice terms, it appears that citizen surveys—even 
surveys of people involved in recent contacts documented in police records—are 
of very limited utility.
That citizens’ responses to surveys do not reflect officers’ behavior very accu-
rately does not mean that the measures derived from citizen surveys are useless. 
Whether they are firmly or only weakly rooted in officers’ actions, citizens’ percep-
tions are real, and their consequences are real too. Public trust is important for po-
lice. We think it likely that police departments benefit from higher levels of public 
trust and confidence. Police officers may benefit when their departments enjoy 
higher levels of public trust, insofar as citizens are more likely to be compliant in 
individual police-citizen encounters, and more likely to be cooperative in pro-
viding information and otherwise “coproducing” community safety by working 
with police. Efforts by a police department to build its stock of public trust can be 
expected to redound to the department’s advantage and its community’s benefit.
But it does not appear that police can do much to “create” legitimacy through 
the procedural justice of their day-to-day interactions with citizens. Officers can 
detract from public trust at the margin by acting with procedural injustice. But 
they add if at all only imperceptibly to public trust by acting with greater proce-
dural justice. For example, and more particularly, when police conduct a stop, and 
when they conduct a frisk or search during that stop, the citizen’s subjective ex-
perience is unlikely to be affected for the better when the officer takes affirmative 
steps to be procedurally just. In general, police may be able to influence, but they 
do not control, any of the outcomes that really matter—crime, disorder, citizen 
satisfaction—because these are also influenced by many other social forces. Suc-
cessful efforts to influence public trust will consist mainly of measures other than 
managing the procedural justice of street-level behavior.
That public trust does not turn to a meaningful degree on managing street-level 
procedural justice might be good news, insofar as what gets measured does not always 
get managed, at least not in an institutionalized organization. In a bureaucracy—even 
a paramilitary bureaucracy—in which the task environment is ambiguous and un-
certain, mid-level managers and frontline workers must interpret agency mandates 
against the imperatives of the work as they understand them. This can result in loose 
coupling between the practices that management espouses and the practices that are 
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applied on the street and that represent, in the aggregate, the service delivered by the 
agency. In an agency that publicly espouses an approach that highlights the value of 
procedural justice, but in the absence of reliable measures of actual performance in 
those terms, there might well be a wide divergence between the public pronounce-
ments by the agency and its day-to-day performance on the street. But it would be a 
divergence about which agency managers could remain blissfully ignorant. The pub-
lic pronouncements might add to the department’s legitimacy, in that they signal an 
appreciation by department leaders that it is important. But the decoupled technical 
core would continue unaffected.
We hasten to add that we do not mean to imply that the adoption of structures 
that serve institutional purposes therefore do not and cannot serve more conven-
tional technical-rational purposes in an organization, and even if the structures 
serve only more symbolic purposes, it does not follow that their adoption was an 
act of administrative duplicity. We do not doubt that when police executives adopt 
community policing, or early intervention systems, or Compstat, for example, they 
do so in good faith to achieve the instrumental benefits they promise, but struc-
tural features of policing and police organizations undermine these measures.
Officers’ views on how they should do their jobs, particularly how they should 
interact with citizens, mediate the implementation of a procedural justice model 
of policing, and many officers in the study departments did not embrace proce-
dural justice concepts, even though our observations indicated that Schenectady 
police performed fairly well in procedural justice terms. Officer safety is an over-
riding consideration, and given the structural forces that understandably make 
safety a high priority, it is likely to remain so; managerial efforts to alter this feature 
of police culture have not been promising.
Like street-level personnel, managers must also interpret agency mandates and 
whether and how to manage the things that get measured. Crime has been mea-
sured as a part of the Uniform Crime Reporting system for decades, and yet as the 
newly appointed commissioner of the NYPD, William Bratton found it necessary 
in 1994 to reengineer the department to prompt police managers to embrace (or 
“own”) crime-fighting as a responsibility. Measuring valued outcomes is almost 
certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient.
It might be possible for police administrators to exercise more control over 
officers’ procedural justice, in spite of the shortcomings of citizen surveys as a 
performance indicator, by making use of in-car and body-worn cameras to ex-
tend the capacity of the bureaucracy to monitor officers’ performance. Just as 
police-recorded video (and especially audio) enabled us to conduct armchair ob-
servation of police-citizen encounters, in-car and perhaps especially body-worn 
cameras enable police supervisors to monitor their subordinates’ performance as 
never before. We know of only anecdotal evidence, but it is likely that the availabil-
ity of video has already improved the capacity of internal affairs investigators to 
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sustain or unfound complaints about discourtesy (though discourtesy is ambigu-
ous). Field supervisors in urban departments have always been able to observe of-
ficers’ behavior directly, but they had to be strategic about it, since the number of 
subordinates for whom a supervisor is responsible and their dispersion across the 
precinct’s landscape requires supervisors to pick and choose whom they observe 
and when. Police video introduces a whole new supervisory calculus.
But the obstacles to direct supervision have not been merely logistical. In many 
departments a strong norm of autonomy holds. Once rookie status is shed, of-
ficers expect to be treated like professionals, with a measure of deference to their 
competence and judgment. It is one thing to review recordings of police-citizen 
encounters to investigate allegations of misconduct, or to more proactively scan 
for major violations of departmental procedure, but it is another to micromanage 
officers’ interactions with citizens. As Brown observes, “the animosity that some 
patrolmen display toward a supervisor who attempts to monitor closely their ac-
tions and the reluctance of many supervisors to interfere with patrolmen stem 
largely from the force [of the norm prohibiting such second-guessing]” (1981, 90). 
Technology is adapted to organizational settings more than organizational settings 
are adapted to technology (though typewriter manufacturers may disagree with 
us), and so we doubt that body-worn cameras are about to usher in a new era of 
scientific police management based on the procedural justice analogs to Frederick 
Taylor’s time-and-motion studies.
Consider another street-level bureaucracy, schools. School administrators 
are much better able to observe teachers’ classroom performance directly than 
police supervisors have been able in the past to observe officers’ performance, 
Nevertheless, teachers have enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, and administrators 
display what educational researchers have characterized as a logic of confidence: 
an assumption that teachers are doing what they should be doing and that the 
organization is functioning as it should be (Eden 2001; Elmore 1999; Meyer and 
Rowan 1978).
If police departments choose to use cameras to monitor the procedural justice 
with which officers act, they have several options. They could actively monitor 
officers’ behavior, sanctioning officers who violate department procedures when 
they engage in some forms of procedurally unjust behavior (whether or not a citi-
zen complains about it), and coaching officers whose performance leaves room for 
improvement with respect to procedural justice. They could even try to establish 
and apply a standard of workmanship (Bittner 1983) that incorporates procedural 
justice, though they probably could not require that officers meet that standard. 
Alternatively, departments could more passively monitor officers’ behavior, re-
viewing camera recordings only when officers’ behavior is called into question; 
this would leave the cameras more loosely coupled with routine police practices. 
Based on our findings, we think it likely that merely providing for cameras would 
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contribute as much to police legitimacy as active monitoring, since any improve-
ment in officers’ procedural justice is unlikely to yield corresponding improve-
ments in citizens’ subjective experience and police legitimacy.
More generally, it appears that organizational reform is a more promising ap-
proach to building police legitimacy than managing procedural justice in police-
citizen encounters.2 The reforms that we reviewed in chapter 2—community 
policing, early intervention systems, Compstat—have probably done more than 
street-level procedural justice could to increase the legitimacy of the agencies that 
adopted them, even if the reforms were weakly implemented and loosely coupled 
to the technical core of policing. Other reforms that might be expected to im-
prove police legitimacy include personnel practices that are designed to provide 
for greater congruence between the composition of police departments and the 
communities they serve (National Research Council 2004, 312–14), educational 
requirements and training (Gau 2014, 3364), and proactively disseminating infor-
mation to the public and managing media relations (Gau 2014, 3365). Let us take a 
closer look at some of these possibilities.
Implications for Police Reform
Piecing together the findings of our inquiry, extant research on policing, and clues 
about successful police reforms, we can cautiously trace some implications for 
contemporary reform. Let us begin this exercise by considering the case of reform 
in Cincinnati, where rioting followed the fatal shooting of an unarmed black teen-
ager by police in 2001, after fourteen black men—but no whites—had died in po-
lice deadly force incidents since 1995 (Fisher 2014). Cincinnati’s mayor requested a 
federal investigation of the Cincinnati Police Department’s use of force, an inves-
tigation that culminated in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) that stipulated a 
number of reforms (Schatmeier 2013). Among other changes, the MOA required 
that CPD revise its policies governing the use of force to provide for a force con-
tinuum, to require documentation of every use of force, and to require on-scene 
investigation of uses of force by a supervisor (Memorandum of Agreement 2002). 
The MOA also established a Citizen Complaint Authority and required measures 
designed to facilitate the filing of citizen complaints against the police and to bet-
ter ensure the participation of civilians in their review. It further mandated the 
establishment of a risk-management system (i.e., an early intervention system). In 
these respects, the MOA resembled the public accountability reforms described in 
chapter 2 as features of the institutional environment of police departments. The 
implementation of the reforms—achieving “substantial compliance”—was over-
seen by a court-appointed monitor from 2002 until 2007.
But in addition, Cincinnati police also entered into a “collaborative agreement” 
with parties to a lawsuit that had been filed in federal court prior to the DOJ in-
vestigation, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Fraternal Order of 
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Police, and the Cincinnati Black United Front (Schatmeier 2013). The collabora-
tive agreement, as an alternative resolution of the suit’s claims, provided for CPD’s 
adoption of community- and problem-oriented policing (CPOP). In particular, 
for example:
The Parties, and especially the CPD, understand that fully engaging the commu-
nity is a fundamental key to effective law enforcement. The CPD will continue to 
implement policies and procedures that are guided by the principles of community 
problem-oriented policing. In accordance with these principles, the CPD continues 
to work in partnership with the community to solve problems that impact the com-
munity. (In re Cincinnati Policing 2003, 7)
Both agreements were overseen by the same court-appointed monitor, though the 
collaborative agreement also provided for the selection of an independent evalua-
tor. The RAND Corporation was selected and, among other things, conducted two 
surveys of the community—one in 2005 and a second in 2008—and also analyzed 
police-citizen interactions in annual samples of traffic stops across four years by 
coding the audio and video recordings captured by CPD’s in-car cameras (Ridge-
way et al. 2009; also see Dixon et al. 2008).
The surveys of the community—surveys of the general population and not of 
people with police contact—showed modest improvement in the public’s assess-
ments of “police professionalism,” that is, judgments about whether police treat 
people with dignity and respect, are polite, apply the law fairly, consider people’s 
views when making decisions, and so forth. On a scale that combined eight such 
survey items, the mean for blacks in 2005 was about 2.4, 0.6 lower than that for 
others, but still above 2.0, which signified generally favorable judgments. By 2008, 
the mean for blacks had increased 0.15 along this four-point scale, a small (but 
statistically reliable) increase, while the mean for others was unchanged.
RAND’s analysis of interactions in traffic stops found a number of racial dis-
parities in the invasiveness of traffic stops—in the likelihood of a search and the 
duration of stops, for example. It also examined the quality of communications, 
finding that “the best predictor for good officer communication was good driver 
communication, and vice versa” (Ridgeway et al. 2009, 83). RAND found some 
evidence of change over time in the quality of officers’ communication: “the ob-
servers rate them as better at listening to what the drivers say, as well as showing 
more patience and helpfulness in 2007 than in 2005” (2009, 86), though the mag-
nitude of the improvement is not specified.
Moreover, as recent studies have shown, the use of force by Cincinnati de-
clined, not only for the duration of the federal monitoring but thereafter. Joshua 
Chanin shows that the use of force by Cincinnati police dropped 46 percent be-
tween 2002 and 2012, even as crime remained stable, and officer injuries dropped 
by more than half; in addition, citizen complaints declined. Thus, as Chanin 
points out, “six years removed from DOJ and monitor oversight, the Department 
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has experienced little or no backsliding, a finding supported by consistent reduc-
tions in undesirable outcomes, including use of force incidence and allegations of 
abusive or unlawful behavior. In short, the reform effort in Cincinnati appears to 
have transformed the CPD” (2015, 179–80).
Indeed, a Washington Post article, written in the aftermath of the death of Mi-
chael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, identified the CPD as a department whose 
practices might be worthy of emulation (Fisher 2014). No one claims that all is 
well in Cincinnati. RAND’s surveys documented a persistent—albeit somewhat 
narrower—racial gap in public trust. And in 2014, the Post journalist observed that 
“mistrust of police in Cincinnati—even after full-scale retraining and a 120-point 
catalogue of altered procedures—remains palpable in black neighborhoods.” But 
he also said that “thirteen years after riots that threatened to wreck Cincinnati’s 
reputation and economy, many here say the police have become gentler, smarter, 
more transparent and more targeted in how they go after bad guys.”
Pinpointing the specific reform(s) that deserve credit for these changes is im-
possible, but based on extant theory and evidence about police behavior, manage-
ment, and community relations, we suspect that a lot of credit should be given to 
use-of-force policies and procedures that would seem to have been at least mod-
erately coupled with street-level practice, and to the adoption of community and 
problem-oriented policing. The decline in the incidence of physical force is stun-
ning, and it is surely not due to commensurate declines in citizen resistance. Cin-
cinnati police became more restrained in their use of force. Certainly this could be 
partly attributable to training that CPD delivered to its officers, including training 
for a cadre of volunteer officers who were to handle incidents involving the men-
tally ill. But a change of this magnitude seems unlikely to stem from only formal 
training; we think it more likely that more restrictive policies that were executed 
by supervisors made a very substantial difference. We interviewed a small nonran-
dom sample of CPD supervisors in early 2016, and while we certainly heard about 
a mix of supervisory approaches, we were impressed by those who took quite se-
riously their responsibility, not only for assessing their subordinates’ compliance 
with CPD force policies, but especially for ensuring that their officers were using 
sound tactics that minimized the risk of resistance, force, and injury. We would 
not infer that the coupling of policy and practice was uniformly tight, but it ap-
pears to us to have been sufficiently tight to have some very beneficial impacts on 
police use of force.
That such coupling does not follow the adoption of such policies is evident 
from DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson police. Ferguson’s policies resemble 
those of the CPD:
Under FPD General Order 410.00, when an officer uses or attempts to use any force, 
a supervisor must respond to the scene to investigate. The supervisor must com-
plete a two-page use-of-force report assessing whether the use of force complied with 
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FPD’s force policy. Additional forms are required for ECW uses and vehicle pursuits. 
According to policy and our interviews with Chief Jackson, a use-of-force packet is 
assembled—which should include the use-of-force report and supplemental forms, 
all police reports, any photographs, and any other supporting materials—and for-
warded up the chain of command to the Chief. (U.S. Department of Justice 2015, 38).
But in Ferguson, “supervisors do little to no investigation; either do not under-
stand or choose not to follow FPD’s use-of-force policy in analyzing officer con-
duct; rarely correct officer misconduct when they find it; and do not see the pat-
terns of abuse that are evident when viewing these incidents in the aggregate” (38). 
Coupling use of force policy with street-level practice requires managerial com-
mitment and effort, but the CPD’s experience suggests that it is feasible.
The use of physical force by police is often a contentious issue. Reasonable force 
is to some extent a matter of interpreting ambiguous circumstances, and police 
and public interpretations tend to diverge. Few citizens who are subjected to the 
application of physical force by police consider it proper. Among our Schenectady 
respondents, we found evidence that suggests that the use of physical force by 
police detracts from citizens’ judgments of procedural justice; the effect was not of 
sufficient magnitude to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels, per-
haps because the use of physical force was very infrequent. Reductions in the use 
of force by police, these results imply, could do more to “create” legitimacy on the 
street than increases in the procedural justice with which officers act.
Further extrapolating from our findings, other research, and Cincinnati’s expe-
rience with the use of force, we would speculate that similar benefits in public trust 
could follow from policies and supervisory oversight and instruction in conduct-
ing searches. The case law of search and seizure is complex. Jon Gould and Stephen 
Mastrofski (2004) examined the frequency with which officers conducted discre-
tionary searches (beyond “plain view”) and how often the searches were uncon-
stitutional (based on a matrix of Fourth Amendment court rulings); they found 
that nearly one-third of the searches were assessed as unconstitutional. If we can 
generalize from Gould and Mastrofski’s findings, it seems safe to project that close 
adherence to the law would reduce the frequency with which police search citi-
zens. If we can generalize from the findings from Schenectady and Syracuse, fewer 
searches would yield an improvement in citizens’ subjective experiences, again 
creating more legitimacy. If policies governing searches were as tightly coupled to 
police practice as use of force policies appear to be coupled to practice in Cincin-
nati, then the formulation and implementation of such policies would be a useful 
step in police reform.
Community and problem-oriented policing was another major component in 
Cincinnati’s reform agenda. We discussed the appeal of community policing in the 
institutional environment, and surely this was no less true in Cincinnati than else-
where. Community policing is procedurally just on a community scale: it gives the 
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community voice in identifying the public safety problems about which it is most 
concerned, and signifies the commitment of the police to addressing the matters 
that would contribute most to community improvement, as the community sees 
it. Moreover, community policing need not be tightly coupled to day-to-day pa-
trol and investigative practice in order to achieve these outcomes; even specialized 
community policing units can serve as a bridge between the police and the public, 
and mount problem-solving initiatives to address community concerns. That is, 
even loosely coupled community policing is not (necessarily) window-dressing.
In addition, we should recognize that public attitudes are likely to change only 
very slowly, if at all. Despite the advances that have been made in Cincinnati, 
public attitudes have been largely stable. That the change in blacks’ attitudes to-
ward the Cincinnati police that RAND detected in its survey results was greater 
than zero is unlikely the product of sampling artifacts. But the improvement was 
small—0.15 on a four-point scale of police professionalism. Street-level practice, 
particularly with respect to the use of force, changed far more dramatically than 
public attitudes did.
Future Research
Whether these findings—some from one police department and others from two 
departments—are generalizable to other settings is an open question, to be an-
swered by future research. One research question that we would nominate as a 
high priority for future research is the hypothesized relationship between officers’ 
procedural justice and citizens’ subjective experience. Clues that the relationship 
is fairly weak can be seen in previous research that has involved panel surveys, 
with estimates of the effects of prior attitudes toward police on satisfaction and/or 
procedural justice with individual contacts with police. But empirical evidence on 
this relationship that rests on measures of the two constructs—officers’ procedural 
justice and citizens’ subjective experience—drawn from independent data sources 
would be far preferable.
Research on officers’ procedural justice need not extend to citizens’ percep-
tions in order to be valuable, for much remains to be learned about patterns of 
procedurally just (and unjust) behavior. We might suppose that, like other forms 
of police behavior, procedurally just policing varies with the characteristics and 
behaviors of citizens and other characteristics of the situations in which police 
and citizens interact; the backgrounds and outlooks of individual police officers; 
the nature and intensity of the cues that officers receive from police administrators 
and supervisors about how they may and should treat citizens; and the community 
or neighborhood context for police-citizen encounters.
Extant research on police behavior sensitizes us to the ways in which officers’ 
behavior is influenced by the features of the situations in which they interact with 
citizens. The use of police authority is shaped by both legal factors, such as the 
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seriousness of the offense and the strength of evidence, and by extralegal factors, 
such as citizens’ sex, demeanor, and (sometimes) race. We might especially expect 
that procedural justice—how police use their authority—would also be affected 
(but not determined) by the degree of respect and cooperation that citizens offer 
to police. Our examination of situational variables confirmed the hypothesized 
relationship of procedural injustice to citizen disrespect and resistance, though 
questions about causal order remained. Moreover, these variables accounted for 
only one-third or less of the variation in procedural justice or injustice.
Research on several forms of police officers’ behavior—arrests, use of force, 
stops, and several forms of misconduct—all suggests that behavior varies among 
individual officers. For example, Samuel Walker (2005, 100) summarized several 
investigations that suggest that small numbers of officers account for dispropor-
tionately large fractions of citizen complaints and use-of-force reports. Steven 
Brandl et al. (2001) found that less experienced officers are disproportionately rep-
resented among officers with multiple complaints about the use of excessive force. 
Many years ago, Hans Toch (1980; also see Toch 1996) found that violence-prone 
officers are especially sensitive to citizens’ challenges to their authority. Ellen 
Scrivner (1994) discovered five groups of officers among those referred to police 
psychologists due to their use of excessive force, including: officers with personal-
ity disorders; officers whose job-related experiences—for example, traumatic in-
cidents such as police shootings—put them at risk for abusing force; young and 
inexperienced officers who were also “highly impressionable and impulsive”; offi-
cers who develop inappropriate patrol styles; and officers with personal problems. 
Christopher Harris (2010) showed that officers differ in their career “trajectories” 
of misconduct. Research persuasively confirms what many police officers and ad-
ministrators have observed for themselves: that “operational styles” (Brown, 1981) 
and police dysfunctions vary across individual officers.
Recent research indicates that the traits, outlooks, and cognitive schema of of-
ficers may be important in understanding and explaining these individual varia-
tions. William Terrill et al. (2003) reported that officers whose occupational atti-
tudes conform more closely to the tenets of the traditional police culture are more 
prone to the use of their coercive authority.3 Similarly, Eugene Paoline and William 
Terrill (2005) found that such officers are more likely to conduct searches dur-
ing traffic stops. Matthew Hickman (2008) found that cynicism predicts “problem 
police behavior,” while Michael Cuttler and Paul Muchinsky (2006) found that 
personality traits and work history predict “dysfunctional job performance.” Other 
characteristics of officers—their race, sex, and educational background—have all 
been hypothesized to affect how officers do their jobs, though the evidence on 
these hypotheses is mixed and inconclusive (National Research Council 2004). In 
view of the findings that officers’ choices about the application (and misapplica-
tion) of their authority in making stops, using force, and invoking the law are all 
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shaped to a degree by individual factors, there is good reason to believe that many 
of these same factors may help to account for the procedural justice with which 
police authority is exercised. In particular, we might expect that the officers whose 
outlooks most resemble those of the traditional police culture, and those who are 
more cynical, would be those least receptive to a procedural justice emphasis. If so, 
then the contours of rank-and-file resistance to procedurally just policing would 
resemble those of resistance to community policing (cf. Herbert 2009).
Previous research shows not only that individual officers’ behavior varies, but 
also that their performance varies: some officers perform better than others. This 
should come as no surprise, as it is surely true of any occupational group, but it 
is especially difficult to demonstrate empirically in policing because positive po-
lice performance is so difficult to conceive and measure. David Bayley and James 
Garofalo (1987, 1989) asked officers themselves to identify peers who they consid-
ered to be especially skilled in handling conflict; in the three NYPD precincts they 
studied, Bayley and Garofalo thereby identified a set of exceptionally skilled of-
ficers on whom they conducted systematic observations. They found that these 
officers exhibited somewhat distinctive patterns of interaction with citizens, par-
ticularly in situations that were potentially conflictual: they “tended to be more 
concerned to get the fullest possible picture [of the incident] and to find a long-
run solution, especially one that satisfied the complainant, while [comparison of-
ficers] showed less sympathy for complainants’ problems, and were quicker to say 
that the police couldn’t do anything” (1987, 13). They added that the more skilled 
officers “offered more information about ways to resolve problems, while [com-
parison officers] lectured citizens about how to act in the future and threatened a 
stern response if they were called back” (13). While Bayley and Garofalo did not 
frame their analysis in the terms of procedural justice, we might retrospectively 
observe that the skilled officers acted in ways that independent observers would 
be likely to interpret as showing concern for citizens’ needs and concerns, and af-
fording citizens an opportunity to explain their situations.
In general, based on extant research, we might reasonably speculate that some 
officers perform consistently well in terms of procedural justice, either preventing 
citizen disrespect and resistance or responding to it with equanimity and profes-
sionalism, and otherwise exhibiting a high quality of decision-making; we need 
to learn from these officers what they do (and do not do) and why, which implies 
that we need to understand how officers perceive and interpret their encounters 
with citizens—the perceptual and cognitive processes that yield different reactions 
to similar stimuli—including how officers see the different clientele they serve, 
and whether/why some are more or less deserving of procedural justice. We might 
further suppose that typical or average officers sometimes perform poorly in pro-
cedural justice terms, and we also need to learn from these officers what they do 
(and do not do) and why.
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As Stephen Mastrofski et al. (2002, 542) suggest, the quality of police-citizen 
interactions might be influenced by administrators in one or both of two ways: 
obtrusive (or “bureaucratic”) controls, such as rules, regulations, and sanctions for 
rule violations; and unobtrusive (or “professional”) controls, such as training and 
socialization. As a practical matter, and for reasons that we explained in chapters 2 
and 8, the establishment of such practices is likely to progress unevenly across 
organizational units, managers, supervisors, and officers, such that we are likely to 
find variation not only in behavioral conformity with procedural justice but also 
in awareness, recognition, understanding, and acceptance of procedural justice 
concepts and principles.
Therein lies a key question: what accounts for the tighter coupling of policy and 
practice in some agencies—such as Cincinnati, perhaps—than in others—such as 
Ferguson? The question has been recently posed, but not answered, in connection 
with sustaining reforms wrought by consent decrees and settlement agreements, 
which coercively “unfreeze” an organization for change. But after the cessation of 
court-appointed monitoring, and the leverage that the court brings to bear to en-
sure that reforms are implemented is withdrawn, the coupling of the reforms may 
loosen, and the practices in which they are intended to result may lapse. How, if at 
all, can such reforms be installed in such a way that they will survive not only the 
discontinuation of court supervision but also administrative turnover?
Finally, while we believe that steps to better prepare officers to exercise their 
authority—including especially searches and the use of force—are the most prom-
ising avenues of police reform, extant research offers little evidence about how po-
lice organizations can effectively perform these functions. Training and supervi-
sion are frequently mentioned. Such prescriptions rest largely on logic and wishful 
thinking, and certainly not on social scientific evidence. Academics and practitio-
ners alike frequently comment on the crucial role that frontline supervisors play, 
but studies of how they play it, and how well they play it, are rarely conducted. 
There are no simple, easy answers, to be sure, but there is no credit for asking the 
right questions either.
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Our research in Schenectady and Syracuse employed multiple methods, including both 
interviews and observation. An overview of each method was provided in the pertinent 
chapter; here we provide additional details concerning their execution. We begin with the 
police services survey, which formed the basis for the measures of citizens’ subjective expe-
rience that were incorporated into the department’s management accountability meetings 
each month. Then we describe the survey of key informants—leaders of neighborhood 
organizations—in each city. We turn then to a description of interviews with patrol of-
ficers and supervisors (i.e., sergeants), and interviews with police commanders. Finally, we 
further describe the observations of police-citizen encounters in Schenectady, which were 
accomplished by watching and listening to recordings drawn from the in-car video and 
audio that has been a routine procedure in that department for some time.
THE POLICE SERVICES SURVEY
The police services survey sampled records of calls for service, stops, and arrests. Recorded 
contacts were assessed for their eligibility for inclusion in the survey sample. Officer-initiated 
incidents were removed from CAD records, as were records that lacked a recognizable first 
or last name, such that records with only, for example, “unknown,” “passerby,” “neighbor,” or 
“security” in the name fields were eliminated. Arrests that had been sealed by the courts and 
included no name were removed, though with the limited time delay between the end of a 
sampling period (one half of a month) and the extraction of data, this was rare. Stop or field 
interview records that listed neither a phone number nor an address (or recorded the address 
as “homeless”) were eliminated. In Syracuse, stop records do not include a phone number, 
and so efforts were made to “append” a telephone number given a name and address. Finally, 
if the same person appeared more than once in the same subpopulation in a single sampling 
period, only the most recent incident was sampled.
Method olo gical Appendix
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During each sampling period we randomly sampled three hundred calls for service, 
and we included all arrests and stops / field interviews in the sample of contacts. We over-
represented arrests and stops / field interviews in order to better capture for separate analysis 
a number of incidents in which procedural justice would presumably be more challenging 
for officers. Surveying extended over approximately two weeks, until new semi-monthly 
samples were drawn, and so respondents were interviewed within one to five weeks of their 
contact. Table 7 summarizes the sampling and survey dispositions for each subpopula-
tion in each site across the eighteen months of surveying. All of the eligible arrests and 
stops / field interviews were sampled, as were more than 30 percent of the calls for service 
in Schenectady and nearly 10 percent of the calls for service in Syracuse. Most of those who 
were sampled were called, excepting the stops in Syracuse, for which the process of append-
ing telephone numbers to names and addresses was only partially successful. Substantial 
fractions—nearly 20 percent in each city—of the people who had called for service were 
contacted, and of those who were contacted, nearly two-thirds completed the interview. 
People who were arrested or stopped / field interviewed were much more difficult to contact; 
6 to 12 percent of those who were called were contacted by interviewers.1 Of those who were 
contacted, however, completion rates were generally around 60 percent, excepting Syracuse 
stops. About one-quarter of those contacted declined to participate; small proportions were 
screened out (people who were under eighteen years of age and who had called for service 
could not be removed from the sample as ineligible because no information about their age 
was in the CAD record) or were unable to complete the interview in English.
Table 8 below summarizes the sampling and sample attrition in terms of the character-
istics of the populations from which the samples were drawn. In each of five columns—the 
eligible population, the sample, those who were sampled and called, those who were con-
tacted, and those who completed the interview—the table displays a percentage breakdown 
by each characteristic. The first three rows show a breakdown by the type of contact, and 
they show the margins by which arrests and stops were overrepresented in the samples 
(e.g., in Schenectady, arrests were 15.4 percent of the eligible population of contacts, but 
32.7 percent of the sample), and they also show the sources of attrition from that sample. 
Table 7 Survey Sampling and Disposition Summary
Schenectady Syracuse
Arrests Field interviews Calls for service Arrests Stops Calls for service
Eligible 6,745 3,127 33,880 8,779 12,472 117,031
Sampled 6,745 3,127 10,782 8,779 12,472 10,800
Called 5,377 2,192 9,965 7,168 1,809 9,914
Contacted 622 138 2,061 535 205 2,108
Of those contacted:
Completed 62.7% 58.0% 64.5% 61.9% 49.8% 65.0%
Incomplete 7.7% 7.2% 5.1% 9.5% 5.9% 5.1%
Refused 26.7% 30.4% 25.4% 22.4% 33.7% 22.8%
Screened out 0.2% 0.7% 2.2% 0.9% 0.5% 2.3%
Language barrier 2.7% 3.6% 2.7% 5.2% 10.2% 4.8%













 Arrests 15.4% 32.7% 30.7% 22.2% 21.7%
 Calls for service 77.4% 52.2% 56.8% 72.9% 73.9%
 Field interviews 7.1% 15.1% 12.5% 4.9% 4.4%
Wave
 Baseline + (1–12) 33.9% 32.3% 31.3% 32.5% 33.3%
 1st quarter (13–18) 16.2% 17.1% 17.3% 16.2% 16.8%
 2nd quarter (19–24) 19.4% 17.8% 17.9% 16.4% 16.6%
 3rd quarter (25–30) 16.1% 17.2% 17.3% 17.7% 16.7%
 4th quarter (31–36) 14.3% 15.7% 16.2% 17.3% 16.7%
Platoon
 Midnight: 8 a.m. 21.3% 24.1% 23.5% 20.0% 18.6%
 8 a.m.–4 p.m. 35.5% 34.6% 35.4% 37.0% 39.3%
 4 p.m.–midnight 43.2% 41.3% 41.1% 43.0% 42.1%
Calls: Problem type N = 33,880 10,782 9,965 2,061 1,330
 Violent crime 4.8% 4.8% 4.6% 4.1% 4.1%
 Interpersonal conflict 18.1% 18.3% 17.8% 16.4% 14.8%
 Nonviolent crime 26.6% 27.0% 27.3% 28.5% 30.5%
 Suspicious circumstance 5.3% 5.0% 5.1% 5.0% 5.0%
 Dependent person 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 6.9% 7.2%
 Traffic 10.0% 9.5% 9.7% 11.5% 12.9%
 Public nuisance 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 14.8% 14.2%
 Medical 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
 Other assistance 7.6% 8.1% 8.1% 7.9% 7.8%
 Other 3.0% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6% 1.6%
 Unknown 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.1% 1.8%
Arrests: top charge N = 6,745 6,745 5,377 626 390
 Felony 16.5% 16.5% 16.3% 10.2% 11.0%
 Misdemeanor 61.0% 61.0% 61.9% 67.3% 67.7%
 Violation 10.0% 10.0% 9.3% 11.7% 12.8%
 Infraction/other 12.5% 12.5% 12.4% 10.9% 8.5%
Arrests: type 
 Crime in progress 25.9% 25.9% 24.1% 24.0% 24.4%
 Complaint 26.9% 26.9% 26.2% 24.3% 24.6%
 Arrest warrant 20.0% 20.0% 21.3% 24.1% 25.9%
 Bench warrant 14.7% 14.7% 15.5% 14.4% 12.3%
 Summons 11.5% 11.5% 11.9% 13.1% 12.8%
 Other 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.2% 0
Arrests: disposition













 Released 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 5.1% 4.9%
 Appearance ticket 33.1% 33.1% 33.8% 36.3% 38.7%
 Other 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3%
Arrests: race/ethnicity 
 White 41.1% 41.1% 42.3% 53.7% 55.1%
 Black 43.4% 43.4% 41.9% 31.8% 28.5%
 Hispanic 8.9% 8.9% 8.7% 6.2% 7.4%
 Other 6.6% 6.6% 7.1% 8.3% 9.0%
Arrests: sex 
 Male 72.4% 72.4% 70.5% 67.7% 66.2%
 Female 27.6% 27.6% 29.4% 33.3% 33.8%
Field interviews: race/ethnicity N = 3,127 3,127 2,192 138 80
 White 35.0% 35.0% 37.0% 34.8% 36.2%
 Black 44.8% 44.8% 46.0% 40.6% 45.0%
 Hispanic 6.2% 6.2% 4.8% 5.8% 5.0%
 Other/missing 14.0% 14.0% 12.2% 18.8% 13.8%
Field interviews: sex 
 Male 80.5% 80.5% 80.2% 76.8% 72.5%













 Arrests 6.5% 28.0% 30.7% 18.8% 18.4%
 Calls for service 84.5% 33.4% 56.8% 74.0% 76.0%
 Stops 9.0% 38.6% 12.5% 7.2% 5.6%
Wave
 Baseline + (1–12) 31.9% 32.2% 32.0% 30.4% 33.3%
 1st quarter (13–18) 15.7% 17.8% 17.2% 16.4% 16.6%
 2nd quarter (19–24) 18.7% 16.2% 17.4% 18.2% 16.7%
 3rd quarter (25–30) 18.5% 17.8% 17.3% 17.5% 16.2%
 4th quarter (31–36) 15.2% 16.0% 16.2% 17.5% 17.1%
Platoon
 10 p.m.–6 a.m. 27.3% 33.0% 29.0% 27.4% 25.6%
 6 a.m.–2 p.m. 25.6% 23.2% 27.1% 25.9% 27.6%
 2 p.m.–10 p.m. 47.1% 43.8% 43.9% 46.7% 46.8%
Calls: Problem type N = 117,031 10,800 9,914 2,108 1,370
 Violent crime 15.3% 15.8% 15.3% 12.6% 12.4%
 Interpersonal conflict 11.6% 11.8% 11.8% 11.7% 12.6%













 Suspicious circumstance 5.7% 5.5% 5.5% 5.8% 6.3%
 Dependent person 6.5% 6.6% 6.5% 5.2% 4.9%
 Traffic 12.5% 12.7% 13.0% 13.7% 14.7%
 Public nuisance 14.0% 13.6% 13.9% 16.6% 18.0%
 Medical 10.0% 9.7% 9.9% 9.7% 7.4%
 Other assistance 6.3% 6.6% 6.4% 6.7% 5.7%
 Other 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
 Unknown 6.1% 5.9% 6.0% 6.3% 4.9%
Arrests: top charge N = 8,779 8,779 7,168 536 331
 Felony 31.6% 31.6% 32.4% 26.3% 23.9%
 Misdemeanor 45.0% 45.0% 46.1% 50.2% 51.1%
 Violation 17.8% 17.8% 16.8% 19.8% 21.5%
 Infraction/other 5.6% 5.6% 4.7% 3.7% 3.6%
Arrests: type 
 Crime in progress 47.7% 47.7% 46.6% 47.9% 45.3%
 Complaint 28.0% 28.0% 28.4% 28.4% 30.2%
 Arrest warrant 15.8% 15.8% 16.5% 17.0% 17.2%
 Bench warrant 3.3% 3.3% 3.2% 2.8% 3.3%
 Summons 0 0 0 0 0
 Other 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 3.9% 3.9%
Arrests: disposition
 Held 96.1% 96.1% 96.2% 96.1% 96.1%
 Released 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.9% 0.9%
 Appearance ticket 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3%
 Other 3.3% 3.3% 3.2% 2.8% 2.7%
Arrests: race/ethnicity 
 White 31.9% 31.9% 32.1% 36.2% 38.7%
 Black 58.7% 58.7% 59.1% 54.7% 53.5%
 Hispanic 7.4% 7.4% 6.8% 7.1% 6.3%
 Other 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.5%
Arrests: sex 
 Male 76.7% 76.7% 76.3% 71.1% 70.4%
 Female 23.3% 23.3% 23.7% 28.9% 29.6%
Stops: race/ethnicity N = 12,472 12,472 1,809 205 102
 White 37.0% 37.0% 53.3% 61.5% 54.9%
 Black 52.4% 52.4% 40.1% 29.3% 40.2%
 Hispanic 7.2% 7.2% 2.7% 3.4% 3.9%
 Other 3.4% 3.4% 3.9% 5.8% 1.0%
Stops: sex 
 Male 73.2% 73.2% 72.7% 70.7% 66.7%
 Female 26.0% 26.0% 26.7% 28.8% 33.3%
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An assessment of the representativeness of the interviewed sample can be made by com-
paring the percentages in the column furthest right with those in the second column for the 
eligible population. In Schenectady, for example, interviewed arrestees comprise 21.7 percent 
of the sample, compared with 15.4 percent of the eligible population. Field interviews in 
that site were underrepresented, however, given the low rate at which interviewers were 
able to contact them. Similar patterns hold for arrests and stops in Syracuse. In both sites, 
contacts during the day shift were slightly overrepresented.
The table also displays a breakdown of call types among eligible calls for service, classi-
fied into a common set of problem type categories based on the CAD field.2 In general, the 
interviewed sample resembles the eligible population in each site fairly closely.
The interviewed samples of arrestees bear a close resemblance to the eligible populations 
in terms of the top charge (though felony arrestees are slightly underrepresented), the basis 
for or “type” of arrest, and the immediate disposition of the arrest (though arrestees who 
were held—placed in a lock-up—were somewhat underrepresented). White arrestees were 
overrepresented relative to black arrestees, especially in Schenectady, and male arrestees 
were overrepresented relative to females. Among stops, males were somewhat underrepre-
sented in both sites, and in Syracuse, whites were overrepresented relative to blacks.
Since the samples are stratified, with different probabilities of sample selection across 
the different subpopulations, and since the response rates varied across subpopulations, 
we weight the cases for most analyses of the survey data in order to represent the entire 
contact population in each site. We apply weights that reproduce the original population 
proportion that each subpopulation represents, though these weights are very nearly the 
same as those that are based only on the probabilities of sample selection (with correlations 
over 0.90).
We conducted a review of 154 selected cases to ensure as much as possible that we 
analyze only cases in which the respondent described his/her experience in the sampled 
incident and not some other event.3 This review indicated that seventy-five cases were cer-
tainly a mismatch: that the respondent described a contact with the police other than the 
sampled contact. Two-thirds (51) of those were in Syracuse, and about 80 percent were 
calls for service. All seventy-five of these cases were dropped from the analyses reported 
in chapters 4 and 7. We also compiled information on the number of calls placed by each 
respondent not only during the sampling period but during the preceding and succeeding 
sampling periods, and we found sixty-eight additional cases (forty-six of them in Syracuse) 
in which the same phone number appeared four or more times in that broader time period 
around the sampled contact; we treat these cases as of questionable reliability, on the as-
sumption that the respondent would be hard-pressed to distinguish the sampled contact 
from others at about the same time, and we tested the sensitivity of our results to the inclu-
sion of these cases.
We also note that our sampling frames were not mutually exclusive; while it does not 
occur often, some people who called for assistance were arrested. Furthermore, if it in-
volves multiple persons, the same event can be the subject of multiple interviews, each 
concerning the experience of a different person. On nine occasions, two different people 
were interviewed about the same incident: six times when one person called for assis-
tance and the other person was arrested; twice when two people were arrested in connec-
tion with the same incident; and once when two people were stopped at the same time. 
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In  addition, we note that across eighteen months of surveying, any one person might 
well appear in the sample multiple times, and in fact, 101 people were each interviewed 
more than once about different incidents; all but seven of the 101 were interviewed twice, 
and one was interviewed four times, together accounting for 210 of the 3,603 contacts 
with police. Finally, a nontrivial proportion of those who called for service reported that 
they did not have a face-to-face interaction with an officer, and these respondents are not 
included in the analyses of procedural justice, inasmuch as we are interested in citizens’ 
direct encounters with the police.
KEY INFORMANT SURVEY
We contacted thirty-seven prospective Syracuse respondents in wave 1, followed by thirty-
six in wave 2, and thirty-five in the final wave.4 Syracuse final response rates in waves 1 
through 3 were as follows: 67 percent (N = 25); 44.4 percent (N = 16); and 28.5 percent (N = 10), 
respectively. We contacted twenty-nine prospective respondents in Schenectady in wave 1, 
twenty-seven in wave 2, and twenty-six in wave 3.5 Schenectady final response rates for 
waves 1 through 3 were as follows: 48.2 percent (N = 14); 44.4 percent (N = 12); and 
50.0  percent (N = 13), respectively. The response rate in Syracuse declined substantially 
between waves 1 and 3. While the initial response rate in Schenectady (48.2 percent) was 
somewhat lower than initial rate in Syracuse, it remained more stable over the subsequent 
survey waves. We did not add new e-mail addresses for respondents after wave 1. The re-
sponses are based on a true panel.
PATROL INTERVIEWS
We conducted interviews with patrol sergeants and patrol officers in order to assess the 
views of the rank and file regarding the emphasis on customer service, how (if at all) ad-
ministrative expectations were reverberating down through the ranks, and any sources of 
resistance to a customer-service orientation.
We followed a similar process in both sites. During line-up or roll call, a supervising of-
ficer announced that an interviewer would be available during the first several hours of the 
shift to speak with officers about customer service. In Schenectady, interviewers were given 
access to a private office adjacent to the roll call room in which to conduct the interviews. 
Interviews in Syracuse were slightly less private in that no separate room was designated 
for conducting interviews. They were held in a common area outside several private offices. 
Interviewers stayed several hours into each shift, leaving only after they determined they 
had exhausted the willing interviewee pool.
Wave 1 yielded thirty-one completed interviews in Syracuse and sixteen in Schenectady. 
Respondents in both sites were fairly well distributed between patrol officers and sergeants: 
61 and 62 percent patrol officers in Syracuse and Schenectady, respectively. We completed 
fourteen wave 2 interviews in Syracuse and twenty-six in Schenectady. Despite the fact that 
we used the same process in each wave to recruit subjects, the breakdown of officers and 
sergeants was very different in wave 2, compared to wave 1; the wave 2 sample was predomi-
nantly comprised of patrol officers (86 percent and 81 percent in Syracuse and Schenectady, 
respectively).
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C OMMANDER INTERVIEWS
In Schenectady we interviewed the three lieutenants who commanded the department’s 
patrol platoons, as well as the three lieutenants who commanded the Investigative Services 
Bureau. In Syracuse we interviewed each of the three platoon captains and the lieuten-
ant in charge of the department’s Crime Reduction Team. The semi-structured instrument 
included items on performance expectations for subordinates, perspective on their depart-
ment’s Compstat process and their own role in it, their understanding and opinion of the 
department’s effort to systematically measure and incorporate information on citizens’ as-
sessments of police performance into the Compstat process, and what steps they had taken 
to direct attention to customer service.
SCHENECTADY OBSERVATIONS
Our observers coded 539 encounters from among those that we sampled and obtained re-
cordings from the Schenectady police. Table 9 below charts the similarities and differences 
among the population of incidents we sampled for observation, the sample, the set of inci-
dents for which we obtained recordings, and the set of incidents that were coded by both 
observers.
In chapter 6, we discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages of observing po-
lice-citizen encounters after-the-fact through audio and video recordings. Here we assess 
our observers’ capacity to detect what transpires in the sampled police-citizen encounters.
Table 10 shows the frequencies with which observers were able to see and identify the 
primary citizens and the primary officers. Each of 539 coded incidents appear twice in the 
table, once for each observer. Primary officers were identifiable most (94 percent) of the 
time, whether they were visible on camera or not. Primary citizens were also identifiable 
most (83 percent) of the time, though not quite so often as primary officers. Across all 539 
incidents, both observers were able to identify the primary citizen in 417, while in 63 neither 
observer was able to identify the primary citizen; in the remaining 59 incidents, one but not 
the other observer judged that s/he was able to identify the primary citizen.
Table 11 shows the estimated proportions of the audio that was unintelligible, for inci-
dents in which both observers could identify the primary citizen, in which neither could 
do so, and in which only one could do so. In the median encounter 20 percent of the audio 
was unintelligible, and in less than 15 percent of the encounters, two-thirds or more of the 
incident’s audio was unintelligible. Poor audio quality seems not to have seriously impaired 
observers’ capacity to identify primary citizens, however; even with one-third or less of the 
audio, both observers identified the primary citizen in two-thirds of the encounters.
We prompted each observer to estimate the level of his/her confidence in the coding of 
each encounter, using the categories that form the columns of table 12.6 Overall, observers 
had a great deal of confidence in their coding: in 47 percent of the encounters the observer 
had complete confidence in the coding, and in 35 percent the observer was “mostly” con-
fident. But as table 12 shows, the observers’ confidence falls as the proportion of the audio 
that is unintelligible rises. Table 12 also cross-tabulates observers’ confidence in their coding 
by whether the primary officer and primary citizen, respectively, is visible and/or identifi-
able. When the primary officer and primary citizen are identifiable, confidence is fairly high 
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 Arrests 21.7% 34.8% 26.4% 27.1%
 Calls 73.9% 57.6% 65.4% 64.2%
 Field interviews 4.4% 7.6% 8.2% 8.7%
Wave
 Baseline + (1–12) 33.3% 32.0% 34.9% 33.8%
 1st quarter (13–18) 16.8% 17.2% 18.1% 19.1%
 2nd quarter (19–24) 16.6% 18.4% 15.9% 16.0%
 3rd quarter (25–30) 16.7% 15.8% 16.4% 17.1%
 4th quarter (31–36) 16.7% 16.6% 14.8% 14.1%
Patrol area**
 1 18.0% 18.3% 9.9% 7.7%
 2 6.9% 6.7% 7.1% 6.7%
 3 16.0% 16.3% 17.3% 17.1%
 4 13.0% 12.8% 13.9% 14.4%
 5 16.1% 16.7% 17.9% 19.2%
 6 5.0% 4.1% 4.9% 5.0%
 7 15.9% 15.4% 18.7% 18.8%
 8 9.0% 9.4% 10.2% 11.2%
Platoon
 Midnight–8 a.m. 18.6% 21.9% 21.3% 20.6%
 8 a.m.–4 p.m. 39.3% 34.0% 32.7% 31.5%
 4 p.m.–midnight 42.1% 44.0% 46.0% 47.9%
Calls: Problem type
 Violent crime 2.5% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0%
 Other personal crime 2.7% 2.3% 1.2% 0.9%
 Public nuisance 14.7% 13.7% 13.0% 12.1%
 Other assistance 11.1% 9.9% 8.5% 7.2%
 Traffic 16.2% 16.9% 16.7% 17.1%
 Nonviolent crime 29.3% 29.3% 31.1% 31.8%
 Dependent person 3.7% 3.8% 5.0% 5.2%
 Interpersonal conflict 14.3% 15.2% 16.7% 17.9%
 Suspicious circumstance 3.8% 3.3% 2.8% 2.9%
 Unknown 1.6% 3.5% 2.8% 2.6%
 Medical 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Arrests: charge level
 Felony 11.0% 10.4% 7.6% 6.8%
 Misdemeanor 67.7% 67.9% 71.9% 76.0%














 Violation 12.8% 13.4% 14.0% 12.3%
 Infraction/other 8.5% 8.2% 6.4% 4.8%
Arrests: type 
 Complaint 24.6% 23.6% 29.2% 30.8%
 Crime in progress 24.4% 26.0% 34.5% 35.6%
 Arrest warrant 25.9% 24.7% 9.4% 6.8%
 Bench warrant 12.3% 12.1% 8.2% 5.5%
 Summons 12.8% 13.7% 18.7% 21.2%
Arrests: disposition
 Held 56.2% 54.5% 50.3% 48.6%
 Released 4.9% 5.2% 6.4% 7.5%
 Appearance ticket 38.7% 40.0% 43.3% 43.8%
 Other 0.3% 0.3% 0% 0%
Arrests: race/ethnicity 
 White 55.1% 56.2% 52.6% 52.7%
 Black 28.5% 27.1% 28.7% 26.7%
 Hispanic 7.4% 7.4% 9.4% 10.3%
 Other 9.0% 9.3% 9.4% 10.3%
Arrests: sex 
 Male 66.2% 66.6% 68.4% 69.9%
 Female 33.8% 33.4% 31.6% 30.1%
Field interviews: race/ethnicity 
 White 36.2% 36.2% 35.8% 36.2%
 Black 45.0% 45.0% 41.5% 40.4%
 Hispanic 5.0% 5.0% 3.8% 4.3%
 Other 13.8% 13.8% 18.9% 19.1%
Field interviews: sex 
 Male 72.5% 72.5% 75.5% 74.5%
 Female 27.5% 27.5% 24.5% 25.5%
* Four cases were inadvertently excluded from the sampling
** Excludes 133 cases in the survey population with missing data
whether the primary officer or citizen is visible or not; confidence declines substantially 
when one or both cannot be identified. It appears that the recorded audio is more important 
for these purposes than the video.7
Overall, observers were completely or mostly confident in their coding when the po-
lice-citizen interaction was audible and, mainly as a consequence, they could identify the 
primary citizen and also determine what transpired. In general the audio was fairly good, 
Table 10 Visibility and Identifiability of Primary Citizen and Primary Officer
Primary Citizen
Primary Officer
Visible and  
identifiable
Not visible/NA but 
identifiable
Not visible/NA and 
not identifiable
Totals
Visible and identifiable 333 200 103 636
Not visible but identifiable 38 279 55 372
Visible but not identifiable 7 14 13 34
Not visible and not identifiable 10 12 14 36
Totals 388 505 185 1,078
Table 11 Identification of Primary Citizen and Unintelligible Audio
Observers Who Could Identify the Primary Citizen
Percentage of audio unintelligible Neither One Both Totals
0–10 26 (26%) 33 (34.4%) 228 (37.3%) 287 (35.5%)
11–25 16 (16%) 17 (17.7%) 144 (23.5%) 177 (21.9%)
26–49 13 (13%) 15 (15.6%) 85 (13.9%) 113 (14.0%)
50–67 22 (22%) 15 (15.6%) 80 (13.1%) 117 (14.5%)
68–89 17 (17%) 10 (10.4%) 54 (8.8%) 81 (10.0%)
90–99 6 (6%) 6 (6.2%) 21 (3.4%) 33 (4.1%)
Table 12 Observers’ Confidence in Coding
Level of Confidence in Coding
Completely Mostly Fairly A little Not at all Total N
Percentage of audio unintelligible
0–10 70.6% 26.3% 2.4% 0.4% 0.4% 255
11–25 45.6% 41.9% 9.4% 2.5% 0.6% 160
26–49 27.4% 51.6% 18.9% 2.1% 0.0% 95
50–67 6.9% 45.1% 36.3% 10.8% 1.0% 102
68–89 7.5% 32.8% 34.3% 23.9% 1.5% 67
90–99 9.1% 18.2% 54.5% 9.1% 9.1% 22
Primary Officer Visible and/or Identifiable
Visible and identifiable 51.2% 32.2% 11.8% 3.9% 0.9% 543
Not visible but identifiable 44.9% 40.9% 10.2% 3.7% 0.3% 323
Visible but not identifiable 18.5% 29.6% 48.1% 0 3.7% 27
Not visible and not identifiable 20.8% 41.7% 25.0% 12.5% 0 24
Primary Citizen Visible and/or Identifiable
Visible and identifiable 55.5% 28.7% 11.8% 3.4% 0.6% 321
Not visible but identifiable 46.8% 39.8% 9.5% 3.7% 0.2% 432
Not visible/NA and not identifiable 32.3% 37.2% 22.6% 5.5% 2.4% 164
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with 80 percent of the typical incident audible. There is no doubt that information about 
the interaction—about what citizens and officers said to one another—is lost as a result of 
observers’ inability to hear portions of that interaction, and that appears to be more impor-
tant than the visual information that is sacrificed by relying on in-car cameras. That loss of 
information can be expected to bias our measures of procedural justice downward, and to 
that degree, this truncated variation will attenuate our estimates of the strength of relation-
ships at the margin.
Another perspective on the effectiveness with which observers could detect the features 
of police-citizen interaction is the number of items on the protocol that they deemed “not 
determinable,” which was a listed option for most of the items. In nearly half of the inci-
dents, none of the eighty-eight items concerning the interaction of the primary citizen with 
the primary officer was characterized as not determinable, and in more than three-quarters 
of the incidents, only two or fewer items were not determinable; see table 13. Observers’ 
ability to make determinations turned to a large degree on the quality of the audio. As 
table 13 shows, the number of not-determinable items rises with the proportion of the audio 
that is unintelligible.8
Our analysis was confined to encounters in which both observers identified the primary 
citizen, and which were not discarded because our review showed that the respondent told 
us about an incident other than the sampled incident. The first of those two criteria excludes 
122 encounters and the second excludes six. The 411 encounters that meet these criteria are 
the encounters in the validity and reliability of whose measures we can place the greatest 
confidence. Among these encounters (822 sets of codes), the observer was mostly or com-
pletely confident in the coding in nearly three-quarters, and in more than 85 percent they 
used a not determinable code fewer than four times.
Table 13 Items Coded “Not Determinable”
Number of items Total
Percentage of audio unintelligible
0–10 11–25 26–49 50–67 68–89 90–99
0 47.1% 45.3% 45.2% 37.2% 33.3% 40.7% 36.4%
1 18.4% 24.4% 17.5% 11.5% 17.1% 7.4% 6.1%
2 12.7% 15.7% 15.3% 21.2% 11.1% 3.7% 3.0%
3–5 11.9% 10.5% 14.7% 21.2% 20.5% 9.9% 3.0%
6–10 5.1% 3.1% 4.0% 8.0% 9.4% 9.8% 9.1%
11–20 2.9% 1.0% 2.3% 0.9% 6.0% 12.3% 18.2%
21–30 1.3% 0 0.6% 0 2.6% 4.9% 15.2%
>30 0.6% 0 0.6% 0 0 1.2% 9.1%
Total N 1,078 287 177 113 117 81 33
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1 THE PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE MODEL AS REFORM
1. State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson, Transcript of Grand Jury, 5: 197ff.
2. Ibid., 4: 17ff.
3. Four decades of research on the public’s attitudes toward the police has yielded sev-
eral consistent findings, though much remains a mystery. See, e.g., Brandl et al. 1994; Dean 
1980; Dunham and Alpert 1988; Frank et al. 1996; Furstenberg and Wellford 1973; Jacob 1971; 
Miller et al. 2004; Parks 1984; Reisig and Parks 2000; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Sampson and 
Bartusch 1998; Scaglion and Condon 1980; Skogan 2005; Smith and Hawkins 1973; Weitzer 
1999, 2000a, 2000b; Weitzer and Tuch 1999, 2005.
4. See, e.g., Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1987, 1988, 1990, 2005; Tyler and Folger 1980; 
Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler et al. 1985.
2  POLICE DEPARTMENT S AS INSTITUTIONALIZED ORGANIZ ATIONS
1. See, in general, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 2014. On police particularly, see Crank 
1994, 2003, Crank and Langworthy 1992, Mastrofski and Uchida 1993.
2. Personnel levels are dynamic, of course, and by 2011, fiscal pressures had reduced 
staffing somewhat. We use the 2007 numbers because they allow us to place the study de-
partments in the national context, using the LEMAS data.
3. Syracuse Citizen Review Board by-laws, p. 2; www.syrgov.net/uploadedFiles/City_
Hall/CRB/CRB%20by-laws%202012.pdf, accessed November 14, 2016.
4. Compstat-like mechanisms have gone by different names in departments that have 
adopted them. With due respect for the Syracuse Police Department, we will use the 
more generic “Compstat” to refer to the management accountability structure in that 
department.
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210    Notes
5. See, e.g., Jim Bueermann’s comments on the procedures for traffic stops in Redlands 
in Tyler 2009.
3  POLICE LEGITIMACY
1. www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm, accessed November 15, 
2016.
2. www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_5.htm, accessed November 15, 
2016.
3. www.gallup.com/poll/163055/confidence-institutions-2013-pdf.aspx, accessed 
November 15, 2016.
4. One of us once heard a police chief remark on the likely effects on the attitudes of 
children when they see the police take their father away in handcuffs.
5. Some research suggests that parental influences on political attitudes may be partly 
genetic. See Alford et al. 2005; Hatemi et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2012.
6. We include here even respondents to the police services survey who did not have 
direct contact with officers—that is, whose calls for assistance were handled over the phone.
7. As Michael Lipsky (1980) points out, even calls for service are nonvoluntary in the 
sense that citizens do not have alternatives from which to choose: if they want police 
assistance, the agency that serves their jurisdiction is a monopoly provider.
8. Most (79 percent) of the respondents who were sampled from among arrests, and 
who were taken into custody, reported to interviewers that they had been arrested. But 
of those who were released in the field, on their own recognizance or with an appearance 
ticket, only 39 percent reported that they had been arrested; much of the disparity we would 
attribute to the respondents’ misunderstanding.
9. Factor analyses of the key informant survey data also yield a trust factor comprised 
of the trust items and one identification item: I am proud of the work of the S__ police. The 
other identification items, however, formed a second factor. The public accountability items 
(listed in table 5) also loaded on the trust factor.
10. All four of the obligation items on the survey loaded on a single factor, but the inclu-
sion of the fourth in a scale degraded the reliability of the scale. That fourth item was the 
statement “There are times when it is okay to ignore what the police tell you to do.”
4  PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE IN CITIZENS’  SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the denominators for percentages include “don’t know” 
responses and refusals, which comprise the balance of the percentages not shown in the ta-
bles in this chapter. All of the results for procedural justice reported in this chapter exclude 
respondents whose requests for assistance were handled over the phone or who otherwise 
had no face-to-face contact with police.
2. Differences in the sampling strategies across these surveys make us very cautious 
in drawing comparisons, and they are offered only to place the Schenectady and Syracuse 
results in a broader context. Chicago residents were surveyed in 2003; those who reportedly 
had a contact with Chicago police in the preceding twelve months were asked a series of 
questions about that contact (see Skogan 2006). Residents of five New York City precincts 
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were surveyed in 2001–2; those who reportedly had a contact with NYPD were asked ques-
tions about that contact (see Miller et al. 2003). The National Police Research Platform 
conducted surveys of people who had one of three kinds of contacts with any of three agen-
cies: the Oak Park (IL) police; the River Forest (IL) police; and the Boston police. The three 
kinds of contacts included reported crimes, reported traffic accidents, and traffic stops. See 
Rosenbaum et al. 2011.
3. We exclude from this analysis respondents who reportedly did not interact directly 
with officers.
4. A factor analysis of these nine items yields a single factor with an eigenvalue (6.00) 
greater than 1. With one exception (explained actions), the factor coefficients are all above 0.80.
5. 2 = very favorable; 1 = somewhat favorable; -1 = somewhat unfavorable; and -2 = very 
unfavorable. Don’t know and not applicable responses were coded 0. This simple, additive 
index correlates at 0.99 with the scale formed by weighting the items in proportion with 
their factor coefficients, and so we use the more readily interpreted additive scale. The scale 
has a high level of reliability, with an alpha of 0.93.
6. See Whitaker 1982.
7. This difference does not hold when the analysis focuses on only those who were ar-
rested. That it does not could be an artifact of the survey design, which posed questions 
about searches only of respondents who were reportedly stopped by the police. But in 
40 percent of the arrest cases, the respondent indicated neither that police stopped him/
her nor that s/he contacted police, but rather that police contacted him/her for some rea-
son (mainly when a third party called police). For these latter cases we lack survey data on 
searches, and so the survey data understate the prevalence of searches among all police-
citizen contacts.
6  PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE IN POLICE ACTION
1. The same challenges arise even when only two rather than four elements of proce-
dural justice—quality of decision-making and quality of treatment—are differentiated.
2. For further discussion of the technique of systematic social observation, see Mas-
trofski et al. 1998; Mastrofski, Parks, and McCluskey 2010; Worden and McLean 2014a; 
Worden, McLean, and Bonner 2015.
3. Previous instruments provided for measures of police “manner,” but to our knowl-
edge no one has analyzed this construct.
4. Nearly 90 percent of the police disrespect “involved at least one act of commission (a 
statement or gesture) as opposed to one of omission (ignoring a query).” Other factors that 
affected police disrespect included: the citizen’s lack of self-control (in the form of intoxica-
tion, emotional distress, or mental disorder), and the citizen’s social status (sex, age, class).
5. Unfortunately for us, their study was published after our observation instruments 
had been finalized and observations were more than half-completed.
6. They subsequently conducted similar observations in a second research site; see Mas-
trofski et al. 2016.
7. Six observers performed this work. We began with four, two of whom were under-
graduate students, one white male and one white female, both of them majoring in psychol-
ogy. The other two of the original four observers were graduate students, one (a Hispanic 
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female) at the dissertation stage of a Ph.D. in criminal justice, and one (a white female) at 
the dissertation stage of a Ph.D. in sociology. When they returned to school at the end of the 
summer, the two undergraduates were replaced by a graduate student (a white female) who 
was finishing a master’s degree in criminal justice, and an undergraduate (a white male) 
majoring in criminal justice. Incidents were assigned randomly to observers such that each 
observer was paired with others across his/her caseload. Ultimately, the individual observ-
ers each coded 123 to 243 encounters.
8. We adapted existing CATI software, originally developed under BJS auspices, to this 
data-entry application.
9. Four of the 1,800 incidents were inadvertently omitted from the sampling frame for 
drawing the observation sample.
10. Five of these were the original arrests in the field that eventuated, following the issu-
ance of a bench warrant, in the citizen later turning himself in at the desk; both events are 
assigned the same incident number in the record management system, but it was the latter 
included in our sample.
11. The only study of which we are aware that has compared observational data to an-
other type of data on the same incidents is Parks 1984, which analyzed the degree to which 
observers and citizens agreed about the actions of the police.
12. One recent study, in Rialto, CA, found that when officers were randomly assigned 
to wear body cameras, they were less likely to use force, which was interpreted as a social 
desirability effect of the video surveillance; see Farrar 2014 and Ariel et al. 2014. In Sche-
nectady, however, officers are as a daily matter of course recorded.
13. The department’s general order concerning the in-car video system provides that 
“platoon commanders may request to review a recording” (emphasis added); it also pro-
vides that the supervisor of the Office of Professional Standards “shall” periodically review 
recordings. One rough gauge of the extent to which cameras have altered officers’ behavior 
is the incidence of secondary arrests, i.e., arrests that include charges for resisting arrest, as-
sault on a police officer, or obstructing governmental administration. These are the kinds of 
charges that are associated with the (proper or improper) use of force by police. In calendar 
year 2002, 147 arrests involved one or more such charges. In 2004, the year after cameras 
were installed, 183 arrests involved one or more such charges, and the corresponding counts 
for 2005 and 2006 are 218 and 196, respectively—more, not fewer, than the year preceding 
cameras. During the eighteen months of the police services survey, there were 381 arrests 
with one or more such charges, a rate of 254 annually. Another rough gauge of changes in 
officer behavior is the frequency with which arrest reports indicate that the arrestee was 
injured. In 2002, 23 arrestees were injured at the time of arrest; in 2003, 56 were injured, and 
in 2004 and 2005, 66 and 59 were injured, respectively.
14. This interpretation of officers’ use of police authority differs from some. For example, 
Paternoster et al. 1997 treated both handcuffing and other uses of physical force as reverse 
indicators of procedural justice, on the assumption that they amount to information about 
the status of the citizen against whom these actions were taken. Yet the same logic was not 
extended to the act of taking a citizen into custody—arrest. By treating the use of police 
authority, in its various forms, as distinct variables rather than incorporating them into the 
measure of procedural justice (or injustice), we can isolate the factors about which there is 
theoretical ambiguity.
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15. We also exclude six cases in which both observers identified the primary citizen, 
but our review of the details of these cases showed that the citizen referenced a different 
incident in responding to the survey. We considered including in the analysis the cases in 
which only one observer identified the primary citizen, but insofar as the behavioral scales 
are less reliable for these cases, their inclusion would tend to deflate the estimated empirical 
relationships; the scale scores in these cases were systematically lower than those of cases in 
which both observers identified the primary citizen.
16. The intra-class correlation (ICC) is commonly used as a measure of inter-rater re-
liability; see Hallgren 2012. We estimated ICCs for scale scores averaged across the two 
observers.
17. Most of the procedural justice that we detected on this dimension was in officers ask-
ing what happened, listening, and paying attention, and seldom in requesting/suggesting/
persuading the citizen to do anything other than provide information.
18. We resolved the ambiguity of explanation as a component of procedural justice—it 
could be treated as a manifestation of neutrality or trustworthy motives—somewhat ar-
bitrarily. The measure of neutrality is comprised only of explanation, so on that subscale 
explanation cannot be confused with other actions.
19. Sometimes no explanation is necessary. When no explanation was offered, whether 
or not anything called for explanation, no addition to the scales is made. Instead we account 
for the inapplicability of explanation, from the citizen’s perspective, in an analysis of subjec-
tive experience (see chapter 7).
20. Derogatory comments were defined in the coding instructions as “words, expres-
sions or gestures that are socially interpreted as insulting, rude, vulgar, obscene, disparaging 
or belittling.” Disrespect “ . . . can include a variety of verbal statements: calling the officer 
names, making derogatory statements about the officer or his family, making disparaging or 
belittling remarks, slurs (racial, sexual, lifestyle). Ignoring the officer’s commands or ques-
tions also constitutes disrespect. If the citizen is argumentative, the citizen may or may not 
be disrespectful, depending on how it was done. If the citizen disagrees with the officer or 
questions/objects to his actions but does so in a polite tone-then do not code this citizen as 
disrespectful. However, if the citizen speaks loudly or interrupts the officer, then code this 
as disrespectful. Certain gestures and actions are to be coded as disrespectful. ‘Flipping the 
bird’ (displaying the 2nd finger in the direction of the police), obscene gestures, spitting in 
the presence of an officer (even if not in the direction of the officer).”
21. The inclusion of a control for incidents in which no explanation was necessary had 
no bearing on the results, and the coefficient was substantively and statistically insignifi-
cant. It is not shown in the tabular results.
7  CITIZENS’  SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND POLICE ACTION
1. Among the observed arrests, we have too few felonies, violations, and appearance 
tickets to estimate separate effects for each, so felonies and misdemeanors were combined 
in a single dummy variable, appearance tickets and releases were combined in a single vari-
able, and violations together with infractions form the reference category for charge seri-
ousness. In addition, a small handful of calls classified as other or unknown were included 
with the much more numerous nuisance calls to form the reference category.
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2. We operationalized searches in terms of observational and survey data; if either 
source indicated that a search was conducted, we treated it as a search.
3. We reestimated the parameters of these models after excluding any case in which (a) 
both coders were either “not at all confident” in their coding or only “a little confident,” or 
(b) one coder was “fairly confident” and the other coder was “a little confident” or less confi-
dent. We thus excluded just six cases. All of the results were similar to those reported in the 
table. We also added a control for instances in which no explanation for the officers’ actions 
was considered necessary, which had no substantively or statistically significant effect and 
whose inclusion did not alter the estimated effects of other variables.
4. Additional analysis that distinguishes among forms of resistance suggests that it is 
passive resistance that accounts for most of this relationship.
5. Call for service codes, based on the information that call-takers elicit from callers, of-
ten differ from classifications of incidents based on more complete information. See Klinger 
and Bridges 1997.
8  PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE AND MANAGEMENT AC C OUNTABILIT Y
1. Some officers, we discovered, are vaguely aware of research that reported (or is widely 
thought to have found) that a “friendly” demeanor puts officers at risk of getting killed (U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 1992), which was widely disseminated through training/
workshops across the United States.
9  PRO CEDUR AL JUSTICE AND STREET-LEVEL SENSEMAKING
1. Maguire and Katz (2002) applied this same approach to the community policing 
movement in the United States.
10  REFLECTIONS ON POLICE REFORM
1. The effects of prior attitudes do not appear to be mediated very much by forms of 
citizen behavior—i.e., resistance or disrespect—that elicit behavior by police that citizens 
experience as procedurally unjust.
2. These approaches are described in National Research Council 2004, chapter 8.
3. That is, these officers emphasize law enforcement as their occupational role and es-
pouse an aggressive approach that also allows for occasional violations of civil liberties; they 
also hold negative attitudes toward both the citizenry and police supervisors.
METHOD OLO GICAL APPENDIX
1. For some of those whom interviewers were unable to contact, we had what proved 
to be a number that was not in service. But for most (82 percent), interviewers’ inability to 
make contact was a result of unanswered calls.
2. We caution readers against comparing the departments with one another, since the 
call type codes and communications practices differ across the departments.
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3. The main indications that we may have a mismatched event stem from a comparison 
of the respondent’s description of how the contact began against the contact subpopulation 
from which the incident was sampled (calls for service, arrests, stops/field interviews). We 
identified three types of potential errors: (1) incidents that were sampled from (presump-
tive) stops, but the respondent said that the contact began when s/he contacted the police; 
(2) incidents sampled from arrest records, but the respondent said that the contact began 
when s/he contacted the police; (3) incidents sampled from CAD records, but the respon-
dent said that the contact began because the respondent was stopped—while in a car or on 
foot—by the police.
4. Respondents fell out between waves 1 and 2 when one nonrespondent contacted in 
wave 1 asked to be removed from the mailing, and one additional prospective respondent 
fell out between waves 2 and 3 when an e-mail bounced back.
5. One key informant whom we contacted in wave 1 asked to be removed from the e-
mail distribution list, and the remainder fell out due to bad e-mail addresses.
6. This item was added to the coding protocol after coding got under way and so it is 
missing for 161 of the 1,078 cases.
7. Needless to say, both video and audio would be preferred to one or the other. But 
these results suggest that the lack of video in some cases is not a crucial factor.
8. The item about unintelligible audio was added to the coding protocol partway into 
the coding, and so it is missing for 270 of the 1,078 coded incidents.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE  | CRIMINOLOGY
In the United States, the exercise of police authority—and the public’s trust that police 
authority is used properly—is a recurring concern. Contemporary prescriptions for 
police reform hold that the public would trust the police more and feel a greater obli-
gation to comply and cooperate if police-citizen interactions were marked by higher 
levels of procedural justice by police. In this book, Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. 
McLean argue that the procedural justice model of reform is a mirage. From a distance, 
procedural justice seems to offer relief from strained police-community relations. But 
a closer look at police organizations and police-citizen interactions shows that the 
relief offered by such reform is, in fact, illusory. A procedural justice model of policing 
is likely to be only loosely coupled with police practice, despite the best intentions, 
and improvements in procedural justice on the part of police are unlikely to result in 
corresponding improvements in citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice.
“Rigorous and thoughtful, this book’s careful methodology and provocative conclusions 
on procedural justice illuminate key challenges for political leaders, policy makers, and 
practitioners who strive to improve police-community relations in America. A must-
read for police researchers!” STEVEN MASTROFSKI, George Mason University
“This timely book challenges widespread assumptions about procedural justice. It pro-
vides a potent reminder that much remains to be learned about how people form 
perceptions of the police, and how police agencies can influence these percep-
tions.” EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, Arizona State University
“Since Ferguson, the nation has been searching for solutions to the legitimacy crisis 
that has engulfed policing. Procedural justice was the number one reform put forward 
by President Obama’s commission. This book digs into this proposal and provides 
the best evidence to date on how it actually affects police behavior and public accep-
tance of being policed.” WESLEY G. SKOGAN, Northwestern University
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crash in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Photo 
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